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CHk"TER I
'mE

QUESTI~

It. philosophy

r;

atIENTATI~

IN

ARI~TOTIE 'S

PHILOOOPHI OF MAN

ot man seeks insight. into the ac tiona and experiences that

make up the var.iegated total which is oalled human lite.

It seeks to realize

a unity in the multiplioity which human life presents, to projeot or discover
structure in what is otherwise only a serie. of happenin88 wi thout ultimate
shape or s1gn1t1oanee.
f>Om kind of order

is never wholly absent from human acts.

The !lK)st

minute aots, acts of the least duration or importanoe, exhibl t real meanings

and purposes beh1nd their varieUes.

Men are continually employing various

standards, at leut 1.mpllcit,q and unref'l.eot1ngly, in their daily activity, and
in this they reveal attitude. toward reality.

The patterns which result trom

an interplay ot suoh IOOtivations are simply part ot the actuality of
., human

experience.

It is these that form the subjeot matter of a philosophy' ot man

and are the starting point of its investig.t1ona.
Philosophy Meles to discover the patterns latent in _n's acUons and
powers, and the basic aims that reveal tbem8elve8 in _n's reasons for do1ng
what they do.

Thus ph110sopb¥ uy seek a formal or a teleological

at last the truth or good tJ1at it seeks 1s the same.

tmit\l", but

to lcDow how hum.aft lite

A 8 tructuring of human life has truth

!unotions when it is in world.ng order.

when it expre8ses a _aning that corresponds to the variety of human experience

and illuminates it.

This structure is an expression of a uni'V'eraal and
1

2

totalistng order in human th1nga, the h1erarch1zatlon ot all that 1s found in
human action and experience around the good wb1cb the exain&tlon discloses,

to

develop 1t and tulf11 1 t.
The Hlcomaohean

I!e!4C6

unity in human Ute.

or Aristotle seeks to give expression to such a

Its focus is malrLb" teleolog1oalJ that ls, the 8t1"aott:m1t

1t reveals 1s in terma ot purpose 1n buItan action, ot ends prox1mate and
ulti_te. of £ultilMnt of oapacities or powers found 1n the lmman person.

finaUsr:t 1s the mettvd

COIIIlOn to

a great part of Aristotle's s18temaUc

pb11osopb,y, and in terms ot it Aristotleta treatises t.1nd whateftr over-el1
un1ty they have.

This 18 t.rne ot the

~Y!'!!oloR and

the f!v!lc!J :I. t 1.

e.poclallQ t.rue of tbe ¥!!!P!g:s1cs, where a l008e ..nea of analyaea ga1na a

suggeetlve but attenuated sort of UBity tram Al"1atotlAt'. almoet incidental.
an&b'si8 of t1na11t7ot .,t.1on in the tm1verse, the 1naert.ed Book

earUer tbaolog_ The

IW~,

J\. of

btB

howIirt'er, with a aubjeot-lDatter lea. 't'Ut,

manapa to realJ... a completer unity, but .t111 on th1a baais of t1nallt7.

•

,

.

1

3
The

EtrhiC8
10
PI

not a treatise independent ot Aristotle's other works..

(Ethics is ~ part,

stands in need of completion h,' the treat.1ae an Pol1t.1.cs.
,~:~

It

the larger topic ot llfe in society, wh10b the Pol1t1oa in its proper sense
I

t

oOl1\Tehttnds.) Furthe:rmore its !1.nellstic structure. dart. mat\V of their principle.

troL1

analyses which Aristotle haa made in athol' P!U"t8 of hts system

ot

teaching and which came to be embodiod in other treatises. Tlms the Ethics p
It

supposes many ot tho obaonaUms ot human activity wh1ch Aristotle

ineozoporated in

~.8

iWtorlc. It presupposes IIIlCh of the anal.ys1a of

pOWl'S iIfhlch waa eventualq incorporawd in p~ of the

does the

fH.comac~

!tb1ee

field of a ph1loaoptu ot

stand by 1 t&elt as Aristotle's

man. For

example, the dialog

~

!'NS1!:tloq.
on4r work 1n

lor
the

Protl'epttcup and the

Eudemian Ethica, of Ariatotle's Platon1c and transitional perl.oda

re8P8Ct1ve~,

are %'9preeentat11'9 of the author's earlier attempts to t1nd urdt;y in bums1
MUons. The

llicomac~ _E.th1~C8_ thus

atUl gains in intelligibility- when it 18

setm in tha context of the rest of the CtOrpwt Ar1stotolloum and in its place in

the h18torical. davelop1l8llt of Ar'1stoUe'a te~hf.np.2

Dut. beyond the.. expl1cl t 01" nearl,;r expl1al t presupposl ti(')Q8 of the
~nt

ot the Eth1ce.-presupposl t.1.ons wbtch 11e out of sight onl.7 in the

prosent. uork hut open to vie... in the author., statements 1n other parts ot bis
m-i t1n..~xiste tho whole body of those presuv,?ostt1ans wh1ch Aristotle seems

not. to have

~.

TIle order of bu'Ir.lan aot.i.ons wh1ch A:r1stotle propoaea 1n tho Et.b1.ca wUl be
~ful

Ol\l;r in l.1ght of buraarl natut'G as 1. t enata in Artstotle's 'tlDder-

standing of itJ that is, it depends on the i.lmGr etructuN ot human nature aa
Ari.stotle sees 11,. But t.h1.s bierercb;r

ot powers and valUGS w1tbf.n human nat'Ul'e

owes all ita order in Jr1stotle •• Wldentandl.ng 'to aome mom bas1c huual val_

ao the

~

of aU

o~ bU1UIl

val._. Th18 standard 1n t.urrl aaat bold 1 til

place 1n a cons1atent \1Ddentl:Dd1ng of the urd.vene of u;per1G1l08 or must be

tlle beat. of 8UCh an UDde.retMldSna. Yet the Ye'Il'3' gl'O\D18 on wh10h nch a
1I1der order . . . do t.beEelws

bp~

a r1nal or1elltatlon in the m1nd of the

th1nlcer, an .1;.11'.ude.

1ft ot.her WOI'da, ewry d8Lnation of P.tt.erna or ata'ldard8 lmpl1ea a JIIOJ.'e
tmdamlmtal standard Which in tm'rl 81 ther 1s accepted w1 tbout eza:1 natJ.Cl'l, or
18

.-.tned tu:rt.her but not w1t.bout

l.eavi.ftg ~ 1fwela

of the quea\lCID J'ltf

8tr1.~ htstor1cal AristoteJiaD poa1 tlona. .....fhe preatJnt, study see:ks onl¥ to
examine tho phllo$ophical orientation of t.he author of the B1comaeman . '
whoever he 1fU, Whether Ar1etotle as u.dit1on baa tt, ar, D' !S&ii'.
•
Pl."OVd CQ~, '1'heophrastlUJ. S1nce tho work e'ND 1n th1s later theory 1s
811lU attrtbttted to a s1ngl$ man, aDd the . . . man to 1dlom the other M1n
AristoteUan wr1t1nga a:re also to b. ucrtbod, tho question of the phUosopl'(yf.
authorsb:tp is related to the preaent historiCal. studT of the phUosophioal
dootn.ne but does not intrinsically aflact an 'UIldentand1ng of it.•

to be touched.

In a1 ther case a 11ne of reflecting on pr1nciples

certain depth of its GYJIl, then S'tops at that dopt.b.
su~pODedly',

not fltop whot'o he does.
c:,-:porter£c9, and

CnrI"'J

The l>bilosophor,

1.t daaper I other philosophers at least nee

For countless areas of dit.tarence in na.tural endotr..1allt

espceial~l',

histor1oal perspective, equip oach philosopher

tor the reflections 00 wUl

quoations:

to ..

couU oartj the cxm.t1.nation dEropar th.an he evar actually does) or

11.' he 1s prcctically unable to

uni'1ooi,y

gOGS

rcak8.

low penpectives raise nevI'

tJBy seek broader un1 ties I they requ1..re deeper probit.gs 1n.to the

8l1,)1-,osl tiOll8 of 110' giwn question and

Such is the purpose

ot

anmre:r.

the pr'eMnt atttt.V J

st..'""Uetur1rJ.g of bumatl 11te, and to do so

n.ame4rI

to O%Mi M

nth a view to mald.ng

Ar1stotle'.

axplic1t t.he

standards on which that structure dcpenda.
Aristotle.s retlect10na on tba un1ty of
goals, :find expreNion in his use
• r

ot

~

Ute. its expertoncos and

the tAX'lIl ba.pp1nen (

-edciayuov/o..- ).'

La

I

'ct. Roam, P. 19O, ttAr1stotl.e accepts trom .the matV" tOO vie.. that tbD
end is filda')-'oJl(a,. The COJ"l'e8pond1ng adjective or~ meant 'watched over
by

a

good

genius', but 1n ord1.nar.1 Greek _age the 1lOrd meana just

good

.fortune, otten with spec1al reterenco to extemal prosper! tor. '!be conventtonal
translation tbapp1ne8. t is unsu!. table in tho Ethl~4J tor Whereas 'bapp1Mss'
mans a state ot teel..1ng, dUter1ng from 'p19uu..~ only by its sugge$t1an of
pormanence. depth, and seren1 1;1. Aristotle 1ns1aw that. ea~at~ov(a -1sa k1nd
of aetiviVJ that it is not s:ny k1nd of pleasure, thought pleasure naturalq
accompani_ it. The more non-commtttal translat.1on twll-be1ngt is t,horetore
be-;,;.tor. If the qneatlon be aslced whether Aristotle mas a hedonist, it 18
bettar to go b7 h.i.s repeated and deliberate ltatemlmt that the end ot Ute 18
activitu rather than b:r his uoe, for want of :1 betwr WON, or ona Wh1ch
augge8ts not action but teellng.u Note also that both eu"daf:,M-ovla and
hill 'piooss suggest by their etymolor,ies an elo!::.1O!lt ot tho advent! t1.ous whioh 18
foreign to AriatotJ.e's conoept..

6

Jlost of the length of Book
examinat10n

~

of the Eth108 i. devoted to a general
•
t.he chief' directi.oM of human action in Ught of the un!\7 wbich

or

the not1otl ot happ1nus introduce. into them.

But. t.b1s noUon appears more in

its ttmotlon of urd.f)1Dg the other subordinate dinctlone than 1n i til own
Ewn Anatot.lets det1n1tlon

ad.gn1t1oance.

!!!!!. "xceU;!noe
lIQ'

d~

ot happ1neas

88

,acUv1!1:

.m &CooN

senu lell to tell what happ1neae 1s in itself than it does to

the lJ.Dee which later clar1t1cationa of it. meal1ng wUl tollow.

At

laut the true slgn1t1canoe of the defin1 tlon carmot 118 Htm until the mean1ng
of act! vi ty and excel.l.enoe have become clear through the extended dtsctuJ810na

ot the reet of the Rth101.
F

I

Purthel' explJ.c1t development. of the idea of happinelS doe. not

the last

ot the

p888age8

1th1~,1

d1reot~

UI'lderatancU.ng

or

unt11

where Al'18t.otJ.e de80rtba that aotlv1ty wbtch

be OOIUJ1dere \be obtet espr•••1Cft ot humatt happ1.neu.

doe. not

OC~

Aga1n, th1a d1Muasion

olarif)' the -metardng ot happ1neasJ yet eo_ ot the author t . ,

the tera can be dnwn from his -t.I"6atment ot the act1vity 1tl
"

wtd.ch be t1nds its ohlet iMtance. lfItarJIId.le in other e_Iter pusagea,
ch1etq in

Boo.

from the rut.

tram

SeYeb

and Ten, he baa contlibuted to dist1ngu1eb!.ng bapp1De••

ot man Is act1on8

by h18 di5cUBslon ot pleUt1.l"e _d 1. ts dlat.t.acti

actinv.
It Jf!Il1' be 0DlJr by 1nd1rect lnterence &om thee. distinctions and . .apUA

cat1cma t.hat OM om uncover the It.andard which give. meaning to AriatOUeI.
&d1.D1t1<m. of happ1DeJa. The _mt.ng does not ext.t in a state

in Aristotlets

mill bTmdlJ.ng

ot the aubject. 11ms the ve17

ot

explioitne••

Gtandam on wh10b he

buea the ohief eonc1ua1ona ot b1a Itbloa rema1ns at leut in tDPl"eplon unde"
tel"ll1lled.

Qle

can pus readily and W1. til a large part of certainty from

1
Aristotle ta explicit .t.atemants to this :t.q>l1clt standard, though. The
prine1ple which Ul'lderl1es the stl'uetun is not very tar from actual exPl101t-

ness, even 1t 11. 1s not tOl'lIula;t.ect.
But. the examination

than th1a.

ot Aristotle's idea of'

happ1ne•• can be c8l"l'1.ed deeper

Q1ce t.he author-• •~ard of happiness has been made expl1c1t

t.ba foregoing exa1.:oat1on. 1t .1.s st.ill possible to seale the

IK)ft

b1

.taa.d&mtmtal

ph1losopb.t.oal or1efttatl00 on 1fhi.oh th18 standard 1 taelt 18 based. Th1e w.U1

amount

to a queatJ.on 1Iby tbe

1fbat there 18 1n h1a genenl

oortteDt of Ar1etotle Is notLon 1·8 8\1Ch as lt la,
~

to pbiloaophiJing that detera1nH for b1m

.uch a etanc!ard.
~ 2!!l!:!?!~

!! thlf

~

then, 1s twofold.

maaninI of happineas 1ft Ar1noUe fa
~Uc1t

Fint, to mat. expl1c1t t.be

!1ooIuc~ EtJl1P!' '

t.bat 18, to dl8COYer

standard by whicb .Ar1atotJ.e j1Jdaea tt. nltiJlat,e

~

of the varl0U8

torma ot hmum activit.)". (This standard, it W\ll be Men, 18 human Ute
patterned by

ordcr~

act1cln and refleot1ve

~f.t

in short, the praaenoe 1Il

man of the Ideal.) Second, to projeot thia etanc!ard on the
deep,~r

or1Emtat1on 1n Aristotle's thought.

bac~

ot

II

(tis or1ontat1oD wU.l appear as

II

focus of phU.osopb1cal attention on the eternal and uncond1tlODad excellence of
P'Q.nt tOl'll and an

attendant 1Dattentlon to tMsubjeot in wh1eh tona ls found.)

Tho upUoitation of Aristotle'. notion of happ1nesa-and tbe pr.l.mar.1 concom of this

8t~

the NLoomaoheap

M:N=9!.

be acbieved by an a:am1naUon of the main passages in

Book

ca., ..blob

treat the not1cm happiness. next of

those passage. 1n Books Seven and 11m whtch develop the

-antnr. of p1euura--a

reaUt,. wbleh IlU8t be car.tully diat1ngu1fJhed from bapp1neas J cd
Book Ten, ot the cultrd.nat1ng chapters of the

'P,;thle,s~

t1nAll1'

1ft

whteh show the activit,' of

8
reflect.iou to ;)E) the highest form of hulaIm happiness.
exam1naUon Will take place respactlvely in Ohapters

theile three SUtpa of the
'l\«),

'!1lree, and Four.

The further oxu.d.nation, locating this standard of l1ttmtm happiness in the

larger context of Aristotle fa balo philosophical orj.entatlon, is a vaster
problem and can tJf) only touched on in the j2"esent study.

SUch an exam1.natlon

goes berond Ar1stotle's own conaiderat1on of the 1'I8tr.r. Bence tl'1erft 1s no
passage in h1a wrlt1nga which gi'tH special support to the lnterpnttat10D that

wUl be .atabl1ahed. A. reliable esamlnat10ll could atend to the 'dlole
Aristotel1an corpus.

'!'he present, inquiry does not arlbU.lon this klnd of

thorout")lneaa J but 1ntends cmJ.y a further refinement of Ar1atotl.e IS standard, a
deduction, by

~

of eoroll.ar7, from the conclusion which the f1rat aamination

w:U.l htMt ach1ewd.

Bence it.. will pJ"OC(Jed by a coaparisOft of Aristotle.••

standard ot bapplntta. with the ll1Pllcatlona of other pueagea in the

H1c0lUC~~

l!}1'l\1c. in Which he d1scUlU_ the foundat1.Ona of h'lendahip and self-love and tb

meaning of the ille of honor.
ArgWllmt and a

'l'hi8 compar1sOft, along with a 8'UDIllar7 of the

t'1nal estimate of ita ooncl.ua$.ons, wUl constitute Chapter Five

ot the present study.

CHAPTER II

Dook

Q).e

ot Aristotle'. !\comacbeanEt
__hi.c.a i. composed ot a aerie. ot d1s-

CU88iona centes1.ng

D>l"8

or l ••s ...lc1:.17 8l"01md the subject ot happ1neas. The

tirst three chapters are devoted to a general. introduction to the whole treatl

on ethicsa its f'ur1crt1on as science, its importance u the sclence wh1ch puts
order into t"he matter-human activ1 t7'-0n whloh all the other sc1enoe8
converge" t1nally the d:l.apoal tiona in the philosopher lfh1ch :I. t.s study require••
Chapter Four introduce. the conaon conviotion that happines. i. the goal of aU

J:Juman actions but points out that disagreement enters when lt i8 asked what
happ1neas:l.s.

In Chapter Pift Aristotle 8ketohea out the tour main views ot

what happiness le.....p1euure, honor, walth, and retlect1an-and briet17 diapoee

ot the t1.ret

thr!8e e£ tbam as inadequate, wb.U.e post,pon1ng disc'lUlsion ot the

fourth until a later

u...

'.
Chapter Six returns to a cans1derat1on ot the
"

approach to be made to the probl. ., with a dtscuuion ot the Platcnic theor,y ot
a universal good l3Ilderl.ying all specUic and I*rtloular goods, this approach 1.

:rejected in tavor ot an inductive method centered on iDtaD actlv1t,..
The tIIOre IQ1Itematl0

~at.at.

of t.he pJ'Clblea beiina in Chapter Seven with

a de8CJ'ipticn ot the way ord1naJ:'y b:aman actin ty 8ubordUaatea certain actlone
purposes which they Ml"'ft, and 11'1th an analysis ot the notiOll ot goal in both

ita relative and abtolute],y t1nal .enna. This prepares tor the question ot
9

10
what human acUv1'tl' best tult11s this notion

ot happiness appeara-acUvi. t¥ according

to

ot t1nal1ty. At

last. a def1n1t1on

excellence-, and thi. 18 to ael"ftt

... a guide toward determ1n1ng what happ1.rrae. 18.

1n Chapter rJ.ght this

formulation 1s cOq'larod with a rrambar ot tradlt10nal ideas of happ1D888 and
more ot 1ta character1st1ca are bl"o1.J8ht to light.
Chapter H1ne 1n1t1ates an :lntormal eerie. ot q'Q8atlC1t'lS on the ambject of
hapP1ne8., the an8W8l'8 to which Hl"ft to define stW mora the meaning of tb1a

state. 1'0 a qn_te1on about luck as the source of happine•• A:riatoUe .boa the
dependence

ot

happ1ne•• on cbaraotAtr.

In Chaptara

Ten and Eleven Aristotle d1

cusses how far changea ot fortune can affect happ1neu. In

Chapter

'twelve be

describes bow ""'a ordlDary wa;ra oflpea1d.ng betl"q a regard for bapp1neaa
other goode.

F1nalJ.y 11'1 Ohapter

Thirteen, with a dJ,y1liOl1 of man'. tacultie.

into Itlb-oNt1onal and rational, he prep81"88 tor the detaU.ttd d1.8auaa1cma ot

excelleDCe in

ot

the

d1.tinc~

hUman act1Y1ty which are to occupy the rema1.n1ng booka

r;tbiS!.l!-1
"

The cl"der ot Al'Utotl.'s approach to the ..m.ng ot happ1neu 18 cleanat
in the central Ohapter Seven, while the later chapt,en, which contain important

u
aegmentAI of the doctrine

ot

Book

(be,

11e outside the ti.ght at.ructuring of the

pas8agu that introduce the det1n1tlon and OOJEent on it..

'1'tm8 it 1. hard to

fonW.ate a briet but adequate 8xpreeslon of Arl..totle'8 doctrine Without de-

parting some'IIhat tMm t.hn or1g1nal order ot itD presentation. 2
Tbe def1n1tion itself ls eat.lstactor.v 1ft t.he ..,. it reduce. Artstotle'.

notion of happ1Desa to the tWDpJ.e.t pos.lble tol'll1lat
the hmDarl

ttThe act,iva a_roUe of

soul'. tacult1ea in conto1'lD1ty- with exceU-.....tt3 ru.

t'tInct.1onal "I1.ewJ.ng ot happ.t.neea 18 corud.atent 111th .Q1.atotl.'a preference tor a.
teleological atl'UoturinK ot his subject atter.

~r

1.t 18 tho key to

Ar1stotle'a digreaaion from the q1.W8t:J.on of happiDNa throtIgbout BlDat of the
length of the

8_

lth1ca.

lor such detaUed di8CUU1ONJ of the v1rtuea in genenl

and part.1CNl.ar are not. neoa-al7 tor an 'ODderstaocU.ng of the happy Ute (which

111 .Al"1atotle's t1nal vlew of the quaatlon to Ue be10Dd the concerns of

12
the moral 111'e) J but such a aeries ot d1scU8sions does havo a place 1n a f'ul1
under8tanding ot the implications ot "activity 1n accord with excellence" sinoe

as Aristotle makes clear, excellence 18 of at least two k1nds, lIOl"al as _11 as

intellectual.
Yet Aristotle"

treat.nt 01 happ1neas even in Book Qle conta1ne l'IIUCh

than the skeleton detin1tiOfl sugge8W.

The notion of

II

~

hlerarahtaation of

value., lor example, is bnrely hinted at 1n the phrase "in' aoaOl"d with excel-

lence,"

while thi8 hieftl'Chi.zation is porhap8 the IIlO8t

~t

aspect of the

doctri.neJ nor does the UIpol"tallt, qaeaUca ot bapp1llea' dependence on outward
, condi t.1ona receive adequate not1oe. 8fmce 1t wUl be uaetul to put ArlatotlAJ la
C-oneral notion ot happ1neH lnto a

llOl'e

expl1c:lt tonmla, though this will 1n

ita own tt1m require further aubdivt.11on .s the d1.acuae1_
AcoOrd1ng

'tltMo._

IlIOn

polbte4

to this tal'lllla, happ1neas will be charaoteria4Jd u a natural

ac~:rt!( .:l!!1!!.~

!!S S1!JozflPlAr.

Each

ot thue tour characteristics

opens onto m 1mportant, _peat, ot happ1..... , wb1le adequate dlaous81on of UleIa,
espec~
~,

ot

the 8ubord1Date _8I.I\i.nga whioh, the terms

~

and

aht1v1~

will 1mol.,. oovel'ing the whole raage of Aristotle's remarks, but in a

laas randoa tuh1an. 4

T.
bror A;r:tatotle'8 own . - r y of the oonel1J8ions reached 1n the oourae ot
t.his book see his raoap1tulation in Book Ten, U16a3o-b9, U71812,131 "Having
now dlscUlsed the various Jd.nds of Virtue, of Friendship and of Pl.eM'UI"8, it
1.:'01;mJ.ns for us !:io treat in outl1ne ot HaPP1noea, 1na."Jm.uoh as~l'O oount this to
be the End of bIJa81 lite. But. it will shortent.be d~,,;xm"81on it we reoapltula
what has bhn said already.

"How we stated that, happ1neaa 18 not a certain dlsposlt.t.on of oharacter)
were it m:l.ght be po88e8sod by a man who pueed the whole ot his

, since if 1 t

We asleep, llV1ng ·Uie lite of' a vegetable, or by one who was plunged 1n the
deepest m1.sfortune. It then we reject Lhis as unsat1stacto17, and toel boubd
olass happiness ratller as SO_ form of aotlv.lty, as has been said in 'the earUe
part of this t.reatlae, and if aotiv1t1ea are of' two kLnds,

SOmB

merely

1. Happ1neas as natural.
Happineas 1s natural in t.be senae that 1t is to be 'Understood 1n the
conteXt of an adequate underatanding of lraman nature.

It tollowa the patterns

laid down b,y human nat..ul'e and is attainable Wi. th1n that nature.

1his

or1entat1ou ot happ1neee reoe1wa 0Dl7 obUque reference trom Aristotle, but 18
tmpl1c1t in the whole work, 1t tor no other reason than that no power or
1n.tluence outs!.. the scope at human nature 1 taelt 18 appealed to.
~

of

~

examination

!:!. ~~

~ SI'Wl'e.

'l'h1a pr1nolp18 1s present in the l1De

that culmlnatee in Ar1stotle's det1ni.t1011 of happ1neaa. D.1 an

ot

the .... maD charaaterlst10ally act.a wU.l be d1acownd wbat 18

~/
) 1t.Are.. thea to auppoae that, 1dd.le the
his twlcal tunotlca. (epr0V".

carpenter and the 8hoamaker have det1n1te t'nfto\1ona or bu1nea888 belonalng to

.a.

..auaary .ana ad del1nble 0I1l7 tor the
ot so_t.b1ng else, ou....
dea1ftble in tbelBe1W8, it 18 clear that happ1neu 18 to be clasaed IIBmg
act1v1t1n deliz-abl. 1n . . .lYea, and not _
tho.. deaiNble as a . . . to

moe happ1neas laoka notbtng. aftd 1. a.U.....utfic1ent.
aoUv1t.1aa an dea1rable 1n ~lft. Wb1ch do not 81m at .,.,
reault bqond tba
...rc1ae of the "1'9'1t.y. low th1.e 1a lelt to be the
nature at actlona in contond.ty with virtue J tor to do noble and Y1rtuous deeda
18 a tb1Dg .suable tor Ita 01JfJ sake."
"Bu\ 1t bapps.nea. oonalats 1n aotl'f'1.W in accozrdanae with Ylrt.ue, 1t 1.
reuonabl.e that it should be act.i:tityin 8OOOl"danoe 1f1th the h1gheat Yinue
uoeUeaatuape r 67, W W.a will be thit 'f'1rtne at the beat part. ot us."
'f'.tru Ari.atotle wJ.U leJ into hi. di8<N881011 of \be ntleotive l11e.
so_~

elM.

-But, thoae

rl •••

_1'8

them,

l1li1

as such has nona, and 1. not designed by natUJ'8 to .tultU

azv

function .,..S
JIoreoftr, the good man, whose exper1eDoe and preterenaee

.

~

are

Aristotle fa guide. in deciding the excellence of a wrq of l1te6 , leada aUt.
in wld.oh conflicting dealre. and Ol'O$s purposes have

DO

place, tor the

verr

S:J.097b29-,31. ct. 22-28, -To e-.y bowver that the SUpreme Good ls
happine.s will probab~ appear a trui8llJ we .tl11 require a more expliclt account ot what constitute.
P8rhapa then _ ...,. arrive at thl. lV'
asoertaining lfbat 18 man'a tunct1on• • • • £Qt JUl' be held that the good of
mm realde. 1n \be fuDo'UOIl ot man, it be baS a ftr4cUon. fI Jlao Part. An.
639bl4-22. ttPla1n.l7, hawver, that. oause ls the firet which ... ci1T""tbi'"'"f'1nal.
ODe. For this is the Beaaon, IIDd t.be Reason tora the atart.1.ng-point, al1ka 111
the worka ot art and in works ot nat1lJ'e. .101' consider bow the physician or
the builder aeta about hi. work. He starts by fol"lll1ng tor himaeU a de.f'1D1 te
picture. • .and th18 he holds tornrd as the reaeon and explanation ot each
subsequent step that be takes, and of hi. act1l2a 1n tbis or that • .,. as the
cue may be. Bow 1n the r.>rka ot nature the good aud the t1nal.. cause i. sUll
IIOnt doainant tblll in worD of art such as the. . . . . .
lb1d. 64lblo-)O,
tor an extension ot tb1a concept of t1nal1t7 in_iura to the whole univer.,
ne An. 4l5b15-l8. "Xt 18 mmitut that the aoul is also the t1nal C4UIht ot i
~ For nature, like mlnd, alW8.)'B doe. Whatev8l" 1t does tor the sake of so_
tId,ng, whioh 80111th1ng 18 1 ts eDI. To that eo_thing corresponds in the cause
of animal. the soul and in this it tollowe 1'Jl8 order ot nature, all natural
bodi.. are oreana of the soul- J Und. 43Wl. ·For all thing. thit exiat by
Nature are means to an end, or will be coneom1tant.. ot .ana to an end."

happin....

ft.

6The whoa present passage 18 an example of Ari.stotle's dependence on th1a
standard. See 109Sb4-8. "Perhaps then ff)r U8 at all events 1. t 1s proper to
start from what 1.8 kno'Im to us. Thie 1s why in order to be a COllllfJt.ent student
ot thet Right and Just. • • the pupil is bound to have been well trained in h1a
habl tee For ;the start1ng-point or first principle 1s the taet that a thi.ng ls
80, if this be satJ.afactorlq ascertained, there .Ul be DO need also to know
the reaeon 'ttt\v 1. t 1. so. And the man of good _ral tralning 1movrs tlrst
pr1nciples already, or can easily acca1re them." Ct. Stewart, I, 54-57 on thl.
paseage. See alao llSla18,19. "[RJO mre in ethics than in mathe.tics are
the f'1rat princ1ple. reached by a process ot reasoning, but by vlrtue, whether
natural or ao~red by training in right opinion as to the tirst princ1ple".
1166a)3 • "ri 7trtue ~d the nrtuous man ..." to be the standard 1n e,"r..Y
also lO94a2Y-l'095aU, 1104 12-14, and Pol. ~33tsa.9. Por an examination of
Aristotle's use ot this standard and an indictment ot his fatlure to g1ve 1t a
more lOUd. toundation than the oomraon agreement of gentlemen of his day, ot.
Marjorie Grene, "An .Iq>1101t Preml.. 1n Aristotle's Ethics", Et.hics, 1945-46
(56), no. 2.

lS
reason t.hat h1.a lUra. follow the dJ.reotioruJ t.hat. nature 1.,. down and nature
doeS not contradict herself.

'7

It

Ls

posa1ble tor men to develop various

pexverted t.Ut.ea or be d1spoeed to them oocause of faulty conatltutlone .. or

8L~ly to act aca1.nat the Virtu.. by exc..

0.1'

deteot6, but all such

aberrations are recogn1S1td by normal pers0U8 tor what, thay are, nazooly
departurtMl, bl.amuworthy or not, froI!l the rule whioh the rational eleroont 1n wan
natur~ ought to ~e on the lower appet1tes. 9
Further,

maine!! !!. Itta!e!RlI, acoord1ru.{

.se na;tu~.

QlCe it

18 held

r..aturtl acts purpoa1ve13 producing det1n1te means tor definite ends, :1 t doea not
make seNte to talk about achieving anell that 11e bcqond the

meaD8

at one'8 d.U-

pos3l.. When the quostion 1s raised whether bapp1neas 18 a girt. ot the

goda or

ot l'UC~O Aristotle does not directly deJv' the possibility of happinea$'
oom.1.ng fltom noh directions.

1'be question or divine intervention in hural

affairs lt1 not a matter than can bed1sct1l$aed in the context of tl18 present
~tt

Q1. the other band, the rtse and fall of luck 1s known to atteot

happ1ne8s but not in en:! essential.,-. Nor,would it be tltt1ng for" ohance to
plq a 'ft/1:'I 1apoJ"tant. role •
•••n

71099&12-1.6.

Bs••• the d1scufJs1ona ot bid aot1oua u

b4, and of
USOaB.

a depart... hom the mean, n0bal2

the varioua states of 1.Doont1nence and bestiality, up_ l.lI8b27-

9ll.02bl..)-U03a3.

l0u99b9-J.l.O()ag.
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rHJappS:Deas can be at.tained t.hrout:h acme procen ot atudy or etton by

i'l.l persons

Whoh capacity tor axocllence has not been stt'llted or maiMd.
Aga1n, it 1t 1s better to be happr as a result ot one's own e:.rertiona than
bY, the gift of furtIabe, 1t is reasonable to auppo_ that this 18 how
happJ.Daaa 18 WODJ 1nasmuch as 10 the world or nature th1.ngs have a
natural tendency to be ordared in the beat posa1ble "iIfI¥, and the same 1.
true ot the prod1.1ctl ot an04 and of causat.1on of ar:q ldnd, eapeciall7 the
h1gheat
inteU1gllDc!f. Whereas that. the greatest and noblest ot
aU tb.1.ngs_ should be lett to fortune wdOld be too oontral7 to the fi t.I'l888
or th1Dga.U

Ct...

In anot,ber context Ar1l1totle diat1ngu1shea wJ..ah1ng

tram

ohooaine by' tbla

difference, tbat the former oan be concerned wi t.h imposstb111tJ.ss while the
latter onl3 w.lt.h

t'tl1n5~s

"Oholoe cannot have tor it.8

111th1a att.a.1nllm.t..

imposslb1lJ.tiea; 1£ a man 1f'8l'8 to

~ be

obj.~

chose saaeth1ng i.mposslble he would be

thOught a foal; but .". oan nah tor thi.ngs that are impossible, for lnstal1C4t
i1wilOl'tal1t7.

[*NJo

one obOos•• what

he th.1.nka oan be atta1nad

b.Y his

0'IIn

doq

not rest wJ.th h1.mself, but onJ.;y what

act." 12

'l'ba acUvlt:q that will perteot man wUl be, atter all, IODrthi.ng posa1ble
to 111m because he has a natul"al capac1 tT tor 1.t. What he bas no capaelt¥ for

-------

~.

"

In this and in otbar quotations throughout the prGsent,

etudT the translation !9!ll;!!M.t! ~place8 Rackbua's or Roea's !f:!:WI.. wrnrever
the teNd; . . . . to favor a ~re.ta:'icted rander1ng Qf Ar.Latot.lili""7tper'; •
This applJ.•• to oognate. ot the WOl'd as well.

t.

12Xmpoa.ib1lJ.t¥ of attailUlleDt wu &lao th«t reason why the Platonio Uniwrsal Good. had to be excluded fl:om .Aristotle discuaa10n of the good tor lIt8l1l
It And lJ.kew1ae with the Idea of the Good I tor even it the goodness predicated of
various thing. in OotGOll re:aJ.l¥ 1s a un1 tty or some t.h1ng ex1ating separate or
absolute, it olearly will not be prac\loable or attainable b7 man. but. the Good
which 'We are now aeeld.ng 18 a good within human reacb." 109&31-34. cr. also
11l2a18-l4.
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will never t.ak8 place in h1m. 'fbe capacity does not constitute the actlv1V'
too act,1v1t.y must be brougbt about by effort and even the disposition
must be doveloped beyond the state

ot mere oa,.l)aei tty to that of habl t.

80

to act

But the

ca.pac!. t7 1.a basic I

f:NJo one ot the l:lOral virtues is on..~red in us by natura, for no
natural property can be altered i:rJ habit rwt4re~J of course, vl..rtuea are
s'l18ooptibla of corrupt1on 7. •• • CrJe't tbo vl.rtuss • • • arc
eni~Mldered in us neither t>:f' nature nor 19t 1n violation of nature; nat1.:ll'e
gives us the eapac1t7 to mceb" them, and this capacit1 is brought to
_tun. ty by habit.
~Oftr, the taculties given us by nature are beatowed on us f'irtrl'..
in a potential tona, .., exhibt t their actual exercise afterwards. 'lh18 itt
clearly so with our' senseSI ., did not, acquire the fe.culty of sight or
hear1ng by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly l1st..en.1ng, but the ot.... lft9'

about.-because ..p bad 1:.be senses .. began to;".YB.,e t.hem, we did not t'Gt them
by ustng them.""
"
"';,
1'bus 1t 1. not necessary tor Aristotle to baYe .made aplicit
happiness' achievement solely w1tb1n the scope of nature.
human

JlUl'P088S

and powers 18 t.be natural preauppos1 Uon

rere~

to

SUch a chan.nel.U'tg ot

ot the

dJ..~'!nplon,

and,.

except for a tow 1nstancd lJJce thoe>} unaowred in the present examination,
passes without the Qtlthor's adftrtence.

2.

Happ1neaa as aotiviV
Happinass- 1s an activity (evepreLa). Th1a termlb signi,f1•• the presence

of a roalitJ' 1n the t..rue .nse of the WDI"d

ac~,

not merely disposit1onal.

Moreo.,r in ita ver'I der1vatim (ev.e'pr-ov) it S'Uggests a quaUtq of illlD8ll8M8,
J

EI J

13U03a18-31.

lLct. H. Bonita. ~9!? Aristotol1cus (ortg1nally vol. :5 of w Royal
Prussian AcaiieIl\Y odit.lon 0 Matott." ~nd ad. (Grata, 1955), p. 25la2-b42,
tor the Ar1stotel.1an uses ot the term. Also see Yet. lQ48b,$-1051a31, as a
s~

ot 1t.

of reality tllat takes place w1th1n the person and 1s independent of outward

oondi tiona.

h!pp1.neas

F1rst,

!!! state 2t notuatlor..

To be active (in the rtght

of aoti:ri.ty) 1s to be happy. while marel,y to he well disposed to such actiVity
1s not by that fact to be happy_

Ariatotlo's languap
bt.:lSt. aobJ.eves

it.

a~1y 1d&nV~fie.

happiness with the &at1v1ty that

"CwJe ident1.f'<; the end Wi til oerta1n actions and actlvi~1e.

for: .thUs 1 t. falls ancng goods of the soul and not among external goode.-15
And again.

"COJur def1ni:tlclon acoorcfa 1d:tb the

descript10n of the happy mill

U

om who 'Uvea _11' or 'does well'. tor it hU!irt;.ualq ldentU'iod bapplQe.s
wi. th a form of f.;t\tH1 11£e or

~1ng

_11. n

16

Is this an accident of language.

is what Arlstotlo re$l.ly intends to sq. not that. happ1ness and rtv,ht actlvlt7

are the

a;.nm9

t.h1ng, but that happiness

!!!!At.1I

f'l'o!I right aotim?

(h

the

eontJl'aJ.7, there ia no reuon to ,l'eConstrue bts words 'When they are pla1nly

1d.anUt1cat1on, and when in other con'testa he is careful to distinguish
, t

..

151098b17-U.
reading.)

(Boas, tr.

ct.

note 29 tor further diocu881on of th1a

16:L098b20..2Z. Arlst.ot.le usuaUy pairs haP.a and do!:mt well ill
paral.lel eons truetienG I as inftnl tift., for aitilii)~ e U ~ a 7« ove7v-and E';:;"rr~TI"ellr ~,or as subetant.iW8,euda5Movla. a.nd el1:rrpa fa, even ezi5wia..
;::;oe also 1095&19-21, \thore tho same parallelism is present 1n his ~;

s

aad 1l'{8b28,.dlere the specific actlvlty of
idantical :Ild til e-U. Oa-~veJY.

~pe/lr

1$ singlGd out.

i?..8

tar

I""'"

17

activity £rom quallU,os wb1ch result from lt

,and at the same tina does not.

thUS d1stinSulah aoti. v1 ty from. happ1ne...

As actnal, activi tq goes beyond mere dispositions.

Virtue (excellence of

charact.er, good bahl t) 18 a dlspoal tion tv do what 1& good.

But tl'ere is no

-

actual good until one movee into actlon according to his diepoal tion.

ntapos!-

tion by itself counts tor notb1ng.

-

170r• Cb. In, no. 2, of tho present study for the distinction of pleasure and aoUv1V_ In 1097b4,$, bowver, Aristotle's language does seem to

imply 80m sort 9! relationship, thus lack of identity, betlftMn activity am.
bapp1.neasl
_also choose them Lhonor, pleasure, lntel.llgence, and
excellence of obaractAr'Jtor the salce of bapp1ness, in the bel1ef tbat they
1f1U be a meana to our S8cUl1.ne It.~ (Italic. added.) 001'A:pal"8' tta~p"uMetJa. J~

"Ca'Jut ..

--'I""':
/("a.£.

- '"

rf)s eu?Jayuoy/'a.s- 'yapJl/;

\

~
,_a.::'
)"
-'
ota 'TO'uTCUV
u.rrO/Ld"y..-vli/Ovres
.eucJtlyttov!Jd'"'ely. •
I

•

•

n/-

A llne· elU"l1er, in another conneotion, '2;,ci, 18 aed with tlls accuaaUw to express
tho unmistakably oausal or intentional ~ter.
But the dld.hsre 1s different

ct. Bonita, p~ " a7-1::t4, on Ari.8toUe t e use of the
genlt1... and 1d.th aoeu&atiw. 'the accusative 1s the usual.
way ot expressing U6USfh The gen1t1ve on the other hand 1s used loo~ and
temporally, or f:!I.')dally, or to cOft'ftrt -no'UD8 to adw1"blal use. :n this last
8Onao, then,o/a. with tho c,.'\lnit1va suggests an intimacy bet_en activities and
happiness which ~s Ol:Jnstitutive rather than oausal, so that it i8 less mts14ad1ng to randel' Olc:t. TOt.l.r",v"1,n exercising thea" than -they will be a lMtaruJ to
eeouring". Thus the apparent sundering or at} activity and happiness"as terms oj
11 relationship is not. neoe8si tated by A:r1stotJ.e's own wordi.rs8, though the
phraseology does not preclude such a readlDg.
because in the genit1ve.

preposit1on~/a1lith

20

CBJut no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the
Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displqing i t-on
disposi tton, or on the manttestation of a diaposi tion in action. For a
man ~ possess the disposition without its producing any good result,
as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from S01II8
other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative-it will
of nece8.i t1' act, and act well. • • .so it iSlr'>se who !2l rightly who
carry off the priZes and good things of lite.
The same view of activity' and the happiness identified with it is present to
Aristotle's mind when he is diSCUSsing the happiness of the dead, even it in
this context he does not seem to draw as full conclusions from the viewpoint as
he might be expected

to.

Are we then t,o count no other human being happy either, as lonp; as he is
alive? Jfuat we obey Solon's warning, and tlook to the end'? And if we
are indeed to lq down this rule, can a man really be happy attar he is
dead? Surely that is an extrelOOly 8~e notion, especially tor us who
define happinesfJ as a form of activity'
!f,as can happen" circumstances keep a man trom acting the way he would if
he were unhindered, it. will make l1ttlo difference what his dispositions are.
His excellence of character JDa¥ remain but it achieves nothing if the act to
which it disposes him cannot take place.

Disposition must be able to move into
"

act i.f happiness 1s to be present.

In a later passage summarlzing the

conclusions of Book (he" Aris1x>tle will illustrate the notion of happiness'
actiV8ness by ment10ning two instances in which good disposition ma..y remain
while happiness nevertheless 1s absent.

16l09Sb32-1099a7.
19U OOalo-14.

"CBJappiness

1s not

8.

certain

2l.
diSp081 tion of character; s1neG if .l t. 'Mire 1 t m1ght be potIaeseed by a man ...,

,used Om lIbole of his Ut. asleep, l1v1og the We ot a vegetable, or by one
who was pltmged in the deepeat misfortUDfh,,20 TrOuble in lU'e 1s one of tbe
l:ain b1ndranoea to the act.ivlt)r wh1ch constitutes hl&pp1neas.

It 1a ~

trJ.'ougb trouble that outward 1..aU.tie. llAVe 1nfluanoe on the QSUI:'.n'Mally 1...__ _

reality that is activity.

For int w aecond qual1ty act1v1tZ

!-!. S; re~

~!Dl

e!!f!ftd, not

somthing ooparate from oneeelt and allanablo l.:1.kB a piece of propartor.
This immanence, or independence ot outward :reaU.ty. 1a t..'1a :1eaning of the

term self-sufficiency (a.c!. -,-t£pK'eUL) 1Ih1ch Aristotle appUes t.o happ1neu .. an
essential. not.e of it.
which merely 8 t.andi.na

nothing, and sucb

\WIt

"CWJ-

t.a.ke a Hlt~ thing to

l!'ItfU').

a tb1DI

b:r 1 UltJlf' &loDe mnder. Ufo dea1rabla and lac1d.na 111

deem happ1nass to

~d1at4l.y ~

1n tM tiama

be."21
text .Ar.1stotle

m.al:Qa

1;1» 3MIl'l1ng of tb1s

sel£'-euf.f'1c:lena;r s tUl cleat'er:
!lbreover we tblnk ~ tho mat do$1rable of all. good 'th1tlg1 without
b&:1.ng 1ts(!)lf reckoned as on. among the
tor if it weN so recK218d,
it iH clear that .. ahauld coaalder it IIIDft da81nblo '\!1lxm tmtn tbt
smal.l4at or other good thlng8 W1"G oomb1.ned w1th 1t, Hince t'hls add1t1<m
would raeult. 1n a larpr ~ of' good, and of two goods the greater is
always to". nore desirable.

rest,

Thus whatever aetlv.t.ty oont;tt1tutel happ1nels will be all that one requirGS to
t I J
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be happy, while all other goods will be on a different level from this.

They

wq be dispensed with if only one may continuet.he chief activity.
But suoh independence of outward reall ties has to be qualified, indeed it
has already been qualified by the remarks whioh introduoed the discussion of

happiness' independence.

For the salt-sufficient activity is carried on in

society and for man this JIItl8t always be the case.

CIJt

is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in itself.
The term selt-sufficient, howeVer, we employ with reference not to oneself alone, living a lite of isolation, but also to one '8 parents and
ohildren and life, and one's tri~nds and tellow oitizens in general, since
man is by nature a social being.Z3

Of course, the range of one t s dependence cannot be extended indefinitely; a
person does not need mere acquaintances of his the same way in which he needs
his family and close friends.

Yet the difference is only one of degree, and at

any rate he is not simply sufficient unto himself.

For this reason, whatever

-

occurs in the nilieu in which he livas Will have some effect on his personal
lite.

The lack of complete independence is iJ.W)ortant to the notion of human

happiness.

For human happiness muat be a lasting thing if it is to deserve the

name happiness.

Immediately atter achieving his definition of happiness

Aristotle thinks fit to oonjoin with it the quality of durability.

"lIoreover

this activity !"U.St (lCcUW a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make

"CTJhe

23lO97b8-U. ct. Pol. 1253&27-29:
individual, when isolated, i
not self-sufficing; andtheretore he is like a part in relation to the whole.
But he who is unable to Uve in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient for himself, must be el ther Ii beast or a gO~1 he is no part of a
state."

,.---------------------------------------------------------------~
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spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one dq or a brief period of
happiness does not make a. man supremely blessed and happy.,,24

Thus the question of the relative influences of inward and out-ward reality
is an important one for the understanding of Aristotle fa notion of self-activit
as constitutive of happiness.

How far does a change ot outward circumstanoea

influence one'. happiness?

The anawr wst be sought in two passages of Book

oha.pter~

in which Aristotle olassified the chief human good

()le I

the seventh

as an inward good, and then the tenth, in whioh he discusses the resistance ot
virtuous activity to changes of fortune.
Aristotle makes use of the traditional division of all goods into those
that are outward, those that belong to body, and those that belong to soul, and
he r,1vss preference k' the third class. 25

Goods of the soul are "good in the

.fullest sanse and the highest degree.,,26 Shortly afterward, however, this
thre£ """Part division is changed tor a dl vision into two olas88sl
soul

Goods ot the

are unqualitiedly oontrasted with outward, and bodily goods, apparentl.7,

are to be classed among outward goods.

Tile end of human life is shoWn to

"consist in actions or activities of some sort, tor thus the End is included

among goods of the soul, and not among external goods. n27

This realignment,

241098a18-20.
25C£. Stewart, I, 119, 120, tor a discussion of the origin of this divisio
and A:r1stotle fa various uses of it.
2~098bl2-17 t "Now things good have beon dividad into three classes, exte
nal goods on the one hand, and goods of the soul and of the body on the other,
and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly pronounce good
in the fullest sense and the highest degree."

27)098b18, ,19., .. ~ •• ~J"""s
/&J'
TIJ/es

/~

.. ,

,/

..

/ /

t:/

AeJ:ovra!., ~at-, etlep(euu To 77!!A05"' OUrtiJ
raf> TUJV'rrepl. t;'1tj"pyara.!llUv r/yerat -' k'q,t o~ TtuV'eI('JtJS."

..
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which gee. without. eouant., ..signa to soul

all the functions

]:.arson, those usually referred speclally to t.he
func"'..i.ons uaua.lly resel""9'8d

1dtbout.

~'i

~,

ot the human

as well as toose higher

soul in the Bense of dOl!le Idf,hcr t.han physical

lhe effect 1s a realigJlllOm. or tbe tradUJ.onal tnroo-P&Tt division

inw a div1alul1 of two parts.

outward and personal. 26 Theae porsonal goods

all of thea among the pel"'sonal J ir. th1.. case,

hit~ber

and dynamic bota.ly goods,

like acUo.na and acUvit.1.8, will be l'eterred to the liv:1.ng principle, 1.e. be

29

considered personal goods,' whUe static bodily goods l1ke beauty or health
will be referred w what somehow ll.es outside the l1v1ng principle, to the b

28lfJuxi, the llv1n& principle, i.s more adequately

oxPressed b7 the word

tErson than by 8O~~31noe the l&"ter baa a narrower meanlllg to the tllOdern
ian It IIIl8t have.
tor .AriBtot.l.e, while on the other hand, reon unless

~n in its technical meaning t!OnW1S be\W.- the sonae of
which Ariswtle'a usa olearly presupposes. "

11~

it

tot.aU~

'..

291098b14. I~cording to Ross's trooslatton, "and psychical actions and
tivh,le8 1'18 class as relating to soul" (tor reading. "Tt;15' oe rrpafiets k"a~
'I'''WK~~ el/epr!tas Tiep/. 'tU.X?//, Tl9e,Mev ,,). Raokhala translates, "BUt it is
acUons and the soul's actJ.ve exercise of its functions that .. posit (as be
l-~1nesa >" for the conJectured reading
" ulS l rrpa. Jets Kdt. Tas evepreLas
r4S ~P' ~u4.?Y T(e~eV' • fJ

,as

oe

2S
as reoalftr ot lite &om the soul, and thus will be counted outward goods. 30
The line of divilion between personal and outward 18 not yet det1n1teJ it

will be settled more satisfactorily later on, when Aristotle deacribaa the perfectnes. of happiness. For the preaent, the ma1n meaning of outward liaa in

its emmpl1f1catlon by a number

or

poselble objects of human. desire which are

approved u naceeaary or rejected, according to the way the,. enter lnto the

constitution ot Ute or do not.
A oerta1n amount of out.1t'ard proaperi t7 cannot be diepeneed w1 the
~ good things

["the

J

out1nrd

a1"8

a1 ther merely indispenaable condition_

ot hapPu.ss, or an of the natura of awdliary meana,
inatJ'UlDal'ltallT • • • •,,31 _
yet so_howI tor

OM

"CTJM

and useful

nGIIIber of tblnga ant cl.earlT not pctraonal goods,

or other of the reasons mentlcm.ed, hIma to be included

among the goode which a happy man p0888.... t

actions require 1na~te tor their perfOl"MnOe, in the
shape of Menda or wealttl or polltlo81 power, al.eo there . . cert.a1n external advantages, the lack of which sull1_ supre_ fel1cit7, such as
good bUth, Mt1.etaotory cb11dren, and pereonal be-t7* a 118ft of ftJ7
ugly appearance or low b1.rth, or chUdlee. and slone 1n the world, 18 not
0'01' idea of a happy JIIIl, aut stUl 1... 80 perbapa 11 one who tau ch1L.""'e!l

lor mID1 DOble

3~ bu18 of the dln1netiOl1 18 haI"dl7 clear in Arlst.o\le, thc:nJgh tbt
ooncluslooa he dft1l8 trOll it are adequately set forth u the doot.r1ne develDpa.
ct. RaaIc:ha, DOte c. to I, vUl, 2, . " . tum of pbrue asaociatea fbod1.ly
eood8' wlth 'Ioods of the soul'. both being personal, in con\ra8t with the t.h1l':1
claN, ,e:.td;emal goode'. But it at once appeara that the tmportarlt dlaUnct1cm
1s bet.en tsoods of the soul t on the one band and all the reat ('the goode 1D
the body and tho.. outs1de and ot fort,una t. • • ) on the otber. Hence 1n II l
.external goode' DIU8t include tbod117 goods t, as also Ills;,
Where extemal
goods' are 811bd:lY1ded into the instrDanta and the 1ndlapeuable cond1t.1ona ot
wU-be1ng (and 80 in lIOn IIc1entU'1c l.anguaae clx. 1), the latter subdivis10n
1.ncl'dd1nl
the 0Dl;r bodily good there speclt1ed.·

t.,

beau.,

,ll.099b21,28.

or Mendl wbo are worthleas, or who bas had good
by death.' 2

0I'l88 but

loat them

Now there is a d1tterence between those outward goode needed for . .ro188 of
••

actions t.hat make one happy, and those outward goode needed as

1

acoO!£E;!!i!!t8

ot such actions) the formal' are onl7 maans, the latter seam to haw a value
surpassing that of mere _ans, 8tnoe they contr1bute to the act10n not by just
mald.ng

1t posslble lmt by maJd.ng 1 t de81.rable.

It there _re questlon only ot outwal'd goods as means, a problem wuld not
ar1se bare.

so_thing can be an lnd18penaable oondt Uon wi. thout entering into

that ot w;i.oh it 18 condition. But 1t the outward _ t be added t.o the
personal to make the personal de81rable-C.n other lIOrds, 11 the personal 18 not
de81nble or 1s even les. dealrable Witbout the out1fal"d-outwal'd p1"Osperi.t¥ la

not altogether extr1D81c to happ1ne8s after all.
ooculCb.8 at l ... t, OCCUW a

DDl"8

Olltaard goods, then, 111 eo.

1mportant pan t10n 1n the const.1tutJ.on of

happtn.a tbu Ariatotle 1nd1.cated whim be equated the goods constitutive of
happiMa. wi tb Personal goode.
.'

The problea 18 not t.a.d1ately rettOlvable.

But Ar1stotle dewteI tbrw

33
later chapters to a dison.lon at fortune'a ert"ta on happ1neN and

ti.nallT

aoh1ewa a delioate, not. al'tO{)etber unaablguous, bal.ance between happ1Jla•• '
dependence and independence.

1tle tnat.-nt tOOWJe8 aI'01Sld the oaae

ot a man

321099bl-6.
'31099b8-ll01b7.. The tbne chapte1"8 anti tled in Rosa'8 tranalation. "Ie
happ1neas aequ1ntd b.Y leam1ng or bahi tllation, or aent. b;y God or by chance?·
"Should a man be called happy wh1.le he 11vu'l", ttl)) the fortunes ot t.he 11v1.ng
affect the dead1 tt

~~--------------~
27

ot

who has knOllD. a high degNe

miSfortune. such i8 the

oaH

bapp1neas in IDe and t'1nalq met overwbeJ.m.t.ng

ot Priam.

Ki.ng

ot

Troy.

To the queetlon whether

a person in such oircUll'lStanoea Clan be happy Aristotltt usually answers in the

Mgatives

"t:s:Joone would pronounce a man 11 v1ng a ill. ot

happy, unleu tor tile sake

ot maintaining a paradox...,4

misery to be

But t.his commonsense

View ot happiness coex18ts with another which makes happ1neBs something ea-

sentta1l7 1.mra:.rd. thus not :really 8'UIlCept,lble of Wl'DdCe .from 1I'1t.hout.
Aristotle'. treatment . . . to make the core-real1ty of happines. at

0Il0ti

.aJm1\

p"nd exclude condi tlon1ngs tram outside it.

Ar1stotle f'1rst

ot all

makes 1. t clear that t.he problem of intlUGllCtts on

happinees artaes only'.1n the

CaM

ot

wry I8r1OUS misfortune, ninee tl"iv1al ot"

passing troublee ean affect an illMr state

onlT

superfleial.l.)r or not at all.

ew.
7e
euTq

have M8U8td happJ..aeaa to be somatJl1ng permanent and by no meana
cbclged, wblle a .ingle man mq sutter IUD)" t:am1I of fortune-.
wheel. For e learl,. it we were ti> keep pace wi t.h his tort\meB we sho1l1.d
often call the same man bapw and again wretcbed, lI81d.ng the haW7 maD out
to be a "chameleon and 1nsecmrely' bued". Or La this keeping pace w1 th
hi8 tortlmes quite lIl'ODg? SUooeft or ta1111l'8 1D lU. doe. not depend on
thestl t but human lite, as we said, needs the.. as more add1 t.1orls, while
ueeUent aotJ.v1t1•• or their oppoelt.es are what cona\ltute happineBa or
t.he reverN.
•
II

The quest.1on we bave now d1scuued cont1rms our dotin1.tiOft. For no funct
of JIIIl has 80 atch permanence as excellent aotJ.Y1t1ea • • • • st&b111V,
then, Will belong to too happy man, and he will be hapw throughout hi•
•

,~ ct. l.lOOa8. ·DfJ 0 one oalls a mill happy' who meets 1d.tb
misfort.unes like Priam's, and come. to a m18.~abl.e end" J and US3bl9-21.
"('JOnaoqu.,ntlJ' t.hoae who say that, if a man be good, he rill be ham eftn when
on the raolc, or when tallen tnt.o the clil"eet m18tOl't1me, are 1nt.enttonal.l7 or
uni.ntentionally t.alld.:ng nonsense. 11

28

.lse,

lJ.te. tor alwap, or b7 preference to ever.ytb1.rag
be wUl be engaged
1n excellent action and contaplatlon, and be wUl bear the chaDcea of
lUe met ZlO~ and altogether ~I 1t he 18 .~ good' and
'r~ 'beyond reproach' .3::>
Yet I\1Cb rea:t.atence to cbaDge u this 18 due
Ughtne88 36 than tc) tho fact that. t.bI!I trouble 1s

-

chang.. of fOl"tlme do affect.

0118 's

B)N

to the :relaUw

onl.7 outward.

lor Hl"10U8

imler state.

But the aoeidenw of fort.. are marl7 and Vt!tI7 in degne of magnl:tu4eJ and
a1~ ..u p1eoes of good luck, u also of ms.startune, clearly do not
change the whole CO'O.l"8a or
Jet gNat and NPfJ&ted 11\1088. . . . wiU
render
more bl1aaM a1nee ~h ot their o. nature they h,'!lp to
embelU.sh it, aM also t.he7 can be nobl7 and ~11 utll.1aedJ while
gNat and t.requent "'''lerNa can crush and mar our bU_ both b.Y the paJA
t.hey cause and b7 the h1ndra1oe they otter to m.aD.Y aot1rl t.i.d.3 7

ill.,

at.

The double

arfeotad,

att•• of

outward ~ 18 qatn

and ..... ..,...abl. . . . ot

apparen'.

~

aot1on 1tHlt

s..

it., and a a1gn1t1caat chanp in .ither work1i

a ehm1p in bapp...... .

A:r:l.e'tOt,l.e'. last statement on the P.r1a difficulty ooml'>J..Das both Y1ewpo1n
in a diat1nCt1on ~ bapp1Deas and bl. . . . . . (e.U.O?OV7~~Kq'p(a)J

between a state of happ1neN \bat 18 deteot1ve yet stUl bapp1.nep, and a stat.
"

'!i.u.00b2-21.
tudee

(Tl".

W.n.

RoM.)

Ital1ca added.

36ct • 1l.01.a2l-b8, when Jri,st,otle di8CU88e1 tJ.'.8 e.tt• • wb1ch the Yiola.
ot t_U,~' 8bd MeDda 1R:ni1d have on one deceased. The tort... ot a:ucb

persons probably have sea .ftect. on the dead (11 tblt dead are ...... at all),
but 11; cannot ever be a serious .fteet. 'lhe
teri.on again tB OM ot deane.

en

'7l.lOOb22-JO.
Aristotle 1nd1oatee
the activity or mar
utU1aed) or b1.nder
aupe:rticlal and the

RotA that here, 1n either C&H, of good luck or bad,
tIIO wap 1n which luck art.eta bapp1ne8a. f.t can ombell1a
it. or it can contribute to the activity itself (be
it. The distinction amotalta to ODe betwen the Jll)nt
.more penetrattng ef'fecta of fon1'JDl.

Yet ~l.e88 awn 1n adftN1 V nobll1t7 ab1.nea through, when a . .
durea repeated and aewre misfortune with patience, not. ow1ng to lnsenslbi
l1q but f:nx!l g8nel'O$itq and grea\neaa of soul. And 1£, as .. Said, a
manta Ute 1s determ1ned by his act1.v1t.1ee, no supramal,y happr man oan

ever become m1aenble. For he 'wUl never do bateful. or 'hue acti0D8,
sinee 1'10 hold that the tl'ul.:I good and wtse maD will bear all 1d.nds of
fort1me 1n .. aeem.l7 wq. and will al.1IIQ"8 80t in the noblest maunar tha~
the circumstance. allow. • • • .And this being 80, tho hapPY' :man can ftCi:lVel'I
becatW Id.serable; though 1. t is true that be 1I1U not be supremely bl.eeaed
it he encounters the l'd.sforttmes of a Mam.,lJ
In this .t'onulatlon of the theory" happ1ness as such remains an inward state

that can be .8sentiaU:r affected

b7 cireulllJt.aIlC8S oul7

it c1rot1llltanoee cause

to be di.acont1rlUed the actions Wh1ch const1tute happ1naas. For example,

dest!tution

Oa"l

rob

Otta

ot the le1aul'e raqu1red

tor the ponu1 t

wortbwbile 1n themselves J cl1sappoint.mant can lead to

d1scou...mrmt and tbeDce

to slack»ning of e,tfort, slcknHa can make activity 81mpl.y
ways outward

extra

events can 1n.t.trrupt the activity itself.

~.

which Otttward circumstances

remains oxtrlnd.c to the acUvi ty 1 tHlf •

not affect t..:'to activity

euenti~_B

earl

ot act1vities

~ble.

Ql the

In such

other band, the

add to -the happy act! n:t,y

1bus remov1ng the agJ'Geableneas doe.

in the radical sense of mak1ng the
"

activ1tq cease altogether.
1Ms 801ut1on is ma1nl;y satisfactory.

Aristotle does ma1ntatn that

happiness in the r.dds" ot mi.G8l7 is p3radox1oal, and tbat MAIl's mistorttG188
lett, b1m

a miserable, not a happy'. man, and tbat

Q.

happy man oan be dislodged

from h.1.8 happ1nees by a aeries of ......... and frequent mlatort.UDes.39 Yet tb1e

3SuCXlb3O-UOla8.

" . , tor example, 1n lO96al, UOOa8, l101all.
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can be understood 1n llIht of the principle that outward mlaf'ortUDe8 attect
ba.PP1I1888 1ntd.n81calq oal7 in the _nee thAt the7 ca make the good aotivit.1e
tbat consUtute 1.t Stop.4O .And thie vi_ is OOl181atent with tba d18t1..nct.1on
be~

happ1Deu IIDd bleaaedneae fOUDd in his solutton

oan be 8al4 that M_ ended hi.

EVen tbo'Ogh it.

~

ot the

Prl.aa queaUCD.

ttnbappUy (Ar1atotle Id.II-

self used this language ...11,,), 1 t 1s more accurate to say that "the haPW
l'l'lSl'l

can never beooJaa m.serabl.e" but fJ.'IB:T 1ndeed lose the state of supreme

bleaaedneaa. lb the preeent oon'brtxt, 1I01"8OftJ', Aristotle . . . . to apply the
8UIII

atandard to Pries

tbat be ....ta1ned

so.

Jd.nd of happ1Maa at leu' 111

1.ta . . . . . t.hoa&b be loat all elM and oou14 no longer be ca1.led bl.eMed.. He
could st.U1 be eall.ed bapw ... lcIin« as he GOUld at leut act as .. ftOble

111ft

1IOUl.d.
!be ftri.at1on 1ft Ari.atotle.s view ot Pd_ ntleot8 hi8 itpJrfeet.

reao1uttoo of U.

8~

be. . . . tbt SJltel1sotual and the

and bet.1IIen . .fa private and 800141 character.
tbat one tn a c~l t10Il of' a~

bo~

nat.ure of

,

at tbe one band 18 the tact

••tOJ'tuDe oan hardl7 be expectAld to ma1.n

the ao\i'fit7 1Ih1oh 18 h1.s bapp1ne•• J on t.bri other, the tact that there baft
al'lRllS baeD OUGS 1IttenD DIll in 8UOh dilUter nevert.belMa atnta1ned a state

ot

soul that 1a adII.U'able and not 1Mppropr1ately ll1cltmed to happ1ne8a.
'ftIU the M1 Manlftg of actS.vitl'ta 1mraJr4neea ntJIaId.ne
Btlt It doea eo baG.- ~le" v1ew of the
I

•

b

trca.an

~

unresolved.

PGl"SOft lt1Mtlt ~

31
partly tm'e801wd. An 1nveatJ.gatlon ot Ar1atotle's doctr1ne on the CODIP081t1cm
of the btJntm person wUl probabq not bnng out ~ t1nal and. dat1nl.t.lw
AJ"lst.Otel1an anawer t,o t.ha queat1an. But it oan perhaps ..... to he1gbten t.bI
diftl'l1ni tandene!...

ot

bi. tJlought

OIl

the matteJ.t. SUch an investigation

18

1I(lUed in an adequate tnatIIIIm'L ot the nut chU'act.er1at1c of happ1naae wb1ch
baS to be s1.ngled

3. Happ1Dees

all

out. tor 8pMlal noUoe. 41

perfeo\

The oharaoterls\i.o of perfection iaprobabl;y the

101ft,

bu10 1n Ar:1.8totle

t.

idea ot bappJ.aua, 81nce 1 t , . . . . tbe teleolog1cal subol'd1.natJ.on ot aU ImmI'D

acUows \1Ilder the ulUMte hwIaIl good. 1app1llua 18 oalled perteet in . .
aenM81

Sot ex1ata tor ita

0Wl1

eake, and thua does not look ba)'ODd ltaelt to

so. end btgbar th.aallt8eltJ second, lt 18 a funotion ot the b1gbe8t
and thus aoella tho tvaotlou ot ..,.,. loIrer 1liiian taoultyr.

maD,

t1nal m1 ..at aceUent..h2 'lbeae two senaes

It 18

~

attar an extended

deve~t

part.

ot

JIapp1neIa.t.s

ot perfect, an ol.oeEtq nlat.ecl.

oltha meaning and leftls ot the

ooneept ot ,0&1. that, t.he d1atlDctlon on whloh tbe two senses are ba8ed at lut

ell. II, no. 3 (1aaed1ately tollolrl.ng) of \h18 .~, ad JIII)N
eapeoialq Cbo. IV, no• .3, 111 wbioh a cl1ecualoD of the pertectne88 of con+~1.
tlOl1 lead8 81m to the quut.1on ot t,he eoapoa1 tlon of I'aIIaI1 nature.

blot.

~
tbI doubl4J ~ of the Greek rrJLel.os, adj;eotiw based 011 the IlO\'m
Tfi.loS' (f1n1s, end, goal, purpose) cOJf)rebending .f'i.nt the oos:nate S8IlH of
~and 8tOODd tbe exteD4ed
of ~ bcmoe ~rtect or again 5BoD1ta, P. 7S1a59-7S2a8 on Ti A.e('J os , and ~~ tor the

h2x•••

• • ot.

._12na

vatlvea of We ad3eOtift fora.
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!!!15!!!8! .n.~ tor 1't.!' 2!!.!.!9.- At

the beg1nld..Dg

ot Book c:Dt A1'1atotle

dison.see tJ18 protuslon of activ1 tie. in wh10b men engage and tbe purposes
vm1ch theao act4.v1t1_ "preeent. SQn1S ot tbeae acUnU_ are performed more
or leas tor their

0YI'l BakeaJ

so_ merely tor what t..he7 produce.li3

But among aU act.1v1t.1ea 18 d1aaem1ble 1Ibat ... be oaUed a scal1ng
va.luefU

DOt

awry purpose looks CIDll' to ltaelfJ

80DIJ

ot

are obviously ahIad at a

turther purpose, and no one would think ot tbaa as purposea in tbellllSelwa. kJ-

tiona 11ke thosH
tor what it

ot the crafts exist

tor the articles they

~. _dlc1fte-tlld.ng tor bealth.bh

cert.ain aotlY.lt1e. which are
punmita of I'iUIlJdm.

nDl'e

~::.roduoe,

work exists

1IoIIet..., there are

or leN genaraJ..ly apreed upon

a.I the

chief

1'ba8e aoant t,o goods 1I'h1ch taU UDder cme ot three broad

dlv1stone-t.llt ao.caUed 1'bne

f.

Lt..,...

_.oned

To judge t.rom maD livea, the mc>re or leas
oollC8pt1ou of the
Oood or l!app1r.Baa that. .... to preyaU. . . . . thea are t.be follO'ld.Dl. ~
the ana band the ~\.Y of lBl IIld the most ~ ldentit.r the Good
J I

113_ l.09laah.-7. lfn, 18 true that a certatn variety ls to be o~ "'_.
the ends at whiCh the arts and sclGMe8 aim. in SOD8 cases the act1v1tq ot
~ tbra an 18 it8elt the end, wlwJ:oeu in others the eo! 1s soma p:roduo\
over and above the mere aarc1. ot the art. J and in the arte wb:>se enda are
cena1n th1nga ooslde tl'lG practice ot the arts themselves, the_ products are
euent1all.7 aupertor in val... to t,be actlY1tlea. ft And l~). "It there.
tOft 8I'ICJAg tile ends at wh10h our act.ion.t a1a tbeJ'9 be one whlob we Wish tor ita
own aake, 1Ib.UAt .. $11 the othan 0Dll' tor the aake of tJll8, aDd if .. do on,
ohoose e~ tOJ' the saka ot aomatb1nf! else (Which would oblr1oulJ rel1llt
in a proaeaa ad. &B(.1D1a 10 that. all delire lft)'IJ].d be tutile and vain), it 1.
dlear that tbli ODe ~ t.e Ibc1 JIIl8t. be the Good, and 1ndeed the SUp,reme Good..
ld.nd

onl7

~. I.g. lO96aSo-7. "The XU. of ~ i8 • ccmatrai.Da4
of lUe, and 018&1"17 wealth 18 not the Good _ are 10 search ot, tor 1t 18
good as baiDg 'I.lfiI8tul, a .ana to ~ else. fl

13
with pleaaure, and accordingly are content with the IUe of Enj07ntBntfOOl" there are three srJGClall.y prominent. Lives, the one jUfJ~ mentioned, the
ate of PoUtics, and thirdly, the Ute ot Contemplation.4.;l

These punmlta seem to stand on their own a. goala desirable in theJnHlvea.
Nevertheless on nrioua consideration

SOl8

ot

t~..

ends have to give up the.il'

claim to being final. Weal. th, for example, otten co.. to OCCttW a prollinent
place in ments aill8J yet little reflection 1& needed to realize that I.IOIl87 la

desired only for what :1 t oan bring in t..M wIlT of material advantage, influence,
or the U.1ce.
Ewn the h1gh ol"'der of values that honorable reputation

repnaenw holds a

place probably subordinate to a more baslc Jd.nd of value.
Men ot refinement, on the ot.her hand, and JeD. of action think that t.be
Good is honour-tor this JUq be said to btl the end ot t.he ille of Pollt.lca
Jut _n'& 1'IIOtive in p\1l'8U1ng honour aee_ to be to assure th.....
selves ot their own mart tJ at leut they seek to be honoured by men ot
judgment and by people 1Ibo knOW the., that. ls, they de.ire to be honoured
on the ground of excellence. It is olear therefore that in the opinion at
all evente of lien ot action, exceUttnoe 18 a greater good than honour, and
one might perhaps aooordingly ~zPpose that virtue rather than honour 18
the end ot U.s Poll.tical We. 4

• • • La

If reputation

8IIIOng

men is valued not tor What it is itselt but for"be1ng a re-

eogni t10n ot an excellence, honor is in no a.nee final

uone

goals.

4St09Sb15-19. Cf. Stewart., I, 58-62, on the origin of the triple division
of Uvea, its development in Plato's Rep!bl~ S81). See also Aristotle'.
other UatJ.ngs of the Chief ways ot
If • • • honour, pleasu.re ..
intelligence, and excellence in its various forma • • • • " 1174a5. It • • •
sight, memory, knowledge, virtue • • • • " The lists are parallel though varied
in expression, the three ohief livea appearing under somewhat different (01"118,
namely, agreeable use ot senses, USe ot intelligence, lite of moral oharacter.
1'hus Aristotle oan speak of tho lit. o£ Poll tle8 in one oontext and in another
context oall it the Ut. ot Honour, whereas honor, as Will be seen, and
polittcs are both logioally subordinat
., of good charaoter, the
aotive 11te.
,~vJ\
W€'~

lIr.. . 7b2.
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In nook '1'Im Ar1fJtotle will t.ftat another claas ot goods 1th1cb

final

Q.l'e

with regard t.o the actions that ex18'l; to support t.heIa, but are not t1nal With-

out quallf1catiozu

the various apeeable actlv1 U.ea eaUed

et1maa.

Ari:Jtotla's notion of the meaning and rank of thaae pursuits i9 not altoeetber
clearly defined in his extant 1lOrlcB. lIost of the act1v1ti.ea that

lIIm

once work 18 done, 1n lut analyals come quite olose to being Uttle
lf~'1J

of ralax1ng or lettlng otf temd.OIUJ.

turn to

1DOl"e

than

l'n this they are usetul ooans .toward

wU-be1ng but ought not be pursued Without that IItd1c1.nal end 1n JId.nd.41
Wbate'ger the ambiguities of his d ;ctrlne, Aristotle hardl.y leaves

l"'OOftl

to

cona1der such pursuits .f1nal 1n the tull sense. Aa.1Bemrtts cannot, stand u a

.anal.

value arq more tbaftll.lOl1C7 can or honorable reputaticm.

It was atter a gradual. auboJ'd.1Mtlon of
ba810

ot man

purposea t-hat am
IlU8t

reduce to

08Il8

C)Qe

~ COl'llIaOll

b.Y Aristotle •• t1ma to

IDIaD punnd.ts to I1D1'e

the opin1on that. aU

or m1'e of the8e t.hr'H yslue8,

~oode

pleU1JN, o:xoal.lGnce

or character, lntelleotual deftlopmJDt.. Bach ot t.heae 18 __how t1Dal..
"t:nJ~. pU.Ii'&8UI'8, 1ntell1geme, and __ lleDce in its

choo8e

~

various

l'OJ'JD . . .

to'!' tlwiz- own sake. Caince we should be glad to have each or .tt.a

.,
410f• chapter IV ot this attld;y. pp. 83 -92, wbere the qtl88t1on of le181ll"e
ACt.1n t.1_ 18 tnated at langt,b.

3S
altl'1.OU.gh no extz'anaous advantage resulted from it• • • •"48

Tbere 18 an

1nt..I"iW!Jlc value in each of these states J t.be7 are not desired the -way a _ana

f"urthor end 10 du1red.

soma

(In that

case,

t.he means would not be desired at

all i£ the end could be ga1nod wi t.bout. 1 t. ) But pleuure, excollenco of
character,

.1Iltelli~~nc8

oertain aenae tl.nal.
Aristotle wtshea to

are desirable siap13 for what they are, thus are in a

let. they are not f'1."1al in t"be stl'iot &enM in which
'W'K;

\be terra.

Happiness alone 18 t1nal in thie eense.

It ie t1r1al at least 88 IItCh as

the otd1er t.hree are f1nal., 1n :relard to all outnrd-3.00ldng p'Grau1 t8 j but 1n

add1 u,on 1 t. bas a tinalrleaa of 1ta om even 1n regard to these tbI'ee.

des1l'ed tor t.ller.rtaelvaa, to be sure.

~t

by are

in eo. deeper sense they are desired.

becaurte happ1naa. 1s desired, they are thl'ee bu1c apreaai0D8 of t.bat "urge to

perfect ex1stence Q whlcb Ar1atotl.e wUl d1ecuss in Bock '1:en.49 Th1s r.u.cal

dea1re tor ?8f'teot1on 18 to be identified w1th the dea1rG for bapp1nea8.

In spealdng ot degNe8 of f1nallt.y. . . __ that a th1.n6 pursued as _ end
in itself 1s 1K>X'e tinal tb.•n one p'tlI'8t1ed aa a aums to something elae, and
that a tl11ng never cboaen as a meane to arqth1.ng alae 18 more t1nal than
•

r

~097b2.'. ct. U7ba-8,

81..1Ibent Ar1atotle ~a~8 a llat of gooda of

'lb... tao l1ataJ
panll.el. (of. note 4;.) and contain t.he sam
at... exoapt, that the later l1at" tNata pleatU.'8 in quite a different ....,...
"Also there aro lllalV t~8 1'Ihlob m;. ~houl.d 00 e~.r to poasess even if tbe7
brought us no pleasure, tor instance, Bight, ~, !QlOWledge; Virtue. It IDIV
be the ~ that the.. are ll8OEtaaar1l¥ attended by plea8'U.r9, but that makea no
d1ttel"8Da<lt, tor . . ahould desire them even if no ple481.lh reaulted frog thal!l.n
11mB .Aristotle subaU t:.utfls actLons ~ and ~ (M ropl"eaoot.atJ.w o1~ sense
act!.vJ:t.7) in place of pleacrure, .cnJiii adaPts a language 111 accord with the
new refi..1sm.rt. of his thought on pleasure as i 11 deYelop8 in Book ?Jall.

t1nal val'U8.

49117SaJ.0.a8.

rr

I

thl.ngs chosen berth as ends in t..her1I8elves and as means to that thingJ and

acoordi.ngly a

thing chosen al~'1J as an end and ne'9'er as a means .. call
absolutely final.. lfow happ1neaa abaft all else appeal'S to be ahsolutely
t1nal in this sense .. since .. al~ choose it for its own sa1ca and lWf'V'
as a nwana to sOJnl!tthlng elseJ 1Iihereas honour .. pleuure, intelllcenoe, a1d
e:xcellenoe1n 1 ts various torma, _ ohoose 1Ddeed tor their tMn sake.. • •
but _ also Choose tb;~m for the sake or happ1n8as, 1n the bel1af that t.be7
w1U involve :Lt. But no om chooses happ1ne8s tor the sake ot honour,
pleut:Ll'e, ete., nor u a _ana to anything whatever ot.hal' than .t tselt .50

If

th~

urp tor happ1nees is what ttl t.1mately moves am, the three b'lS1c

(losiros in whioh this urge expresses 1 \.Selt are 'fk)rthy or at ta1.moont in801"ar as
tlw}," are capable

ot achieving happ1.nel!ls,

atta1.mnent only 1naofar as they

se~

just as all other values

tU"e

wortb,y

in ooh1Ntt.ng one of these tl1ree.

kind of t'lnal1t.y t.h.e tl1l'ee oro on a par.

~J

ot

In tb1a

far as th ts finality is concorD8d

ph'H18ure ia just as final .. &xoel.lcmae of character or int.ellie:ence. But eonslderAd in relation to the tinallt1' of bapplnau, Wh:Loh look8 to abIolut.e PB"teotJ.cm, they take on a relati'VVDNs of the1r own. TbDugb tb.ey are
valuable in one respect, 1n another-ln relation to the att.a.1nJl¥mt

....-.one ot them

~

be

11>1'8

~

or perfect1

valuable than \he othel'll if 1 ta looks to a h1.e!:

level of .""rtection.
For !!!ppiness !!..!:b!. 11leb!!t

~

in man.

Arls tot19 goes on to ska tab out

the 8t.epa by which 1t 1. detem1.nad what bumaft sct.1v1t7 approache8 closest to

absolute PEtrteotlon.. Sl But the chief part,

ot

th1a queat,lon he

N~

tor BoO

50].091 a30-b7 •
~23-1098al.7 • The method will consist in an uam1nation of the
vm1.01l8 typical forms of human 8C L1.v1t.y (with much of the Ethios devoted to a
clarification of the norms pt'eSe!1 t 1n th-. acttvl ties at £Ii9Ir'''be8t) and

t.1.Mlly a selection of the activ1ty or aotlv1t.1ea Which belJ't fulfil what 18

lalown or. the oapac! tie. of hulrMm natA'lre.
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ten, in wh10h

he wtll discua. spec1t1c~ the aotlv1t¥ from aJIIOIl8 all buman

aoUv1U•• that. constitutes ram'lJ happiness.52
The.. two requ1a1.tea ot ulttmate bmtan value are what 18 1Mant. bt the two

senses in lI'f":1.ch .e2rt!S!1i1op character!... happinelS. Bapp1.neas 1s final becau..
it is sought -.bIclute17 10'1: 1.ta 0'Wft sake and all elR tor happ1nu8' saloe.
HappineSIJ

18 met excellent bMauae, as w1ll appear in the d1.acuaa1on of conteJD

plat1on, 1t. oonet.tIt 1n

ot man,

activ1.. that 1s aocol'<U.ng to t.he b1ghest. capac1ty

tba capwlit7 that. . .lea to achieve in the Blst perfect wq \be moat

perfect objeota.

4.

all

Bapp1.ne.s as

And 1t 11 We e:xoel.leftce that 1. the. reason tor its t1nal1t7

aa3o.rable.

A JIII'l who apendtJ the s1gaU'1cet part

ot his Ute in.

pos_81on of the .,.t 110rtb7 objectil in the IIOst wortl:\y

such an act!.""

'fIq,

1s bappJ' b7 tb1a

The det1n1.t.1on of ~ which .Aristot.le repeatedq giftS uader-

.,.". fact.

lJ.ne1 the identity of the state !l!R..,1Ma8 with the state ot perlect aot1'4tZ
1. tseltJ and tor this reason theft 18 no qautJ.on

or

ha.pp1neaa t ar:S.a1Dg as

result ot aot1:d. V or tII/:J:I' other relatiOll8MP' bet.wen the

1;.1IO.S3

Jl'JJrluantneea

on the other htad 1s deeoribed as a propert7 ot 8UOh act1:f1 t7, ao-thlna

alose~

neceuariq, oomaeoted wltJ11t, au a quaUtT lIOUldbe, 1naeparable, 18t.

diat.1Dat and

su~.SL PJ.euantneaa 18 attli'bu.\ed

S2U16a.lo.l119833. Of. Ch.IV, no. 3.
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•

1 ,

to aotlv1\7,

.1_t as

38
goodneSS and tinenus are J but none ot these 'luaU.ties can be idant11'1ed wi tb
activity.
And further, the 11f. ot excellent activity is essentially pleasant. For
the teeling ot pleasure is an experienoe of the soul, and a. thing gives a
man pleasure in regard to which he is described as 'tond ot so-and-so'
•••• CTJh1ngs pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is
noble, and so alwqs are actions in oontormlty with virtue, so that they
are pleasant essentially as 'Well as pleasant to lovers ot the noble.
'.rberetore their 11f. has no need of pleasure as a sort ot orna:mental
appendage, but contains its pleasure in 1 tsel£ • • • • But if 80, actions
in conform1ty with excellence must be essentially pleasant."
Pleasure is so olosely connected with activity that a defiCiency of
pleasure indicates a defioiency of act!vi ty, and absence of pleasure absence ot
activity.

A man that pertorms a certain action and does not take pleasure from

so acting, is in fact only going through the motions of it.

Since the activity

is not congenial to him he is not genuinely disposed to it.

But so tar as he

lacks disposition or capacity tor an action, he is really unable to perform
it • .$6

"1099a7....30.

>6Cf• 1l04a27-ll05'b12, viz. pas sima "An index of our dispositions is
atforded by the pleasure or pain that acoompanies our actions. A man is
temperate it he abstains trom bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itselt
enjoyable, prorugate it he teels it irksome J he is brave if he faces danger
nth pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with pain."
tf Again, as we sa1.d betore, every formed disposi tion of the soul realize. 1te
f'ull nature in relation to and in dealing with that class of objects by which i
1. its nature to be oorrupted or improwd." "We 'f.fJII:3' then take it as establl.
that virtue has to do wi. th pleasures and pains, that the actions which produce
it are those which increase it, and also, if differently pertonood, destroy it,
and that the actions from which it was produced are also those in whioh it is
exercised." "["AJcts done in conformity with the virtues are not done justly
or temperately if they themselfts are of a certain sort.. but only if the agent
also is in a certain state of mind when he does them) first he must act with
knowledge J secondly he must deliberately choose the act and choose it for ita
own Bake, and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent dlspositi
of character." For an act does not consist merely in something the body goes

3'
pl&aaantlleea 1s an eesentlal qual1ty of the e:ellent activ1ty

1tho~e

chiet

cha.:ractorlstlc. Aristotle has been <1eacr1bing in the abstract throughout Book
()le,

and is

con8Gquen't~

an esaent1al qual1ty of happiness, which 1s ldent1f1ad.

with that excellent acUvlt,y.

Thus the question aria•• how the two are di8tinguished and related,

h!PpLneu" which Aristotle oonceives as the supra.m end of Ufe. and W?m!$;,
ox' pleasu:r."\9 t wh1eh is co~ taken to _an much the sane as happiness.

••

-

throUgh but lIS also, and more ImportantlT, an act:trl. ~ ot so_ faculty such as
the f'a.cu1'tf'that ..t. moral charaoter. -In this sanse, then, a dishonest man
may do something that would be conaldeNd an honest deed, but be is not acting
with honor. For be baa no real dtspasl t10n toward doing honest daeda. But
tb18 1s preciael¥ lIbat HoDol' 1,..

-

CHAPmR III

Aristotle'. two treatisos ou pleuurol are to SOJ}J!t extent parallel.. The
2
'
earlier pSS5agtll is ma!nly concerned wit.h refuting the arguments ot the AcadeDV'
aga1nat pleasure and nth .stablish1.ng its 1ntl'1naic exoellenoe and even

supreme oosirabill t¥.

The later passage repeats this

d~ren8e

in br:teter form

emphasizing its poSitive aspects, contrasts pleasure to imperfect st-a.tes, and

introduces a sign1tlcantdist1nctlon between pleasure and the activity trom
which pleasure takes ri...

It represents a more aubtl3' developed view of the

subject. than Aristotle's oarlier fOl"lllllatlou

ot the relationship)

the very

I

con'trut between the t1fO puts Aristotle's maturer intention 111 special rellet.
The treatant-

ot pleuure

thus falls into two parts, fint, tJ1e defensive

passages from Books Seven and Ten, which consider pleasure in itselt as a
,

.'

"

gem:d.ne good, second, the poSit-1ft pusages from Book Ten, which consider the

origin of pleasure in act.lv1ty and the relationship bet_en the

1;110.

luS2bl-ll$4b.31u U'{2al9-ll76a29.
2."

,_

ef. teonard, especial...., Chapter III and Append1xIn on the chronologr ot
Book Ten in relat10n to Book Seven and the reat ot the Corpu Ariatotellcua.

40

1.

Pleasure it.self as a good
To estabU8h that pleasu.re is a good Aria totle makes use ot a triple ap-

proach.

enl,

He defends pleasure aga1nat accusation of the AcadeDV that it is an

next. he develops, dofends, and qualifie., the opposite view, RUdoxus's

op1n1on that pleasure is the ohief good.

After t.his he introduces pleasure '.

relation to activity, and thus shows that pleasure derives f'.rom a perfection 1n
the one who enjoys rathal" than an i.mperfeotion in h1a.

This thIrd approach

involves problema-not reoognized in the earller pusage-t.hua mald.ng it.
neooaaary to close discussion of pleasure by itself and open dl80uasion of its
rslation to

activi~.

. lIt1mbera of the

A.oadeDV argue -a&1nst pleasure in

any of three ways.

Spau-

cippus holds that it is not good at all, tor it is only a process, the temperatA
avoid it, the discreet do not, aeek 1t (rather, abaence of pain), it interterM
with thought, it. 18 not the end ot

t!I/q

art., 1nterior beings Uke ohildren and

animals Hek it.:3 bee "ar1ed re850M amount to an a:rgumemt agatnst pleuure
because it lacks f1naUty.

What 18 onl.1 tbt way to an end or is not itself the

end of' something elae i. not itself desirable. What is deairable only to le8M
beings, not to those whose praterenee oarries .ight, 18 at leut not pl'Operq

desirable.

Other l3IIBS'Ibel'8 ot the Aoademy argue that

are good, most are bad, swe 8CDa

ot thea do

e"faf1

1f certain pleuuru

haria and 80_ are admitted to be

indecent. h The t.lrl.:rd argument, recalline' part of the fir8t, 18 that even 1f

31052bl3-20.

4ru,fl*,

21, 22.

all pleasuree are r:oOO a pleasure Mverthelss8 CamIOt be the chief good becaus8
lt is only a proo.... '
'i'he chiat

~t.

against pleasure, then, ls that it ls not to be des1.red

at all slnoe one .}'Quld rather do witb:mt pleasure altogether than enjoy it by
baing

subject to the imporfect,1on 1 t

~l1e..

F~.pt

tor ate.. prel1ad.na.ry

8ideratlons Arlstotle poatponea disoua.1on at t.his diff1culty until the other
argumants have been disposed ot.
the objeot

ot reapectabl.e desire,

'l'bese lesser arguments, that pleasure ls not
and that lt sometimes happena that pleuure

i8 harmf'ul or indeoent, Arlstotle 801ve. by di.t1ngt.Jish1ngthe _aning

He nakee use

ot

t.'tWO distinctlons

ot

good.

ot good.

Firat, good 1s either &load

~ ~tlca.t1op or good !:!!. !. certa1n re.2!!~. 6

Second, good 1s 81 ther

Sl!t

i222,

.!!!,1t8el;f or lopfl 'bec.ause 2!.!2l!!. 9s,c.t.ance. 1 Aristot18 does not consiaten
appq t.hese dlst1nct.iona in the two defenses that tollow, but

~les

flrst one,

then the other, then both, depending on whether the general goodnus of

pleasure is conceded or denied.

It one grmts that all pleasures haft $Ome element of good in theta, it ls
still pos"ible to stq that DlIID3' of them are not good without quallfication but
need to be UHd properly
they aN good),

(They could be used nth harm.tul effect even though

or are more su1table to one class

01"

age the to another (they

are not to be used by just .".one at all ewn though they are good).

6U~~"1
' ,
::,KoUCO 1_10I"'uw

, ",rrA&uS~
ft - /....
\
rap
10

'\.,
oe
TIVL/

i ••• I i 9P.11c i tar or

1US2b34.~a'f~ ~/~~KOs i.e. E!!:. accidens, as

pel !2.t

or~a..e

ea.u. TO.

-_.:I.

id
seuu",u~ ~

would·be oontransted with
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'.l:he argumante that the temperate man avolds pleasure, and that t.be
prudent man pursue. freedom from pain, and that an1m.als and ah1ldren
pursue pleasure, are all met. by tb8 same reply. It, has been expla1nod
how some pleasures are absolutely gOod~ an~ bow not all pleamtre8 are
I'~d
DDt wi.thout qual.1t1oat.ion • Bow lt is those pleasures
which are not absolutely good t.hat be
animals and oh11drun pursue,
and 1. t is freedom from pa1n arls1ng from the want of those pleasurea
t.hat the prudent man pursues. that ls, the pleasures that tnvolw desire and pain, namely the bod:U¥ pleasures (tor iiboae arc of that
nature), or t.heir excessive forms, in regard t.o which ProfUgacy is
diapl.QN. That. is why the c~ate man avoids ~xoe.Sive ood1q pleasurea. tor awn the temperate man bas plea.:rurea.

Cl•••

Butt-he pleasures whioh the id.ee man values are more 1ntrinsicall;v valuable, tlvl t.
1:;, approach closer to goodne.. \1'1thout qualUtoation.
en the oth.er band, 1f one deni•• that oorta1n tunotions conaidft'ed

pleasant. are real17 good, it 18 sUll poaalble to expla1n how thelr pau8Iltnass ma-Y be the reault ot
pleasant..

80_ o~tance

even though they are themselves not

'l11e pr1lB exaple of t.his is the pleuant.ness u.ociated 111 th varlO'll.

processes of NatoratiOD, such 88 convalescence or eating.

In the.. the

pleasure belongs to tJl8 health or balance of nouriabmnt, that

1~1

raatontda ttl ~

proceeD of retlDhtng t.bat balance ia not It.Ml£ pleaaant-d.\ even inYOlves tlw
"
"

pain

ot def1clency....out. der1ws its pl.eaaant.ne•• b'om the $tate

to be achiwed

and t.rom the state ot other taault.lu not affected b.1 t.be defio1.anc.Y but
capable ot

~

the tact of anticipated reatorat101l.

In this wa:y even

dtaagrne.ble mdiotnee or the discomforts ot heaUng are pieuant psr 4Caldena. ~

•

BuS3a21-3S.
9U $2b2S-US:'1a34-b2 J l£...o2l.

This same distinc tion may be applied to pleasures which do harm and to
those wh1ch are indecent.

A given function m.ay itself' be quite good and

pleasant, yet do harm to other functions under certain cirClJ.mstances.

The

pleasure involved in 8lJ1" given activity does not interfere with that act1v1t;n
the pleasure of thinking helps thinking, the pleasure of work, work.

The fact

that the pleasure of one activit,. interferes wi th another activity-say-, that
of work, 'With thinking-is no argument against pleasure. 10

This applies also

to cases where a real loss is involved, not mere1,. a temporary distraction:
To argue that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are detrimental to health is the sar.., as to argue that health is bad because
some heal~ t.bings are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and
heal tb1' things can be bad in a relati V6 sensEI.. but that does not malrs
them refPY bad; even contemplation may- on occasion be injurious to
health.
Again, indecent pleasures need not, be simply evil because they involve

evil.

Here Aristotle makes use of both distinctions.

In one view of t.he

matte~ ~

the acts in which indecencies are involved are themselves good and pleasant;
they are not good without qualification, though, and thus can be misused, for
"

example, b.Y being used to excess. 12 This i~' the arg~lt that Aristotle
follows in Book Seven.

In Book Ten he argues more fully.

It;. ecent pleasures

may be considered not pleasant in themeelves, but enjoyable R.2!. accidens becaU8t

a. perverted or diseased appeti to finds its satisfaction in them. 1 )

10:l.1$3a2l-2 S.
llU58al7 -21.

l2U 54a12-2l.

l.3U7.3b21-25.

Or they 11JI!f:j'

4,
be cOllsidered pleasant in tl'1eIIsalves but not des1Z"able 01" pleum'lt 1n the wider

sonse since they have to be obt.a1.ned in ~1"8 that are unde8il'able.14 A tb1l'd

attitude w:ruld consiat 1n 3udging the goodne8. or badness of aU pleasure by
1
the goodneas or badne.8 of the aat.lon from wh10b 1 t proceeds. , This solution
1s perhaps the mat bulo because 1t grow. out ot Artatotle'a notion ot the
relat,ion ot activit,- and pleasure.
By this set ot distinction. Ar.letotle dHtend8 pleasure agalnat the

ADadeIV"'s aocuaatJ.on at badDeas.
not indicate that 1t is bad,
respect,

01'

onq

i'be objectione brought up aga1nst ple.un

that certa1n pleasures are not. gcxxi in ever:!

that they so_ti_s are detr1mantal to other goods

OJ"

actions that are bad. Before going on to consider the Acadelqf•

imOlve

.s.n

arguMnt

ap,ainst pleasure-that it cannot be a good because as a _re process it is not
~

f'inal-Ariatotle

pr~t8

a mIIlber of cOllsidel'ati.on to indioate the

goodness of pleasure in a positl"" 111'&7.

'1'heM 81"gUIIlMlts are from the heOOnis

school ot E'tldox'aa, 1Ibo Wle. them to prove that pleuure 18 \he chief good.
'l1le

.,.t basic 1ndioatlon ot the goodnesa of pleasure is the tact that

beings seek it by a natural tnst1not.
Im'eover, that all an1male and all hwIum beings pursue pleas1U'8 18
some tnd1catlon that it. 1.8 in a sense the SUprema Goods
No l'U1IOJ' nailed abroad by mIIIll" peoples
Comes utt.er~ to naught,.

-

14Ibld • 2$-28.
lSu73b29-U74a8.

But they do not all pursue 'the same pleasure, since the natural state
and t.he beat state neither is nor s . . . to be the a. . for them allJ

yet sUll they all pUl"8Ue plea.imre. Indeed 1 t 1s poseible that 1n reality
they do not pursue the pleuUl"Q wh1Gh they tb1nk and would sl1i¥ they do,
but aU the .1De ~uureJ tor nature bas implanted in all things
someth1ng divine.
'lbo members

ot

t.he AoadeIq do not accept

their d1sagreelllmt only with a

Wlre

tnl. reasOD1ng. Aristotle counter.

eXP+ici t application of the principle that

nature al'W'Q'S seek8 the hut.
Those on tho other hand who rlony that that which all creatures seek
to obtain, 1s good, are 8we17 talld.ng noneenae. For what all think
to be good, that, 'tie . . .rt, 1s good, and he that subwrts our beller
in the opin1on of all. f.II8Dld.nd, will hardly persuade us to bellew his
own either. It only the irrational creature. atz'Ove to obta1.n what 18
pleasant, theft would have been so. seDM in th1a oonten\lon. but
1nasmch aB be1nga endowed D1 th lntelligence do so too.. how oan 1 t be
right? And per~ evu the lower ani.mala poe.... aD inatiztGt superior
to
own natnNs, wb1cb seeks to obta1n the good appropriate to their

thJ.Y

Jd.nd.

.

A aeoond cODfd.derat.1oD taTor.I.ng the oonteDt4.on that pleasure is good

dert".. trom
rejecta

ple8lU1*8 t S opposition to pain as a good to an evil.

l!~xua 'a

op1nlon on the

~d

opposed 1n contrat.")" dil'OCt1ona to a mean

that

The

Jcadel\f

both pain and pleuure ..,. be •

ot .utral reeling. Arl.atotla ntuma

to t.he rational. ohoices of man. 1nd1ca1liJlg the true nature ot p1euure and pa1D

l6uSlb2S-32. Of. Book Ten, U72b9-l5, where the . . . &rguI*lt 18 given.
this t1me with a qual1f1catlon that it prons pauu.re a good. not neoelsar1l7
the ohlet good.
111173al-S. Of. alao MIt. lO72b), and Joachim, p. 2)8 and pp. 291-7.
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It both pleasure and palo are in the clus of evUs, both 1IOUld be also
of neoe.sity things to be avoided, and 1t in the elan of things neutral,
neither ought. to be aolded, at} they ought to be avoided aU•• but as it
1s .... 8M men avoid pain aa evil and cboe.. pleasure as good, it 18 tharetOI'8 as good and evU that they are oppoaed. 18

Mn'eover, pleuuJ'e 1& oona1dered a necea• ....,. 1ngredient in the Ut. ot a
~

happy me.

But U' pleasure 18 not a. good there 18 no reason 1IIb,y it

shoUld be des1l'able at all. It 1s dea1rable because it enhances, and only what
is good oan make scathing el.Ie bet.ter.19

tfCr.,Jbe

addition of pleuure to

an;y good-for 1.nst.aDce, jUlrli or temperate aonduot-make& that good

desirable I but

~

1IDl'e

the good oan enbanoe the good. ,,20

A'l'1at.otle amtiona abo an ~

ot EudoXWJ

wb10h recalla his om view

of pleU'U'e 01' pleasurable act.iY1't,7 as cme of the tJlree final goods.
thing 1s

"CTJ'hG

.,.t desirable which .. chooae not. as a _ana to 01' toJ" the sake ot

something elM J but auch ada1ttedq is pleaBI.ll"e' ... never ask a . . toJ.' what

purpose be indulge. in pleaaura-we ......., 1 t. to be deatrable in 1 tself. 21

The Aoadelqts main

at'gUMnt

lacks the f1nal1ty which the

aea1nst the good%Jeas of pleaa'tU"Ei

~

noUon of ,good l.uwlve..

1,'1

that

'-t

Pl.euunJ lacks tb18

final1t,. bctcauee it 1s a proce8sJ and prooess itself 18 not good but only looks
to the

~;ood

whtah wUl have been produced when

proces. has

coat

to an end.

-

Ar1stotla t s anawr to this objection i. that it 18 qu1t.e rlght it pleasUN 1a a

l8u1.3a6-l3.
19l1.54a1-7.

2Ou72b24-26.
2l:u72b20-23.

ct. U53bl-7.

~---------..
bB

The tact t.hat. so. of the most t.ypical pleaau.res arise in the

CO'tll'88

of reatoratlve procesaes 11ke eating or recreation lends plaualb1Uq to this
vie"" through a consideration of other pleuures 11lm &ell8at.1one of small or
hear1.ng or intellectual. pleasures, none of wh1cb arises on the Ii 111ng-in of a

detioi.fmOy J could at. once call the tbeoI'7 into question. 22 Tho'ugh :trequant.'q

found in oOlJP8D7 wit.h process.a, pleuure 18 not itself. proce8s, but ows its
ex1atenoe to

activity,

wh10h 1. a state of perfect.ian rather than a way to such

a state.

activ1V'
Aga1n, it- dt:IeS not. tollow, U 80_ argue, that as tho end is bat.ter t.ba:n
Ule process towards it, 80 tho" nI1$t be 60ln1:~thi.ng bet.te:a." than pleuUN.
for pl.eU\11I'M are not really Pl"OO8Ue8, nor an they aU 1Dc:tdental to a
prooea.. tJloy ;U"e acU..,lt.1es, and therelore an endS nor do t.bey result
from the proaus of' a.cqu1.r1ng our faculties, but from their d8I'C18eJ nor
haw they all of them some end other than themselves. thisitJ true only
of the pleuurea ot progresa toward. the perfection of our nature. Hence
it is not correct to Wino pleaBlll"e as a. 'conscious process' J the term

should rather be 'act.lv1tf7 of our natural state', and tor 'cOI'l8CiOll8' _
must substi tuw fun1.mpoded'. sa. th1nkers hold that pleasure i. a
pJ"ocea8 OIl the pound that, U. 18,Coad 1.n the tull.eat ..nee, bedause 1n
their vieW an ~iJ.v1ty i6 a process; but really an activit)" 18 dlfterent
£rom a prooe... J
.
.

In tb1. flMII'lH, a pleU'Ul"Cl wUl be the

&upI"eIl8

good. the DUpre. good of a maD,

his abLer happ1Dess, w:Ul be the activ1ty ot hi. highest tacul1;', and pleasure
18 the un1.mpeded
F'

act.1.v1tq ot a tacult7_

rf--------h9---S1Dce every faculty bas U,s um.D{leded actlY1t.y', tho actiVity of all
the faculties, or of one ot them (whiohever oonatitutes Happiness),
when ~, JIIWIt probab17 be the most dea1rable t.hi.ng the" 18,
but an ~ded acUdt¥ is a pleastll"8J 80 that on this ~hovd.ng the
SUp;r.e1l& Good will be a particular ld.nd of pleasure. • • • 4

The paatsagOs in Book TeD which treat. this q.at1on base the di8t.1nctlon

bat1men pleasure and proceas on a psychological exam1nat.1on of the character1at-los proper to each.

EHential to the notlOl'l of proous or .,Uon 1s the in-

completene8s of fItf3 part

ot 1t. Considerat.ion ot

8fl7 1IlOtant. or period in 1t

discloau so_thing 1ntrinaloally 1ncouplete, a step on tbe

f'u.rther, a tr8gll8Dt of a'lhole.

In a sense

war to

something

the Whole ProceH is something

8VeD

incomplete wofar as 1t 18 oonaldered onl11n 1taelt nth aahi8'f8Mllt of the
goal and end of the DCt.1ort-toward excl.u&td as ly1ng outaide the ;4'00e88 proper.
No part ot a prooe18 make. . .tIN unl.eaa seen 48 a step on t,be ...,. to aom&th1ng,

nor does the serle8 ot stepa 'UlWt88 _n in the r1nal and

?X'OO88$-end1ng

aoh1.,....t ot a purpose that. standa b7 ltHlt.2$
But plel.lflll"e d1t.ten fro.

pZ'OCe88

in 1t.a

. .sent,tal

tragmant ot p1euure 1.8 stlll pleasant taken, by itself.
not. ha."h to be Hen

U

oompletene_.

Sl!!. pleasant.,

Any gi

it doe.

a step on \be ,.. to sotaeth1ng ltHlt desirable.

Durat.1.on ot a. pleasure """ be desirable, but 11117

Ja)IIIIlt

of a pleuant duration

po...ases till the quaUt.at1Ye excellence that a long period would atford, so
tbat the

onl7

d1fterence between a long pleasure and • short. one 1s q'Ulllllt1tati

••

24us3blO-l.3. In Book Ten Aristotle revise I this equat.ton of pleasure and
supreme aat.1v1ty.

25U1lt.al9-b5. ct. Joachim, pp. 269-275, for a suromar.r of the Aristotelian
ot change in ita various k1.nds, substant.1al change, process, and d1t...

thsOl')"

terent mot.1onsJ and 275-279 for detailed appl1oatton ot this doctrine to the
argurarmt at hand.

not quaUtati"e.

Prooesa, on the other hand, requires duration because its

completeness or perfection is only something to be achieved, not so;oothtng 1n
fact possessed.
Now the act of slcht appears to be perfect at. any moment of ita
duration, it does not require auything to su~rveM later in order to
perf'oct its apecitic quality. But p1ea';ure also appears to be a thing

of this nature. For it 18 a whole, and one cannot at w.ry moment put
one's hand on a plOU'!ll'e wb1ch will only exhlb1t ita specU'ic quality
perfect;J,;,it its duration be prolonged. • • •
moment of pleasurable conaoiouenes. i. a pertect whole.
These considerationa also ahow that it is a m1atalae to speak of
pleuu.re as the result ot a mUon or ot a process of eenerat1on. For
we cannot so delCl'ibe eft~ng, but only web thing. as are divided into
parts and are not, whole••

CIJve't'1

Aristotle has solved the Aca.den\Yts ohief argument aga1nst pleasure b7 de-

1l¥lnetrattng pleasureta 1ntr.lnsio perfection, ita wholeness in active actualitYJ
he has placed the IlI08t General Ol"iterion ot the excellence

O'l'

badness ot the

various pleasures in the excellence or oadness of the act! vi ties from. whioh the
proceed.

Such considorati0D8 are helpful for evaluating pleUU1'esJ

espeo~

they are useful in treating certain rather specific problema that arise in
connection with them.

To this purpose JrQst .pf the passages of Book$' Seven and

Ten have been devoted. But the valld1t;y and larger worth of these 1ndlvidual
s)lutions depend.s on some deeper view
indireotly suggest.

or

the realities which these preble_

It 1. necessary for Aristotle to indica.te

I'IlOI'e

e:x:actl3

structural relati0D8bip of pleasure to tho activity or actuallty which Ls ita

Sl

2.

Pleasure and activ1ty

Pleasure ari.ses from activU,,. and i8 inconcelvahle apart fi'om 1 t..

What ia

the mean1.ng or th1.8 actlv1tl on which pleasure, u well., in an earlier

context, happine.s, i3 sald to depend?

Aristotle's doctr1.ne of activity or ac-

tivation as the fult1lDmt of a faculty is a special appl1cat.lon of his general
doctrine of aotuaUtY......nd-PC88ibil1ty2"1 to certain reallt1es found exclusively

1n aniwals and motu

intelleot1on.

the apecial types of actualization which are sensation and

The principle ot aotual.1zation 18 applied 1n a number ot ways.

firat, to any bo<tr at alWiv1ng or not-insofar as it has some torm.
Thua, the esalble element i8 the _twr which 1. capable ot supporting thi8 or

that tOJ'1l, the actual
.T element is whaWVer de term1.natlon the matter comas to

support. Tbe actual11rl is the fact

or

such _twr's supporting such a

de termination.
Again, the pr1nc1ple oan be appl1ed to &n.7 11v1ng body 1n ragarci to the

mat basl0 tunctlon1ng ot cvthing that is alive, tho actuality ot nutrition.
In this cue actuality ls lAOre than mare infQl"ld.ng

ot a oertaln matter. Here

21cr• a) Pbya. 189b3v..l9la22J 20l.a9-b15, Jlet. 1069b3-34. general applioation of the pr1ne1plB of :.?Ctuallty md possiotm'y to the theory of matter and
torDlJ b) E!. An. 4l2al-41.;alO, 4l$.ll2-14. appUcat10n to t.heory of soul as the
~r1nc1ple ot-rtteJ c) t8 An. 429aJ.0..432al3. applioation to intellection. ct.
also Joaehi.na a) pp.
116-186, 2'/1-2"1$. b) )8, 39, 0) 2"9, 280, 288-291.

I,a;

S2
certain matter that belongs to it, its body, proceeds, without altering its
first way of functioning, to a second f'unetion, that of adding to its body by
assimilating to itself matter which has hitherto existed under other forms.
1he third kind of actualization belongs to certain U v1ng beings by reason
of cognitive faculties.

Here the faculties of sensation and intellection are

non-physical ways of actualizing in the soul the forms of beings distinct from
it insofar as they are cogntzed. 28
The activities of the various faculties are rooted in the Uving prinCiple
"Which is i tsel! the actuality ot the body' that it 1nforms. 29 Each of the tunetionings ot the powers of lite is at once man1te8tat1onand further
actualization ot the Uving body.

The bare minimum of Ute is continued

activation ot the power of vegetation, wi tbout at least this level ot actualization beyond merelf informing a physical boqy lite is not pre8ent.30 Llte
itself is none other than the total1ty ot such actualizations •
.And lite i8 defined, in the ease of animals, by the capacity tor Mn8aUon; in the case of man, by' the capacity for sensation and tho'Ught..
But a capacity is reterred to ita activity, and in this its ruU

28Cf.

pp. 68-7$ of the present study for more detailed treatment of

knowing.

--

29 re•An •

412&20-28.

>3
real! ty consists. It ap~ar8 therefore that life in the tull sense
is sensation or thought.
ACcording to the powers of the body it actualizes, the living principle
manifests itself in vegetation, sensation, intellection, and the various movements proper to each of these three levels, for example, nourishment, rational
or an1mal appetite, sensation of different ld.nds, movement in space, thought. 32
The being lives by activating the powers proper or most proper to itJ this i8
what life meanl.

activation of the various vital potentialities.

Life is a torm of: activity, and each man exercises his activity upon
those objeots and with those taoul ties Whioh he likes the BlOst. tor
example, the llJU8ician exeroises his ~ense of heariDg upon musical
tunes, the student his intellect upon problems of philosoph;T, and so
on. And the pleasure of these aotivities perfects the activities,
and therefore perfeots life, which all man seek. :ve·n have good reason

31, _

,

,

?

-...

3

/1,.

/7

7'

,.,,,

-U70al.6-20. Of. alao, 1170aJ4t ",10 ra.p elVat ? CllcrC7aJ/ecrC7at ? J/OelY- •
striCtly, Ari8totle dilftingu1shes a 'first' and a 'seoond' actuality in the informing of a llving body by sottl. "Now the word aotuillty has two senses oarresponding respective~ to the possession ot knowledge (tbs. .elCI-Offj/U? ) anti
t.he actual e.rcise ot knowledge (ws TO eewpelv). It is obvious that the
soul i8 actuality in the firat sense, viz. that oflcnowledge as pos,essed, for
both sleeping and. waking presupp08e the existence of soul, and ot these wa1d.ng
oorresponds to actual knowing. sleeping to knowledge posses8ed but not employed
and, in the history of the individual. knowledge comes before its employJDllJDt or
exercise." !!._ &!,_ 4l2423-27.· Again I UConsequently, whUe wa1d.ng is aotualit.
in the sense oorresI!0nding to the cutting and the seeing ["i.e. to the second
grade of actuali t"¥J. the soul is aotual1t,l 1n the sense corresponding to the •
power of sight and the POWI' in the tool L i.e_ to the first grade of actuali~ ~
the body corresponds to what exists 1n potentiality! as the pupil ~~ the PoweA
of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul El~ the body oonst1tute'i""'th'e animal.
Ibid. 4l3al-3. Nevertheless in the view revealed by the passage from the Ethic~
CI'ted above, 1 t 1s not 1naccurate to speak of 11fe as conati tuted by actual
exercise of the faculties of sensation, thought, etc. ror this is said to be
true 'in the tull sense of the word (k"Up(l()SC 'preeminently'). Of. !let.
10:)082-1.7, especiallys "For animals do not see in order that they mSy have
.1g:ht, but they have sight that they may see."

3~.

An.

4!4a28-b$.

tharetont to pursue Pleasure, sinoe 1t perfects tor uach his llte, wb10h
is a desirable th1ng:3'
This 1s the sense in wh1ch pleasure belongs to activ1t7.
t.he

activation of vital

p()YIW

It 18 preaent. when

reaches its natural ful.lneas.

Since art:! act.ivity'

of sensing or mo.1ng depends on the meeting ot 1. ts two principles, the raoul t.y
a,."ld the object, it can be full only when the faculty is integral enough t.o be
truly receptive and the object. strong ei'lO'tlgb to

act on it.34 A

_mt.

Yf.ho8e

organ has deteriorated cannot take in the ai.gnalllhich the object shauld set

up J an object tJlat lacks def1ni

ten...

or ill too ter trtroy to lIet up a good

aittnAl cannot produce much .ttect in even a healthy organ.

01 the other band,

the higher the raoul.ty-the more wholly 1. t 1s recept.1:ve-and the higher the

object-tbe more exact a form it hae-the better 1. the grade ot activatlon.
The grade ot aoUv1:t.)I" follows on tho grade of 1. ta pr1nolp108, and pleasure

f'ollowa on the grade of' activ1ty.'!>

SO lorlst.heref'ore u both object i..ho'ught. ot or perceived, and subjeot
, diSCel'n1ng or judaing, 81"8 such u they should be, there will be
pleasure in the aot.lv1.W, since Wh1.ls both the pus1ve and ~, active
part1u to a relat.1oDab1p remain the ...-. in themselves ad unaltered
~~ relation to one aIlOtbet, the 8ame nNmlt 18 na~ pro-

"U7Sall,...).7.
34U7bb14-20.
35U1Sa22-2SJ U76a3-9, 26-29.

36u74b35-ll7Sa3.

5S
A sign of pleasure'$

dependence

on aotlv1tY' 1s found in the tact that p

sure 1n an actlv1ty l ••sena 1fben tho act10n 18 prolonged. COnt1nuance ot 8lt1'

activity

COnBU1188

energy and 1'eaults 1n fatigue, fatigue in tum causes a rel_

ation of effort or attenUon, and thu8

A

fall-ott 1n a.et1vity.

14osenod

aotivitY' axpla1na l ..eened pleaaure:J7
AnOther slgn

ot lnterconnoctlon 1s the prom.otlw etfect that pleUU1'e

has

on tho activity proper to it (and oonftnely the hindering effect it has on
alien act1nties).

An ocoupatlon that carr1ea 1tselt along by' absorbing all

subjectS· interut 18 a pleasant one.

It. 1s pleuant because 1.t 1& intenH,

and oan 00 intense because 1t. 18 pleuant.

An

unpleasant Job requiNe a

constant effort to maintain 1t, and effort expended in maintat.n1ng it cannot
also be spent 1n the act ltaelt. henco activit,y surfers and alSt evantualq be
abandoned for fatigue sooner than it mut'It if l.ua effort wel"e requ.lred.

Ql the

other hand, one activity 18 dlatraoted b7 some pleasure coming in from alOther
actlv1ty_

'1b.e tact one 18 appealed w by' the other activ1ty indicate. that be

has a bent tor it and euily moves into exeJ'C1s1ng 1. t.

'.the fact that be

actually 1.8 en.1011.ng it to eOlDO degree indtcate8 that he is alread7 engapd in
1t. to SOIDl'! degree.

acttnty

be 18

Without an expenditure of energy he cannot IU'dnta1n t.he

lea. incl1.ned to when by natural bent he keeps entering into the

other. He cannot en.107 both at once because he cannot. concentrate his .facult1e
on two objeota at once.3S

Pleasure and activity, then, run parallel.

The very criterion of the

excellence or badne,s of a pleasure is the quality of the act that belong, with
1t.39 What conditions aotiv1ty conditions pleasure at the ,ame

u..

They

are

inseparable.
Thus the pleasure of a goad activity i8 morally good, that of a bad one
IOOrally bad; for even desires for noble things are praised and desires
for base things blamed. but the pleasure, contained in our activities
are more intimately connected with them than the appetites whioh prompt
them, for the appetite i , bath ,eparate in t.i.me and dist1net in its
nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is closely linked to the
act1v1 ty.. indeed so inseparable tram 1.t as to rftb" a doubt whether the
activity is nat the SatOO thing as the pleasure.

Aristotle.s treatment of pleasure in Book Seven identified pleasure and

actlvity.h1 This emphasi38d that pleasure is something final, containing a
certain completeness of meaning within itself Without reference to any end
beyond it, and distinguished it fran any kind of process.
be either process

If pleasure had to

2!:. activity, it was clearly the latter because of its perfect

ness.

Here such an identification is abandoned though not formally repudiated.
SOme have raised a doubt whether activity is not the same thing as pleasure.
"However, we mnst not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation
indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem to some

people to be the same ...42
Aristotle does nat declare the reason for his inabill ty to "regard

39U7Sb25-.28.
4<>U75b28-'4. Cf. 1174b27-32.

4lcf.

p.

4B

of the p:ntsent study.

h2u7~b33-36. Italics added.

Cf. also .I.€onard" Ch. III, asp. 1 B.

pleasure as really being a thought or a sensation".

The falseness of so

regarding it is apparent,more or less Without dSll¥>nstration.

It. did not sound

Ula:aasonable to equate activity and pleasure; but to equate baing-pleased and 8

specific activity such as thinkinC or hearing somehow reveals a lack of parity
bet'1fEten

the ttto terms.

it is not expressible.

The distinction is necessary even if the exact gromd

0 ~

Wi thout actually developing the impossihill ty of

identifying pleasure and activity, Aristotle estabUshed the distinction bet1Rte ~
them in such a "'113' that proof does na:t need giving.

It 1s the perfection or achlevedness of pleasure that raises it above
process; it is by this characteristic that it is ASsociated wi th actiVity, si..mt
activity itself is achievement of capacity.

achievedneaa of activity.

Pleasure indeed is made the very

"Pol' each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as

also htmt thought and specul.ation, and its activity is pleasantest wben it is
most perfect, and most perfect when the organ is in good cond!tion and when it
is directed to the lOOst excellent of its, objects) and the pleasure perfects the
aetivity."4,)
Ot.her elements also are said to

con~ribute

to the perfection of activity.

The activation that constitutes sensation or intellection owes its completion

to faculty and object, and derives its degree of perfection from each of them
and their relation to each other.

perfects activity in a

~

This has already been seen.

that is superior to this.

But pleasure

ftThe pleasure does not

however perfect the activity in the same way as the object perceived and the

58
sensory faculty, it good, perfect 1t, just as health and the pb,ys1cian are not

ot

1n the same W8'Q tho cause

being healtby.uLh

'lbe analogy or health 1s not

apt in every reepect. but 1.t suttLe.. to POint up the difference betll'een causes

or conditions

or

a state, and tr.18 8'-&te itself in which other causes terminate.

Pleasure and health are achievement J the organs that ex1st to makn sensation
possible,the objeet.a themselves nhlch might aa well not exist if they are

unknown, or 'the various _ana to health including the physician- all are prejaoe.nt to achi.evemant tmd draw their _an1nge from i"t.

(es:, so ) 18 a perfection much closer
c-/:

Again., ditJJ)QS1tJ.on

e1 thor organ or object ls.

".

to activation than

ntapoa1.tton is more 1nt1mately' Cont:l8Cted ld. th the

faculty than 18 the peroept1bla object, which alwa.ye rema1.na p!v'sically outside
the perce1ftr.

It 1s 'probably as a k1nd of d1.apoeltion or bent that the

act1.va'tJ.ng aspect of m1.nd comJ"erts the marely senelble object into an
intell.1g1ble.45 D1.8position is thus also auperlor to tacult7, which as such is
cere passive capacity.

nut.

to the greater finality

ot activation, which is the achievement of &aposition.

this superiority of clisposit.i.on is still prejaaent

!Ioreowr plea.,emre is called in a special sense a perfection even of activit)"_
And thts. even tbottt:)l Aristotle denies that pleasure itself is activity.

It 18 as perfection
alemt~nta

or

a different sort from all such contributing

that pleU'\.lre cont.r1bute8 tc

~ already

final perfection of aetivit7.

Aristotle does not develop the queetion What 1.t is preataely that pleasure

gt",.. to aatlY1tYJ at this pOint Jv,t 1s nJ)re a\llpstift t.han

.xact.~

b4U74b24-26.

4S~. Aa- 430al.6.

at.

also pp. 71-73 or tho present study.

PleasUl"e i8

r

a Itsupervening perleoUon, l1ke the bloom of health in the young and

vigorous" .46 This is annlogy alJoost become metaphor. But the psychological
reality conveyed by the
would sel"VC

'i(ell

~e of fresh ooloring

and rea111ency47 is vAlid and

w indica:te Aristotle's intQn t10n eycn

in the absence of other

ml"e philosophical. e:;q,lresslona.

Plt1a8Ul:'e 1s something su~ (ent r'rv~ev6vn h

it. doe. not

enter into the oonstitution of the 8Jtlvation, is not necessal')" for the act-

1.vation to :..e what 1. t. i8, 1s really sonlet.hing extra awn t.bouch it, is
:tnevitabl.,y present

moo

tho nctivation is 'l9'b.>1o.

oofora" ",man demonstrating

that plaaDure is not prooelS8, Ar"J.StO,.,i..e described actlvity in terms that
aniJiclptl'i;.ed ttds d.i.stinction between What

,:~onotitut.es

and wbat

"How the act of sight appears to be perfect at, ett:r:f f11OJl1Ilmt

does not require a.n.,rth1ng

t,,:) supel"V"8lla

supervenes.

ot ita

latar in oroor to perfect

c.1uration. it
11;.6

specific

qual1ty.nh8
-

IF

46117LW,33.
'....

ft • •

410t. U54blO.

•

:>""
/
errtr'Tv9MevoY" r~ TlP.-cos,J

Cf. alao Rl:ln.

-1'
...:1
'" "
OtOV 'fOtS a~aLotS'

c

(.1

tl

1) wpa.~

lJ89eO-bU,

where Ar1st.otle t s description
of the vigoJ' and puslonatenesiO'l the young suggests 801D8 ot the qU.llltles
which the PI'seen t use or tJpCL ma.,y haVe implied for him.

481174al4...a.tJ: "-6 elf t((J'repoV"rev§.M.eJ/cJj/ re~et~q-e,. The description 1.
1ntroduoed as 1UU$trat1oo of wbat ie meant by the per.etton ot pleasUl"th The
line that 1Bmad1at,e4t follows th1.a quotat1.on, ttBut plea.su.re altJo ~Jpearfl to be
a thing ot We natrure", doe. not indicate that. pleasure poIJaemIU the __
of perfection as activit¥ poeaesses (tor plsasUl"8 itself is something
supervening on aot.1vJ.~), onl.y that neither perteotlon regarded from its own
character requires anything further to constitute it. Both &rEt in fact .
aooompanted h7 other quaUtas (4C'blv1t1 by pl.eaaure, pleasure by duration), 1m
these are only St.."Ptl.rvening on t.hem, not cOOMt1 tnting them in t.hesIIselvea.

rr------------.
60

Again" A:r1atoUa deacrioos pleasure, in Uw ~& of nool~ Seven, as

'un1.mpeded aotiv1tgrt.h9 This use of 'un1mpeded t suggests tho quaUtl.oe
abunda.nce and eas1neee, and reoalls the conditions health 1n orean and

abill ty of object, wb1eh he

~

are neoeaeary for the right activation ot a

An actiV1ty 15 agreeable when 1t goes along as it should.

faculty.

rot-

If a

maoh1ne or a f'acul.V operates lDXltbly, there is present to the operator a
eerta1n 86Me ot wellbeing, an GXh1l.ar'ation that contributes to tho act soma
indefinable and irntcmolble, somethirlg unexplainable in fAJl"mS

.~

of tba

operation.
Passagea .from

foundat1on

ot the

Book Nine .. in Aristotleta deacripti.on ot Ul«mea. as the

h1gbest forma of t.r1endah1.p, help to expl.a1n th1s peeul1a1'

now of pleuure-the 8OIBth1rte that 1t adda to the perteoUOIl of activ1t:r-in

wnw ot

Galt............ or conaclousn_ (a:t1'6Iaved"tJcu).

.concerned w1~ other PJ'Oblela, so what

teet1raorV'tl1eT

The Pfll88ages are

gift 18 plaaeure 18 only

i.nd1rectJ but" it 18 at least. au.gge8tlw.$O
Trt1,.~

Monds are alJ.ke 1n excellence, thus the exoellance of a"f:r1end 1s

much the same as one fa 01'111. FrUndsh1p orters

one

the chance ot regarding h1a

om oxoel.lence lai.d 'out betore h1m 1n the penon ot another. Th1s 18 a better
1fI1;f

of' v:l.fn'I1ng

81.'('.f ~

than the iAtNapeotlw _tmd can atf'orcl, tor it

pUts tM <luaU ty under v1ew 1n a sart of perapect1.ve.

But 'WiV' 18 such attentJ.on to a Mend '8 excelle1lce pleasant?

r...

J.'

...........

U911Sla14-l6.
S0:u69b23-U70bl9.

It 18

6J.
ploasn.~t

boaause the oxcolltmce that a b".i.en.d

1s

posseSSC;\

000 ts

Q."n (t.he fri

b,~lnG b"J ~,r1rtu.e of Ukon6ss another self) .. a.nd ~ .~uliAAtJ.211 ~ alfl ~

£,oosasaion

2f !

good

!:! essentially

ploasan~.

"But,

l.D.

we aatr, it. iu tbo

&$

consciousness of oncsfJlt as Coed that :t"lal<ea exlst+mco deaire.b:e, ar:(! {moh

consciousooss 1s pleMoot 1n 1taell'• .,51 The passage sugge.ts that too quality
which pleam.1I'O adds to acti vi t.y 1s oonsoiouane:Js of possession

wore possible) is tOO foot or volt a;l posoess.1.ng it.
Sa:! still more I

C!Jn tholr awarer..eas (J£ ["POfl80SSUlgJ what 1s in. .1 walf

ft

this as t.Im dtl'itingu.lsllinc

own is " ••ploasant. tt

pr,:dioatus ;:11~}asa.nt.ness

ot

11000

'3

or

pleUl'lI'e.

.All that

''LT.JhO

,b,...lstoUo

s~"&

s~tomnt

agre.'1abla.

~lfwould
001100

in

regard

tha~ a thin~~

is

'~he~o P8.S0~tJS

such BiilaI'entilOSJ uot:.h1ng statsB that selt'-aNaranea8

the cause or oven neceSoa:r.y oondition of pleasure.

the

t..hat

Another pasaa.:.:e see_ to

It 10 not. clear tram t::Q context whethor ArlstCItle

0'.11'

sclfJ

'1'l18 only corl.ai.n mani.ng of

1s that such con..<Jc.iousooas of vosS88Si.n(; good is .in faCt

Yet the pass4b"es :rnggo&t more tlw.rl they requ1.re.

A similar amb1valenoe appears in a paaaago near t.h1B, 1n which Aristotle

is d100usainc salf....l~. lJera the POsseMJ.OO of a bood by it::JGl.f.' is made a

••

62
"ff.JveryoM wishe. his own good.

posttive factor in choice.
CbOOH

no one would

to 'POssess every good in the world on condition ot becoming somebody

else • • • but only while rema1n1ng himself, whatewr he may be • • • • ,,54

Ci1e

finds hi. pleasure 1.n a thing because it is eomething exoetllentt ;yet, in a

deeper consideration of the matter, this pleasantness involws another element
in add! Uon to that ot excellence J 1 t inYolvea oneself enjoying it.

$Ueh an

object is exceUent whether or not it is being possessed, such an action 1s ot
a certain pertection DO _twr who pertor. it. But it is pleasant to this
person onq if'

.!!! 18

inatead ot hUl.

the ODe that OO'HI.8 it or performs it .. and no other

Even the

exoellence ot a friend brings his friend enjoyment.

becauae' a friend 1s ...at'lO;;;.;..;the
..
· .......
! !!!£' so that a friend's ucellence is one's own
excellence-to whatever degree th& sqing holds true.
Ibreover, awareneas ot excellence as one's own fita well Ari.totle'a quill.
fioat-ion of pleasure as an a<idit1onal. pertection supervening on the perfect
activation of a taculty.

Such awaren... does tollow in over)" operation ot senaE

or intellectS5 aftd 1s something at once one with the activity and diStinct from
it.

But granted his words are favorable to an identification of pleasure wi th

awareness of excellence u one's own, Aristotle himself rt.O'W'h<.l'8 maleas this
identIfication which would explain more clearl,. the nature of the phenomenon.
The desoript,lon

ot pleasure

4S

"like the bloom ot health in the young and

."s,gorous tt 1s as mlloh as Aristotle elaborates his notAon ot what ult1mately
oonsti tute8 t.he pleasant.
In whateVer..., pleasure derives trom its proper act! vlty, wha'l:4ver

peculiar quality it adds to that activity, the activity i8 the essential thing.
thO ?lea:nqoe would not extet w1t..loJout the activ1ty tthich 18 its baa1a, bUt the

activity would be jut what it is even 1f l2!£ i!J'g!slblft no pleasure attached tc

56

it.

The acttY1ty 10 primar;y.

But from a tunhe!' __ nation, the aoUv1ty itself has somathing of the

relatl.V0 about 1t, at least 1n

80

far u it 1s

!!S!!. 11 act1:V'1ty

and not, anotbeJ'4

The .,.t basic actlV1U,.. atUl, as seen befOftt S1 , look to a totality beyvDli
t.beDIelwa, to lite itself and What perfects life u Utel

~ry

happinesse

activity is .. way 1n which lite is act.uallzed, every act.1v1to' 1s des:tred 1..be<I:aua1tl
it actual.1zea Ute.
the

-.r

EYal7 being desires the further actiualiu.tion of ita lite,

ttltl_teq, every pleasure i8 deeirabla-i.

it baa of ex1.8t1Dg.

enjoyable-booause it i.nd1oatea that one's exl.tence is being perfected.
might br3 held that all

We 10

Ii t?l'm

man aeek

ot act1:d.ty,

1.0 obtain

nIt

pleasure. because aU men des1ro Ute.

and each man exercises his acUv1.t7 upon those

objects and w1 th those faculties which be l1kea the met. • • • And the

pleasure of these activities perfects the act111.t.1e., and therefore pertects

ill., Vlhioh all
They are

Il8!l

80

cloae17 1Dte1"related, the drift.

Stlct. U14a4-8.
51or.

. . . . .$8

also note 60.

pp. 3 2 and 36 of the preNllt study.

S8U1Sal..3-il1.

to both

of

them

ere

80

basic,

t,hat some C81not tell wb1.ch is pri.Dtary1

"Men have good reason therefore to pur

sve pleasure, since it perfects for each his life, which is a desirable thing.

The question whether we desire life for the salaJ of pleasure or pleasure for tb

sake of life, need not be raised for the present. nS9

In fact, Aristotle has

already expressed his vie,.. that 11fe or perfection of life is primary and de-

sirable in i tsel£ even if unaccoq>anied with the extra perfection that pleasure
is.

"Also there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if

they brought us no pleasure, for instance Sight, memory, 1m.owledge, virtue.

It

JD8IY be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure" but tha:
makes no difference J for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted

from them."

6O

Though Aristotle's treatment of the subject does not include an analysis
of exactly what constitutes the essence of pleasure" it leaves little ambiguity
about the relations of pleasure and activity.

nevertheless distinct.

They are functionally inseparabl4,

Pleasure is a Bort of perfection of activity, activity,

hOW8'V9r, as the actualization of existence is the more primary.
low, the same relations that hold between pleasure and activity hold as

well be _en pleasure and happiness" for happiness, as Aristotle has shown in
Book

ene,

1s in fact an activity, the JlX)st perfect activity.

Happiness and

pleasure, then, are closely related notions, yet they are radically distinot.
This distinction between happiness and pleasure reveals itself in all the
treatises of the Ethics, nowhere so much as in the treatise on the activity

S9U75al7-19.

6Ou74a4-8.

Cf. Cb. V, no. 1 of the present stuctr.

6S
1fiu.ch 1.1 1n tho moat

propel"

sanae of the 1tOl"d haq>p1ne8S-...contemplaUon, whtch

Aristotle d1scl.l8aea 1n the second part of Book Ten, in vtnuall;y the last pagea
of the Ethica.
I

I

Aristotle'. treatise on happ1neas in Book Ten1 beg1ns atter he baa stated
the general rule that, the nom b.r wh1.oh the value of a pleasure

det.eftd..rled 1s the value ot tbs act.1vlty from 1fb1eh 1t, prooeeda.

0811

be

'lha

consideration leads natural.l..1 to a diaoussion ot the relatift values of the

'Var1aua aat1:ntiea and of what activities or aot1v1ty 18 moat. proper to man.
AM. . .1ng the queat.ion 1f1ll oOMlat 1naholfing what aot1v1V be8t conforms to

a..
8CtlY1:z that !! 2!!1!ct !!!d

the chal"acter1et.1ca of happ1ne.8wblch .Ar1stot,le out.l.1.r.18d 111 Book

AccOJ'd1ng to that
ea1~.

2

~i.a, happtneu 18

a nature!

The actlv1t1 wb1ch correaponda t..::> theM characteristics mat

aactl¥ is conteJcllat4.on.

1. CGntelllPlat.1on As

~.
.'

~le

doe. not spend t t . 1n -tablJ.atd.ns t i . cbaracierl.at.1.c. ,.. 1t

already atllu:Ut e_tabU.bed t.ha\ the

~o,yable....

of an act.1Y1tq 1_ plJ'&llel to

ita perfection, and can be ayatematioaUy ranlatd with other

pleatml'08 only 80

tar as 1ts CO:&TCt8ponding actlY1t.y can be nmkad 1n a h1eraraby ot 'Val. . .
I

a

1u1~79a32. Tho reaa.1ni.rlg chapter, U19a3)-U8l.:b24, devoted to a
di8CU881oa of how tba values dewnd.ned 1n the course or. the Ethics can beat be
put 1nto effect in the state as a whole .. MJ"f'e8 U .. tranaltlOii {OM the t...--~.€llt
of the Politi••
~t. Oh.

n,

beg1nn1ng, of the

preeent atud1'.

('7
- I

Nevertheless, .conviotion that a e.l·tain activit)" 1s enj07able oan be bad
through e>..-perlence.

cne

who has exercised h1mself sufficient.ly in an activity

knowe whether he :rinds it agreeable.

F',xper1ence in phUosophizing has shown

Aristotle that its reault, Wisdom, 1s highly enjoyable in its own way. there 1.

general agreement <at leut ,.,ng the men

ot

good character whose preferences

serve as standard3 ) that Wisdom "contatns pleasures of m.a.rvalloua pnrity and
per.manance ...4 This is certa:lnly true
the ach1evlng

or the

ot 1 t requires great ettort. S

be k:nown only by exper!Anee.

end-product of ph1l0e0pby even if
But this 1s something that will

Qte can dispose another to try phUosophy, one

oan introduoe him to 1t gradually, but realconvlction ct philosophy·s
enjoyableness

CODltS

not from argument, but from practice.

This understood, Aristotle can only repeat that the best guide toward the
excellence of a pleaaure 1. the excellElnce ot the activity from which it st._
But among the pleuu:res considered reapeotable, wb10h C1U8 ot pleaaurea
or which particular pleasure 1s w be deemed the distinctively bulan ple
sure? Perhaps tb1s will be clear trom a consideration ot man t • activitie •
For pleuurea correspond to the activiti.s to which they bel~J it 1a
therefore that pleasure or those pleasures, by which the activit1, or the
act.iviti.. , ot the pertfJOt and supremelJr happy man are perfected, that
IIWIt be pronounced l'rw::Itaft in the fulle.t sense_ The other ple&8'U1'ee are
80 onl11n a seconda17 01" lower degree, like t,he actl:rttie. to Which the,.
belong.6

It 18 possible at least to reach the rank of a pleasure by diBC'U8sing lta cor-

3].176&8-24.

41177826.
5U71a27.
6u16a24-29.
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reap<mt1S.Dc 8Ctti'V1V.

For a pleasure does not lend itself to direct comparison

vith other pleaauresJ an acttuty. on the other band,

2.

«088.

Oontemplation.b Activity.
'!'he 1a&nence and &etuaU. eharacteriatle

ot actiT.l.iV at ita beet find.

. .~ expresaion in contemplaUon.

Tb, activi:Z.2!

reali-.
onl.T

in a 1d.nd

~

!! ~

itsel;t actuaUl&tion .2E ppUence.

ot tull.nea. what the eopitJ.ve faculti•• ot aenaaUon

in a priJdUft. 1JIperteot 'tIq.

auaea

fhe theory ot intellection 18 one ot the

highen appl.1cat.1ona which Ar.1et.oUe u.kea

ot actualiv

It

ot h18 general aetap)q'aieal prino1p1e

md po&e1b1l1t7.1

The various faculties ot sensation, cape.oit1.. tound. onlT in the higher
living be1np, aD'! the taoul. of intellection, tound only in mera, conais' 111
the eoul's abll1t¥ to actualiae in itself w1\boub alteration ot it&t own plv's1oal

constit.ution toru vh1eh are the actualitie. of other be1Dgs. '!'he dtJi/~/S
htch a faculty

repl"8Hnta

18 a oapaci. existing 1n the nbject. abow and

beyond the various other areas ot poeaible

an4 actual. d.teftd.na. . . .·• wblob

onatit-' ita basic make-\lp, eubat.anual, qualitative, qumtitatift. etc. fh:l.a
special sort. ot capaoit.;r 1s open \0 a spMial sort ot evepyetQ..

, an activ11i7

r actifttion vh1ch consists 1n tbe actual det.eftd.nat,ion ot the capaalt7 bT a

69
given fom.

8

In the case of sensation the organ of sensation, whether sight or hearing
or any other, .18 a member of the physical body whose fUllction it is to remain
open to being affected by

is sonsiti.ve is

80

o~rtain

physical conditions.

only potentially" not aotually.

nIt is clear that what

The power of sense is

parallel to 'I'lhat is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneousl;i', bui
requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; ot!1erwise it could
have set ttself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it
ablaze" 9

Insofar as a sense is a special area in the soul in a state of alert

noutral readiness for activation, t ts "reality" is quite as dis tinct from that
of th6 activation which takes pla.ce in it, as it is distinct from the physical
object whosa.form determines the activation.
From one viewpoint, the sensation which is pl'Qduced

01998

more to the sonse

faculty, because it is as an activation of the sense faculty that the sensation

BDe An. 42L.al8-231 "By a tSI~nset is ID98l1t what has the po-.er of receiving
into itBeiftre sensible forms of things without the matter." Ibid. 429al2-171
nI! thinldne is likA perceiving it must be either a process in"Wiiroh the soul
is acted upon by what is oapable of being thought, or a process different trOll
but analoGolls to that. The thinkinG part of the soul must therefore be, while
impassible, oapable of reoeiving the form of an object, that is, Im18t be
potentially identical in oharacter w'ith 1ts objeot without being the objeot.
Vind BlUst be related to what 1s thinkable J as sense is to what is sensible. It
Of. Ibid. 43l~24-291 ftKnowledge and sensation are divided to oorrespond with
the reall ties, potential knowledge and sensation answering to potentiali ties,
actual lmowledge and sensation to IlCtualities. Within the soul the faculties 01.
lmowledge and sensation are potential.ly these objeots, the one what is knowable,
the other what is sensible. They must be 'lither the things in themselves or
their forms. The former altematJ.ve is of oourse impossible: it is not the
stone wi.ich is present in the soul but its form."

9Ibid. 417a6-9.

10
exists at allJlO from the other viewpoint, sensation owes

111)1"9

to tM object

sonsed, because the foroallt1 which detarm1.nes the ctivation of the
belongs oonsti t.ut1onally to the object not to the

HJlSe,

Sen8e

Y1h1ch is open

ind1tferently to an,y number or determinations. ll In tact, sensation depends on
both elements and is a :reality distinct trom both.

10

. Ib1d. 424a25-bl9, viz. "The problem might be raiHd, Can what cannot
smeU be si1d to be atfected b.1 a.11.s or what cannot see by oolours, amd so on~
It might be said t.hat a smell 1.a just. what oan be &melt, and it 1t produces my
effect 1t can o~ 00 80 as to Be 8OIIIIth1.ng . .U 11'., and 1t might be argued
that what oannot soell cannot, be atteot.ed by 8mells and f'urther that wh4t can
s.roell can be affected by it only in 80 tar as it. has 1n it. the poRI" to smell
(s1m1larl¥ with the~roper objects of all the other senses)." 11ma, the preHoa
in the body of a oapao1ty to sense 18 What turn.. a ....qr ptvalcal encounter ot
two bodlee into lSODlBt.htng mora. the ~S8 1n one or them ot the preaence
ot the other. Cf. alao lb1d. 426a2-lS. v.l.ZI tilt 18 t.rue that the mvu.n't,
both the acting and t.be b8t'iig acted upon, is to be tomd in that which ls acted
upQU, both the sound md the hear1ng so far u it i8 actual. must be found 1n
that which has the faculty of hearlng; tor it 1s 1n the pusive factor that the
actual1t1 ot t:'1G act1ve or mtive factor itl :reaUzed, that is wt\Y that which

causes mvemant ..,. be at rest."

l~d. 4l6b,,,. uSensat.1.on depende, u we bavu said, on a proceas of
movement or affection trom without, for it 1s hold to be some sort ot change ot
~t7.tI Al8o, ibid., 417&6-9, quoted 1n nO.te 9, Oh. IV. ct. Fr~o1fl Nuytma,
de ~1v.Cho1051.. d t £1atote, Par1a, 1948, pp. 283, 284, rta. "Ia
...tuft n a pas· I.lle-mame i 'acta de connai tre I alle en a awl&men\
1& poas1bilite, 1a puissance. L'act;uation de cet;t;. pu1u8lCe est un mouvement,
une altarati.on ( Id"'':j(I"Is"~ aA..ioLf.l.)crIS). Ce ou part.1oul1er u1:. dcmc 8OUIJd.s a 1&
1cd. general. suivant laqueU. un ~nt, c •.....-d. un passage de putnanoe a
acta, no peut ee produlN que 30\13 1.Wluence de quelque chose qui potlseda dej~
cot acta. PoaI' +.,<;rut r,.,:)~_nt 11 dolt '1' avoir quelque chose QUi 18 aubt t at
q1.l01G!Je ahose qui 18 oause. • •• Ql voit ola1rement. 1& role usighs par l'
a.Jteur aux objets sena1bi.. vu........,ns de la faculte sensitive. Les objets
sEtnaibles, c.-a-d. lea chous 1nd1v1duelles aont le8
, leo cauSE ~
motrices ou etticientea de 14 connalaanctl 881l81ble. tt The whole of Ch. VIII, no
51, emphasizes the passivity of mlnd.

,.aee
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S1d~

the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty
,one actuality in spite of the differenc~ betlteen their modes of being l2
~t~hearing and sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and
rt.he :s&me moment, and so' actual savour and actual tasting, &c., while as
pot$ltiali ti~s one of them may exist without the other. The earlier
stu4ents of nature were mistaken in their view that without sight there was
no ~ te ,or black, without taste no savour. This statement of theirs is
par~ly true, partly false.
'sense' and 'the sensible object. are ambiguous
terlJilS, i.e. !lU\Y denote either potentlalltls§ or actualities. the statement
is ~ of the latter, false of the former. 13
•

'.r~

act

qf

sensation is the actuality in Which are fulfilled the capacity (for

se1p.sing) /which is the sense faculty and the q'llB8i-capaci ty (for baing

wh~ch

sens~)

isl'the formality manifested by the "aense objeot. 14

Thei case of intellection involves a function parallel to thisl5 f

the actu-

al1.ty which constitutes it is the activation of a oapaoity for receiving in a
collapletely non-material wa:y the form. or some objeet.16 As faculty open to IJ'lJ:T

Joachim, pp. 293, 294, a deve1~nt of the idea that tt~t we
really have [in, say, an act of hearingJ is not two actualities in relation
but a single actuality • • • • ft

lhcr.

15Ibid • 429&13-18, "It thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a
process in whloh the soul is acted u:x>n by what is capable of being thought, or
~ process ditterent tram but analogous to that.
The th1nld.ng part of the soul
nust therefore be, Tdlile impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object;
r.hat 1s, must be potential.ly identical in character With its object without being
",he objeot ('.'n>'C)u r"y- a,,(,.(J./,,,,b 7OUTl). ft
16"It is not the stone which 1s present in the soul but its form."

43lb29.

-

Ibid

r---------------,
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determination whatsoever (since evar.y kind of reality is a possible object of
thought), intelligence lacks ever.y deter.m1nation, "is, before it thinks, not
ac tually any real thing. "11

This pure-receptiveness remains mind's chief char

acteristic whether in its act of gaining new knowledge or in its recall and
of knowledge alreaqy attained.

us.

18

Actual intellection takes place only when this capacity is activated by
some agency which possesses the actual! ty of which mind is capacity.

Ql the

sense level this function is performed by the sensible object. this supplies
the determination that fulfils the sense capacity,
sensitive with the sensible issues in sensation.

Thus a meeting of the

This would be paralleled on

the intellectual level by a meeting of the intellective and the intelligible
issuing in actual intellection. 19
The intelligible object, however, which would be the agency that
actualizes the capacity of mind, is not found in nature as the sensible object
is.

(This would have to be some sort of free-floating idea or form which the

•

17 Ibid. 429al8-271 "Therefore, since everything is a possible object ot
thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoru sqs, to dominate, that is, to know, must
be pure from all admixture, tor the co-presence ot what is allen to its nature
is a hindrance and a block. it tollon that it too" 11ke the sensitive part,

can have no nature of ita own, other than that ot having a certain capacity.
Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by aind I mean that whereby the soul
thinkB and judges), is, before it thinks, not actuall1' any real thing. For this
reuon it cannot reasonabl1' be regarded as blended with the body. it so, it
would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the
sensitive ta.cul.tyt as it is, it has none."

18Ibid. 429bS-9.

-

19Ibid• '429al.3-18, (ct. note 15, where the passage has been quoted). For
an explanation ot the problem raised by the parallel between sensation/sensible
and intellection/intelligible, and of Aristotle's solution ot it by the
doctrine of active and passive intellect, ct. Hamelin, pp. 16-22. Ct. also
Nuyens, pp. 296-309, on the meaning ot vous TrOl'JllkOS ~ A!!.. III, 5.

r-------------------13--~
mind would oome 1n

~()ntact

with, juet as the sensIble object is matter-eCloodied

form wh1c.'1 the senae organ oo_s into contact with.
~a1nst

Yet Aristotle's polemic

the Platonic theorr of forms denies that any such frett-floating

exist in nature.)

torms

The natural objeot, u suoh oapable of affecting other thing

only pb¥sically, cannot act on mind or ac tl,alize its capacity, becanee mind
unllke

Sf',nae

cannot be affeoted p!v'sicaJ..q.

solution ot lih1s difficult,.,

SOlIe

According t.o the Aristotelian

at,"8ncy of intelligence bridges the gap

between. the natural. object, as such not actually lntelUglble, and the
intEtll1elble object which ach1....... t.he actuali••tlon of the intellective
oapaeit1. 20 The exact. tunct10n of this agency, ita relat4.on to the intellective capacity of mind and to Id.nd itself', and to the actualltyof tnteUect1on,

is not cle.. in Aristotle'. treat.mant and in taet ra1se. several. critical
problema in his soience of man. 21

2o..The problem tdgbt be suggeate<h 1f th1nking 1s a passive artectlon,
then if m1nd 1••iJllplo and 1..mpusible and has noth1ng in common w1th" anyth1ng
elae, aB AnaxagOras .~, bow can 1.t come to·- th1nk at all? For interacUOIl
between two f'aotora is held to require a precedent c01lllDtl1t.y of aature between
the factor••- "Have not 1m alrea<f!.r disposed ot the difficulty about interact!
1.nvolv1ng a COtam element, when . . said that mind ta in a aenee poterlt.iall¥
whatewr 1s thinkable, though aet.ual.q it 1. nothing untU U. has thought?
What it th1nka IIl18t be 1n it Jut as oharacters . . be said to be on a wr1tingtablet on whioh
yet nothing stande wrltteru this 1s exactJ.T what bappe:na
with mind." "S1nce in every clus of things, as in nature as a whole, ... f'1nd
two factors involved, (1) a matwr wbioh 18 potentIalq all the :partIculars
inoluded 1n the elus, (2) a cause which is ;>roductlve in the a"nee that it
make. lih_ all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its
material), theae d18ti1nct elements must 11kl8w1.. be found within U1e soul. And
in fact mind as we have described it i. what. it 18 by virt.ue of becoming all
thin{;8, whtle there is another which 1s -That it is by vir-t,ue of mak1ng all
things I this 1s a sort. ot posit1_ state like lIght.) tor in Ii eMe light make
potential colours into actual colours." Ibid. 4291)23-2$. 428b29-4)0a2 J
43oalo-16.
~r. 1U.Yen8. p. )00, ct. also Ch.
no 3, pp. 15"2 .. 153, "'f the present
on the-bearing ot 'tthis problem on t.ne umty of t.hi human person and 1ts

as

.-

.

V,.

r~------------~
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Despite this obscurit.y 1n the two prinoiples of intellect.ion, the
actuality ot·lcnoW1ng in Whioh they issue is sttll sutfioiently distinguished
from more oapaci ty ot knowing (.specially where the parallel with sensation 1s

recall.ed) to put in pel'8peot.lve those passaps ot the Ethics where Aristotle
oontrasts faculq- and acti'YatiGn of faoulty.
Intellection i. t.bua the cbief way in whiob the human being finda actual1zation.

The t\mctlon of nutr1t1on, even the cognit1ft tacult.,' of sensation,

tnvolw8 mat.ter in U.s aotualit.7 and inasmuch. 1t 1nYolves utter it invol'ft8
restriotion and 1.1Dd.tat1on of lt8 actuality.

InteUeotlon hoIre'Yer does not ot

its enena. involve matter, hence ita actualt.aaUon can extend to

arty

kind ot

being at, all, even to the pure17 ialaterial J 1ndeed 1. t focuses on its objects
just 1neotar

&8 they

can be .et free f'ltom material condit101l8.

Aotivity par

excellence, in whioh intellection 1. leut concerned with be1ngs in their
material rutrlotlone ot place and t4_ and partial real1zation, 1. the

actinty of oontemplat1on. The gruptng of tint prlnolplea and of the
relat,lona of beings as independent of

_ter1~

condi tions i . the subject.-

matter or 8}.1Goulatift wisdom.
Bence it i8 clear that W1sdo!!l must be the most P<lrtect ot the modes ot
knowledge. '.the wtae man there tore must not only lenoir the conclUSions
that £011011' from hi~ first principles. but 8180 have a true conception
of those pnnclples themselves. Hanee Wisdom must be a combination of
Intelligence and SCient.iflo
1t muet. be a ~ted knowledge
of the 8>.t exalted objecta. 2

rledge:

2211.hlal6-20.

~.------------.
7$
In this oonoentration on what i . 'UIlOhangeabla lies the supreme value as well as
the supreme actual1ty of Wi8dom and the pursuit wh10h achieV88 1t, {)ewp(",

philosophioal cODtaaplat1on. 23

~ontem2latlon 1!. !!!2

::a !2!l,1mmanent 2!. art1vttie!,. 24

Thus Aristotle

aBserts the relative independence of ohanging ctrcwutccee which philosophio
aotd. vi ty uniquely enjoys.

It 1s true, the philosopher need. the ordinary goode

of nourtahDmt, bou81ng and oloth1ng, agreeable oiJ."CURItaloes, as much 88 aI'\Y
other man.

Aristotle in8i. ta on th1s. 2$

A breakdown 1n these c1rallmstanee.

leads to 1U-bealth, diltract1ons, d18courIAgement.
ward goods only
i8, 80

80

far u

But t.m Wile

lUll needs

out.-

they enter into the general upkeep of his person,t.ha

far as t.be7 are not really extrinsic to b1m.

Beyond

sucb a tunot.1on au

ward good. act.ually are aupernuoUlJ concern 1d.t.h these, and 1t 1s hard not to
be ooncerned with them when the,. are pre8ent, is more h1nd1"anoe than help.26

The phi108opher's need of outward goods 18 l1ke that of other _n only in
Ulia one l"8.pea\, t.he needs of hi. pereob.

For other ways of 11fe, say, those

ot the various a_ellenOM ot character 11ke .,justice and temperance

and oourage

2.3ot• pp.94-100 ot the present. study, where Al'1.atotle's desCription of the
objects of contemplation i8 developed more at leng'iJ1 am related to p.arallel
not.ions in the 1"I!!f!ll!!:c!..

2bcr. pp. 26-31 of the present study, wherfl Ar1stotle's relating ot the in
ward state of happine8s to outward cirO'U.Ut.Qnoe. 1s treated in detail.
25tl'l7a29-31, 1178b33-3S.
26u78b3.

76
cannot find activation except under circumstanoes where there ie the
pOssibil1ty of their oontraries, of injustice, selt-1ndul.geme, cowardice.

1'ba

man of good character oannot actual.l1' spend mach or his Ute exercising bis
particular virtua even though he ma1nta1n8 his disposition to act by it when
,-,ccuion arise •• 21

Ot,her excellences 1ika generosity actually require an

abundance of wealth in order to reacb f'ull actual.iaaUon.
under no weh need

ot

'l'be phill'sophlitr 1.

cil"CUllltan.cee to fulfil his disposition.

ItC'rJbe nee

man on the oontrary can also oOtltensplate by" hiJIHlf, and the !l¥)re so the wiser
he

1s. • • • ,,28 Good actlona indeed do not alwa;ys require extraordinary

c11"CUlllttances J exoelleno9 i. to be tound alao among porsoLs of moderate means. 2
But tll! ph1loeq>her'. dependence on conditions 1s still of a different order.
If' he needs out,ward goods it 1s only in his capaolt7 as mID and social being

that he needs them, DOt as philosopher.
Yet there 1s something about the

that enhances the philoaopber's good.

tamUy, friends

add

to the happy 11 f8

tavorable concurrence of ci..rc'wltlstancss
It was M.nl 0 that extras like beauty,
mald.ng .,1 t blessed.

Aristotle I\aa

reterenae to this idea again when he stqfl that happiness as sllOh reqUires lltt

27U /1 ~1-33; 117 Sa28-b3.

28 U77 .:J4, 3S.
29U79a4-l8 __

3OCt • pp. 13~6 of the present study.

17
J.n tho wq of outward goods. 31 lfol'8over oontemplation proo"eds better w1th the
aid of fellow-philosophers.

In Book N~2 Aristotle has developed at length

the good effects that the right kind of flolendahip has on higher actt vi. ty.
quall tiea of character spread !'rom one friend to the other by' reason of the
im1 taUon which triendship alwaya fosters,3,) one oo_a to understand hie own

characteristics when be sees them objectified in his trienJ4J the et1mulation

and encouragement that &l'UJea from ..sociation in a

COIllOn

lnterea1i 1a a great.

spur to e:mellence in IUJ'3' pursuit.)S But theae advantages are mattera of more
and lesa.

The;y malca .it poaaible for \he &etiv1t.;y to reach 1ts fullest develop-

I'J.'I8!1t and to con't.1nue longer.

they foster certain

acco~

pleasures, but

do not toucb the act e888nttally.

b

question how Mceuary this condition la, 1a not altogether resolved

1>7 AristotJ.e.

Ql one hand, in the wtV'a emlJII8ratAtd, friendship 1s desirable

becauae it enhance. the h1gher actJ.vit1ea, it ia de.irable

88

D1Cb as 8D7

enhancetMnt 18 dea1rablA-oeo far u 1 t reall;y oontr1butea-i t 18 desirable but
ia not neces"ary in :Lt.aelf.

Ql the other hapd, 18 1t delirable beoa'tl8e t.he

higher acUv1ty would not be sat.lsfaotol7 w1 thout 1 t?

toes the man who..

-

oontemplation, tor example, 18 the source of his happ1.neu need alao the

3lu79a2.
32u69b28-U10bl9.
33U10aJ.2J 13, U72a9-14.
34l.l69b31-lJ.10ah.
3SU7~.

~--------------------------------------------1-8----~
axperience of friendship?

Aris totle eeelllS to hold he does I

"But t.hat which 18

desirable for him he ls bound to have, or else his oondi tieD will be incomplete
in that ;.)artiaular.
This seems
OSS6tl tial

t.o

Therefore to he happy a man. needs virtuous friends. 1136

mean that oontemplation, whose selr-euftlciency comprised an

part ot 11;.s superiority to other goods, does attar all have to be

supplemonted W1 t.h a good outside itself if t t is to be humanly sattsfying.

Thi

recalls the problem raised and discussed in Book ':he-the 6ssam;,laL"'less or

unessent1alness of outward goods to a good whose whole
within.

DlDaning

looks to what 1s

The solution of both difficulties l1es in a contrast between an

aotivitq integJ"alq complete, that. 18, postten1ng every' qual1ty that eould
belong to it, and an acti'ri.t.y not 1ntAtgr~ complete but at leut esaentiall¥

complete.

In other words, .Aristotle fe distinotion between l'-.app1ness and

supreme bleasednGu. 37 As before, the balanoe 18
This 'IlDcortalnty

St1gge8ta

80mewhat

uncertain.

another area of uneasy balance in Aristotle fS

tho\18ht, the more fundamental question of what he holds on the unity of the
human being.

*1'he tlSUal Ariatotelian view, oontrasted With t.he PlatoAt.c, 1s tha

of a 'IlDit composed ot body aDd soul,

'the bod,y is not the

man, neither 18 the

soul, only the 'un1t7 of the t.wo 18 actual.ly man.38 But Arl.etoUe himself orten
speake differently, espeoiill7 when he is disc1l8nng the philosophio liret

36u70bl6-lS
31c£. pp. 28-31 of the present study'. cr. al80 pp. 59-60, where,
especially in now 48, activit.y is oontrasted with pleasure, arld pleasure with
duration, on the basis ot what. amounts to the SUB t.ype or distinctlon.
lSer. Nuyens, asp. Cb. VI, no. 4), Pp. 239-243, where a ohronology of the
Corpus Arlstotelicum i8 built ur on the basis of the historical development of
theory of ent81echioal 'Ull1t.y out of an original position of Platonic muuisll.

79
here m1nd-d1stingulahed floom aU other powars of the soul, eYeD. lo...-e-is 8po
of as

too

man, "the true 8alt of eaehu • 39 The senee in which such statemnta

must be taken, hence the beat indication of the direct10n in which Aristotle's
tb:>ught on tL1a probls D>W8, is found in the pages where Aristotle diseuaaea
the relative -value. of the active and oontemplative lives, and in tiEUleral t.he

f1nal1ty and perfeot,lon ot oontemplation.

S. Contemplation All Perfect
Cont,emplatlon is the activity that most. wholly tul!11c botl1 oon88S of the

word 'perfect ,40.

it 18 moat t1nal 1n that it ex1at8 tor its own sa.ke and not

tor err other; it is

lOst excellent in that aU other pursuits are concorned

wi tb objects inferior to thoae of contemplation.

In the covse of tnat.1ng the

perfection of oontemplat.J.on Aristotle rai... two probl8. whioh are of

e.peoia11.mportance 'to an understanding of hi. poslt1on. These are tJle probl.ea
of the active and contemplative 11£., and t.he prebl_ of the f1n.alJ.t7 of
le1sure activiti•••
The active Ute accOl'd1.ng to excellenoe pf character "ls llappJ'

0b17

in a

secondary degree.,,41 Up to this yo1nt AI1.etotle has not 8xpl1c1t~ sub·:)rd1.nated tl"..e 11fe of excellence of character. which he discusse. throughout
moet

or

the length

ot

the Ethics, Books Two tbrough lli.ne, to .. he Ute of

.39U78a2; U66al"lJ ll.68b)2-34.

WCf• Cb. II, no • .3 of

the present. study.

r-------
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philosophioal contemplation.

The t..hree 11vas enumerated a L t.he beGinning of t

"\:.l."oal.ise on happiness, and reoapitulated in clearer form in Book "Ienh2-the li~
of enjoyable use ot the senses,

thr~

life ot honor, the lite of c()1'll.amplat.ion-

are only in these pages f1nally weighed one against. the other and one ot them

ohosun as supr8:'::e.

Hera Aristotle proceeds to show that the high level of

excellenee which the lit. of honor represents nevertheless serves a

D\ll'p088

soz:show out,side it.self.
The life of honor is dinUnotively a human lifa.

It was seen" the actions

JiJhat mankind agree1n call1.ng honorable all der!ve from man t s

nature.

or

bod~

Justioe, generosity, agreeableness, friendship come into their own

b'10an8e ot the mutual needs and st.reas6s that exist among men.

staney,

soci~u.

~Hllf-control,

Temperance, con

cour"" prudence serve to regulate tl".e drives and

mootions that stem from man's physioal makeuP.h3

Had men no bodies, then soo1

and emotional problems, thus the whole area of exeellancesconcerned with thea,

would s1mply not ex:tst.

"CNJ ow the

virtues of

':>\11'

composite nature en

, P}ll'9:q humanJ so t.herefore aleo is t.he 11te that maniteata these v1.rtua., and
the happiness tJlat belongs to it..

't21097b2,3i 111441.-8.

43U18a.0..22.

lbJreu the happ1nees that belongs to the

81
intelleot 1s separate. • • • ,,41.
Theae 'human' activities oannot be final without qualification.
doe. thia appear

1lOX'8

Hollbare

clearq than in the ab8urd1 t7 ot tr)1.ng to attribute such

concern. to the gods. Virtue. Uke hone8t7, braw:r'7, ger.r08i tq, temperaDCe
haW no meming

tor baings exempt trom all trial, being. auppo ••d to po.... .

supreme b1eaeedne••

bT

their T8I'7 nature.

"If.. go through the 118\ ... shall

find that aU torma ot v1.rtaous conduat . _ t.ritl1Dg and unwortbJ of the

eod8. 1t45
But the ill. ot oont.eJnplatlon i8 another case altogether.
St,lll, eftI"1Ol'l8 euppoaea tbat t.hct gods ltve and therefore that, they are
active J '" oannot suppose t.ha to sleep"'Me Endymloa. low U JOU take
~ from a 11Y1ng being actiOD, and atlll IIOre production, what i8 lett
but contemplation? 'bref'ore the actl'91.t7 ot God, which surpasses all

·1a4U78a21-23. ct • .nt Aa- 40,3_5-8. "It we cone1der the majority ot ['"the
attect.1ou of 8oulJ, thire .... to be no cue in wblob the soul can act or be

acted upon Without involving the body, e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and Mn8
tlon generalq. '1'hln1d.ng . . . . the mat probable e.xoept1on• • • • ft ~. 408b
24-29. "Thus 1 t ia that in old age the aot1 Y1 tq of Jlind or inte1lectUir
apprehension deol.SAe8 onq tbro'ugh the deCfq' ot some other inward organio part.
mind 1 taelf 11 impa8sible. Th1nld.rlg, loving, and hat1ng are aftect10na not of
mind, but of that wd.ch has m1nd, 80 tar as it has it. That 1. wby, When thia
vehicle
lDBmOl'1 and love cease, the,.. were actlvit18. not ot Dd.nd, but. ot
the compoa1te which has perished, mind 18, no doubt, .omethlng more divine and
impassible." Ibid. 4)0&22-25. ftJand 18 not at one t1me knowing and at another
not. WheD ad.JJ18 Ht free from 1 ta present conditions it appears as jut what.
it la and nothing 1IlOr9t thi8 alone 1s 1sDrtal and eternal <we do not, howewr
remember 1ta tOl'ltlllr IIOt1'91.t7 because, Wb1le Id.nd 1n th18 sense i8 1IpU81b1e,
mind aspuat" 1s destruct.ible), and ...\hout 1t nothing th1.nks." ct. Joacb1sa,
pp. 288-2,1, vie. "ThevoUs....-the aot1Y1tT ot Jlo1;(,IS or6>el.f.}J>fa-ia independent ot,
and unaftected by, abetract untY8J".aU.t,....

dec.,..,

4SU78bl1.

others in bleaaed1'le8., m:t18t be COIltemplat1veJ and of human activ1tSa.,
therefore, t~ which 18 moat aldn to thi8 MUst be most of the nature
ot happines..
•
fl:)re I atta1.ning and ••curing goods has no

i8 t.hat they po.ses. their goods.

_an1ng.

What _t1ien lI1th the gods

Van differ from the gods in th1s at least,

that they do not s1mpq po...ss the goods they poe...s, but tIIIl8t be concerned
about. getting and keeping them.

'l'h1. 1. the lmman side or their existence, or

rather the an1mal side. But. men are lION ak1n to gods thC'l to anlaal8 becatl.8
t.hey share, however imperreot1;r, tbt experience

ot happine.s, something which t

beyond the scope ot brute•• 47 !bat human actions, workadq or heroio, look to

something beyond t.hemselYea J they e.x1et onl1

w

pronde access to the area

where h1.1man actlv1:ty take. on qualities which would not be altogether UllW'Ol"tby

ot the goda. 10 one can reaaonab1;r ala1m tha.t vlrt'UOUS actlyltie. ex1at

tor their

OWl

.~

sakB. Yet happinH8. requires absolute t1naUty, t.he ve'1!!7

character18tlc whloh oamnot be claimed tor t.heal.

activitie. exi.t to secure oould

tr

what the virtuous

be atta1ned without them, they would engage no

oneta eftorts at all. 48

46u78bl8-23.
41U18b26.

48compare

U16b8-1O. aBut those actiViti. are de.irable in tJ1e..elva8
wb10h do not atm at any Nault beyond the mare exercise ot the aot1nty. Wow
thia is telt to be the natura ot actions 1n oonfoml ty with virtue J tor to do
noble and virtuoua deeds 1s a t,hing desirable tor ita own sake." Thi.
express10n ot virtue as a good in i lBelf J tJplcal as 1 t 1s ot the moat part ot
the r;thics. seeme in direot disagreement w.L th t,be preHnt. aubordinat.ion ot the
vlrtuea to so-called higher gooda which the virtue. exiat onq to ..(run...
'I'he shift of value whleh ranks the Ute ot virtue below the 11te of conte
platlon corresponds to .A:ris1;oUe ts concept ot lUe lived 1n the midst ot the
socio-oorporeal needs of tho human condit1on as contrasted nth 11te lived
according to .1 t,s highest. capac1tloB, 1Ibether theae are typical ot the human
(Sondi tlon or not. In the tormer case moral vtrtue 1s supreme, in the lat,wr it

r...------------.
What they secure is leisure.

The business man exerts himself' to gain

wealth, and wealth exists to secure the goods and graces of an agreeable life.
"We are busy that we

~

have leisure. • • ."

There is no reason for war but t

protect the life and property ot a citizenry in danger from without. Statescraft itself derives its meaning from the lives of the citizens which it
guards and promtes.

sate-

-

For all the anxiety, sacritice, honor, that attaches to

such activities, they have a reference beyond themselves, the Good Life lI'hich
they variously support. 49

Prosperity,. peace, sooial order are the oonditions

0

has importanoe only relative to its supporting a life of intelligenoe. As seen
before (pp. 31-)S), both the life of honor and the life of pleasurable use of
the senses and the lite of oontemplation are relative gcodas relative, that is
to the ultimate good, whioh is happiness. If one of the three is taken to be
supreme and the other two act! vi tie., supreme as they are in their own lines,
are subordinated to it, such can happen only beoause this is oonsidered the one
which is intrinsioally' the most conducive to happiness. It may be that the
philosopher is under more of an obligation to achieve vtrtue than to achieve
philosophical wisdom; but this is not because virtue is better in itself-for
wisdom is better in itself-but because virtue is better and more neoessary" for
him situated as he is in the human oondition,
The life of the mind holds :first plae6. in Aristotle's scheme on the solid
ground of its intrinsic superiority. His CJlltinuous concern for the ·'aotual pr
tice of Ufe as it has to be lived, and his UDmtstakable regard for the
qualities of soul which ma1lD the man of honor, hold the superiority of the
con templative lite in full respect.

49U11b4-18. ct. Josef Pieper's essays ''lIus8a undkult tt and "Was Haiset
Philosophieren?", llunich. 1948, (Inglish translation ol~th in one volwue,
leisure the Basis ot Culture, New York, 1952), tor an extended application ot
.AristoieiI'8n and p1'itonic notions of leisure to a ChristilUl philosop!V' of
culture.
.
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man's spending if only so brief a time in the pursuits that he values for themselves.
The meaning w:lich leisure has for AristoUe reveals the hierarchy in which

he places the various human faculties and their activities.

Iaisure in its

basic sense, and the way that Aristotle is accustomed to use it, is contrasted
with busyness

(t:f";z'o.i-,) and~U-,(o£~). There is no indication that Aristotle

uses it in the narrowed sense which it was later to receive, that of time
devoted to formal study.50 Navertheless, in the present. context philosophical
contemplation is the only activity that is named as a leisure activity.

This

omission of other activities is not by itself enough to restrict leisure to
intellectual pursui ta J a page earlier howevexSl there has been discussion of
what Aristotle calls tagreeable afIlU8ements' ('7"'tCV"rraLJ{&3V'"a,~ QdeL'a.l), and the
I'ank

that he assigns them strongly suggests such a restriction of the notion of

leisure.
Common acceptance of the word leisure includes a number of activities
besides the purely intellectual.

Games of various sorts would have their place

thereJ sports, notably truntingJ receiving company- and vi.iting, and the
banqueting and drinking that belong to themJ conversation aild discussion,
entertainments of all sorts, comedy and drama; the enjoyment of dancing and
pl¢ng 1IlU8ic, or of watching others perform. .
But such activities as these Aristotle at. least implicitly calls amuaements not leisure, moreover he assigns them a purpose different from that ot
leisure.

5Ocf.

He looks upon them. as body-centered and does not consider a:tJY, even

Bonitz, p. '741, b, 20-50.

r..---------------.
the highest at them, 1n their spiritual aspeots.

They are things that appeal to

the low standards of animals, slaves, children, and profligates, and thus can
hardly have muoh special worth. 52
But agreeable amusements are Bought tor their own sake, not as means to
ot.her ends.

Indeed the preferenoe that men show them is often of greater dis-

advantage than usefulness since it oauses negleot of duties, whioh are more
necessary but

18SS

enjo.yable.

gives of leisure pursuits.

In this they answer to the desoription Aristotle

that ments workaday activities exist to support

them. 5)
This preeminence however is 'W'1deaerved by amusements.

The rich and influ-

ential persons whose pursuit of such pleasures is thought to be their best reoommendation need not be the best

judge~

of what is good, any more than are

slaves or ohildren. The man of quality and character, the serious man, is the
real standard of worth54 , and his interest does not foous on amusements.

It is

not for amusements that men spend their days in toil J even though many seem to

521117&6-10; b12-24. "Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a
slave no leS8 than the noblest of mankind; but no one allows a slave any
measure of happiness, any more than a life of his own. Therefore happiness doe!
not oensist in pastimes and amusements. • • ." Cf. also, 1176bl7-24. "But
perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue and intelligence,
whioh are the sources of man's higher activities, do not depend on the
possession of power J and it these persons, having no taste for pure and liberal
pleas1ll'8, have reoourse to the pleasures of the body, we must not on that accou; ..
suppose that bodiq pleasure. are the more desirable. Children imagine that the
things they theJD8elveS value are ac tualq the best J it is not surprising therefore that, as children and grown men have different standards of value, so also
should the worthless and the Virtuous."

531176blo-12.
S4rhe (j'1t"'OU.~a.LOS J.V?P as measure of all values, of N. E. 1166&13. also
Bantu, p. 696,b, 5,-697, a,57.
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think so.

A.mU.8ement is useful where it serves to refresh men for work again;

but if work itself is for the sake of amusement, the reeult is a Circular
argument that arriws nowhere.
Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be om' End-that .e shoul
toil and moil all our life long in order that _ 1'IW\1 amuse ourselves • • •
['"T 70 make amus81Jl8nt the object of our serious pursuits and our work see
foollsh and childish to excess. Ana.charsis' s IOOtto, Play in order that
f!1Il¥ work, is felt to be t.he right rule.
For amusement is a form of rest;
but we need rest because we are not able to go on working without a break,
and thet:~fore 1 t is not an end, since we take it as a means to further activity.55
Certainly, then, amusements do not hold the privileged place of leisure, of
which Aristotle has said, "We are busy that we may have leisure. • • ."
The true scale of value is rather.

amusement for the sake of continued

activity, continued actiVity for the sake of leisure, leisure for the sake of
pursuits that most deserve ments attention.

But this passage has not explicitl

named the activi.ties that fall into the class of agreeable amusements.

Possib

the amusements that .A:r1stotle here subordinates to work are only the strictly
bodily ones.

Meanwhile, what should be the rank of activities that lie half'.
'"" between the extremes of philosophy and of banqueting-the area of oultural
values like musio, arts, poetry, the drama-is not indicated in the course of
the Ethics.
I

Book Eight of the Politics56 is more explicit about these higher activitie ,
at least about those whioh come under the broad olassification of lIlWJic.
pertinent passages are useful. in t.wo wqs:

55U76b28_36.

56Fbl. l337b4-1342b34.

-

The

thay more clearly define Aristotle'
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notion of leisured activities, and at the same time they reveal an inconsistenc
of standard that may result trom a stress between Aristotle ts philosophic principles and his acceptance of enlightened human experience as a norm. 57
Amusement as such maintains its position subordinate to more serious activi ties; i't must be engaged in only at sui table times, be used only with profi t,

sinoe it exists to retresh on for activity.,8

Play exists for activity; every

type of action entails its own fa.tigue and needs re.t'reshment.

leisure, however

is distinguished from amusement inasmuch as tithe first principle of all action
is leisure.

Both action and leisure are required, but leisure is better than

occupat.1.on and is its end. • • • "59
vi ty which they value above all else.

In leisure men are able to pursue the acti
If amusement exists only that tiresome

occupations of business and sta.tecraft m81 be carried. on without

~~cessive

fatigue; if these tiresome oocupations exist in their turn only to provide the

,7Cf. Jaeger, Ch. X, ssp. pp. 282.., (also Ross, pp. 19 and 235, 6) in
whioh the composit.ion of this book is sboWti to coincide with the oo~sitlon ot
the Eu<iemian Ethios, hence to preoede the related passages of the N. E. by a
number ot years. For this reason, the. passage in quest.ion need nQ;. represent
Aristotlo.s final view of the matter, thus need not indioate a final inoonsistency in his thought about leisure. But it is the only available indication
of what his opinion was, and is not inoonsistent with the tew references of the
later passage.
. 58 Po1 • 1337h3-42. "Cw"7hat ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we
ought n'Ot""to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end ot life.
But if this is inconceivable, and amusement is needed more amid serious
oooupations than at other times (for he lIho 1s hard at work has need of
relaxation) and amusement gives relaxation whereas occupation is alw~
accomp81ied with exertion anJ effort, we should introduce amusements only at
snit able times, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they
oreate in the soul is a relaxation, and trom the pleasure lie obtain rest."
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l'!eans a.nd leisure for engagwp, in finer activities, the refined aetivities whic
fill t.he leisure of a

gentlm~.an,

on the oLher hand, tend of their na,\':ure to

give ifpl.,al:mra and happiness and enjoyment

Df

life" by the very fact that tr.ey

exist for themsalvfts and are not only steps on the way to fFlmething

,

attained.

y~t

to be

60

Beyond the kind of leisure ti1at tht:: intellectual engages in

6l

, -w."'e chief

t:)9 gentlamaT.;ts leisure, not because it cannot be dO;:la lIithout, not 1)Bca'iJS9 It

pro'''ides some 11seful service, the way a.hility to write helps b'llsines, or
s>.:ercise improves physical 1'1 tness or experience in drawulg makes for uetter
taste Ln home decorations.

62 Music is admitted for a higher ld.nd of excellence

far "intellectual enjoyment", and this is something fine in itself and befi ttine a f'ree man.

It. needs no further excuse.

"'l'o oe

al~'s

seeking after

the useful does not beoome :treo and exalted souls • .,6)
1I\18io may be consldeI'ed in respect to any of three good affeots whioh it

W"orl{s

C1)

thoSQ _·ho lis ten to iii.

l'elaxat.ion.

It provides some of the bes·t amusement. and

This function is 1ll8rely a s'ubordinate one; like sleep or drink or

'--_.-l338al-$.
-Ibid. l338a9-11u
60

(;lro1d.
"It. is clear then that there a:ro branohes of learnint;
::t.r:d edveatron which we lIIU.st study mzr~ly with a view to leisure spent In
iHtelleotual aotivity, C£r.d these al'e to be valued for their own sake; ~~1ereas
tho:::e kinds of knowledge mlict! are ils~f"l tn bU6j nOIHl are tD be deeF./SI) nOC9SS
:.tnd exi.st for the sake of otnol' t.hil'AgS.;:

.:...,

-

vC'Itild.

-

l33Bal2-2l.

t..jIbld. 133Ba21-b4.

89
dancing, it is valued not for what it is in itself-sleep and drink are not the selves lIfOrth anything-but for its "making care to cease".64 This restorative
function of music recalls the purposes Which Aristotle assigns to amusements

6

here as well as in the Ethics. $ But in the case of music, other functions are
present besides that of restoration, and they are the more characteristic.
For dxample, this incidental lower service is distinguished from the
second effect of music:

the main reason why men introduce it into their

leisure is the embellishment it lends to life and social gatherings by its mere
presence-its llberal oharacter.

66
CIJntellectual enjoyment
is universally acknowledged to contain an
element not only of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is made u
of both • • • • Hence and with good reason it is introduced lnto social
gatherings and entertainments, because lt makes the hearts of men glad. s

-

64 Ibid • 1339416-20.

6$And in the Poetics 1449b27 (Cf. Pol. l341b39,40, for the only other reference to this theor,y in Aristotle's extant works), where Aristotle's
explanation of the effec: of tragedy approaches this medical view. "Tragedy
produces a purgation (kaea..prrls ) of emotion in the spectator: and artificial arousal of the emotions of pity and fear results in working them--at
least any excess of them-out ot the system. Cf. also Pol. 1347&8-16 for the
parallel to this process in the area ot music itself. 66The term ~('ctr(Dr6, "pastime", is idiomatlcally used of tm pursuits of
cultured leisure_erlous conversation, music, the drama. (Rackham, note 4 to
Pol. VIII, iv.) This term is distinguished in 1339blb from educational
p;1rsuits (rra.LoeCa...) and from amusements (lralt:Ju1. h ln N. E. 1177alO lt cover
actions of a lower kind aewall, 'pastimes' in a less serious Elenee
approxiaating 'amusements t.

that on this ground alone we may assume that the yomg ought to be trained
in it. For innocent pleasures are not only in69armony with the perfect
end of 11fe, but they also provide relaxation.
The precise nature of this effect is not clear.

It is distinot frolU the first

effect, "alleviation of past tOil M68 , by the fact that men seek it even when
they are not tired, so supposedly' because it is agreeable to them on its own
account.

69 But at the same time its pleasantness seems to derive from the tact

that a relaxation has been effected.

ItAJIuaement is for the sake of relaxation,

and relaxation i8 of neoe8si ty sweet, for it 1s the remedy of pain caused by
toil J

and intellectual enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain an

element not only' of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is lIlS.de up of
both.,,70 Thus the two effeots are felt to be distinct, the one desirable as
remedy, the other desirable for itself-liberal-though in Aristotle's brief
description of them the remedial aspect intrudes into both effects and is
probably predominant.
A third, educative, effect of DlUsic

by formation of good diaposi tiona.

7l is the training of character and

Aristotle asks whether music

dOGS

not

perform some nobler service than that of removing fatigue or agreeably

-

67Pol. l339bl8-28.

68~. l338b41.

-

69Ibid • l339b2f-40

-

10 Ibld. l339bl$-20.
7l'Educative t in the theoretioal sense of rral deta, that is, referring to
the finer types of puraui t, not I training t referred to business and rmndane
ends.
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recreating.
In addition to this common pleasure, telt and shared in by all (for the
pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and
characters), ~ it not have also some influence over the character and t~
soul? It must have such an influence if charae ters are affected by it.
And that they are so affected is proved in many ways.72
Some

types of music affect the movements of character, shaping in them resolute

ness; some develop sympathetic capacities, value standards, qualities of temper
some, sensitivity.13
Aristotle.

This third set of effects is

hig~

esteemed by

Its purpose merges with that of the liberal etfect.

Whereas it

would seem possible to di.stinguish the educative aspect of music-its etfect on

character and personality--from its liberal aspect-the pure worthwhileness of
passing leisure time in intellectUal pursuits--such a distinction does not
appear in .Aristotle's treatment.

Indeed, these two functions ot musiC,

educati01l of personality and 'intellectual enjoyment', are only two aspects,
emotional and intellectual, of the same effect of refinement to which mq be
given the generic name 'liberality..

Thus it mq not be necessary to determine

whether spending time in speculation is 'more liberal' than developitng refinement of personality through the fine art8, hence more fundamental to the meaniru
of leisure.

Both functions of music are fundamentall1 leisured, and in their

liberality transcend &n1 restorative functions ot music,

And this, despite

the tact that in his psychological explanations ot why the liberal arts are

72

-

Ibid. 1340al-9.

-

13Ibid. 1340alD-b19.
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enjoyable Aristotle seems to rely heavily on an amusement-therapy theory such
as that of purgation in tragedy.
In short. Aristotle haa not made his standard clear or has not applied it

consistently in those activities which lie somewhere between the physicallyrefreshing and the intellectual1y-challenglng.

It may be that there are a tew

forms of entertainment which possess value irrespective ot purposes outside

-

themselves; iv may be that all entertainments,

~ven

the higher arts are l"edue-

ible to the amusemant-therap,y tunotion.
But the place that Aristotle uigns to the purely intellectual pursuits
which make up philosophy' cannot be mistaken.
~alification

These are final without

because they occupy an area in lite which the rest of life's

activities exist in the last analysis only to sup!>ort and enrich" and because
they are valued simply tor what they are in themselves without providing any
other servicea

uLCJontemplation may be held to be the only activity that is

loved tor its own sake:

it produces no result beyond the actual act of contem-

plation, wherea.s from practical pursuits we .look to seoure some advanta.ge,greater or smaller, beyond the actlon itself. n14

This asoendancy over other

activities once granted, it is easy to see how contemplation fits the character·
istic of perfectness which Aristotle required ot human happiness in Book One.
Contemplation and happiness are in tact to be identified t

14u11bl-4.

"Happiness therefore
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is ooextensive in its range with oontemplation.

the more a olass of beings

--

possesses the :faculty ot oontemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as
accidental oonoomi tant

2!. con templation

con1;.emplation is valuable in i tsel!.

~

!!. inherent !!l 1-1, since

It tollows that happiness is some

contemplation. ft7S
The liberal oharacter of Wisdom is fundamental in the Aristotelian view

0

man and human actlvitles I
That CWlsdDa,J ls not a soienoe of prod\Jotion· is clear even from the
history of the earlielt philosophera. For 1 t is owing to their wonder
that men both now begin and at firs t began to philosophize; • • • since
they philosophized in ord~r to escape from ignoranoe, evidently they were
pursuing science in order to knoW', and not tor arrr utili tarlan end. And
this is coni'il'J'ded by the factsJ for it was when almost all 1~ necessities
of ille and the things that make for eo;nf'ort ar.d recreation had been
secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evident.ly then we do no
seek it for the sake of any other advantage J but as the man i8 free, we
say, who exists tor his own sake and not for another's, so we Plf'isue this
as the only free science, for it alone exists tor its own sake.
But why doee the intellectual life alone of all human activities have this
ascendency, that is, this unqualified finality of value?

1>U78b29-32 (italics added), i.e. "ou Ka;ra. cru;«;Sej3T}lCosJa.£ kar~ ~v
fJewp{av q. Cf. 1114814-16 (also note 17, Ch. II of the present study), where
the perfection of an act1 vi tT is described in much the same terms J and 1114b3.3,
where pleasure is described in 1;.erma conSistent with this cri wrion.
760f • Tredenniok's translation. "for speculation ot this kind began With
a view to recreation and pastime, at a time When practically all the necessitie
of life were already supplied." The Greek admits either interpretation. viz.
11..-4
..... '
,
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•
"
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;'.
,
\
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<.Ix.e~ov rap ,n-a'{Twv ~7Tap,(ov-r;U)v rCl);~var~'U)v ~t Trf>0s Pfl(rr4,)v?y
k'a.t. oUlT""r1J V t; Tol.a.u r~ i;6povorrls DrJ aro J'7Te«rO"t::lt.(.'.

-

77 )let. 982bll-26.
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Because contemplation!!.!2.!1 excell8!lt.

This answer concluded discussio

of the inferior forms of activity and introduces the passages in which
Aristotle shows that the activity of intellect is the highest way- of comprehending the highest objects.
But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with excellence, it i
reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest
excellence; and this dll be the excellence of the best part of us.
Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is though
tc rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble an
divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being
relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this J:Jlrt of us
in accordance with the excellence proper to it that Will constitute
perfect happiness J and it haS been stated already that this acti.1t7 is
actlrlty of contemplation. 76
The lntelieot is

t~t

part of man which is thought "by nature to be ruler and

leading power in bimlt J it is the inteUect that has "cognizance of what is

noble and divine", this because it is "itself actua.l.l1 divine" or"the divinest
part of us".79
Intellect is highest in man ()ecause of all his faculties it is capable of
activation with the least possible admixture of material conditioning.
"

ldent1t7 between two is never perfect where both involve matter.

Hence,

because mind involves no matter in its constitution, it is capable of
reproducing in i teelf arq determination whatever and is not limited by depending on the disposition of its matter to receive this or that determination.

It is capable of being determined by the forms even of objeets that contain no

781177&12_18.
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matter at all.

Indeed, a thing can beoome objeot

at mind only

be divested of matter and the limitations due to matter.

80

tar as ito

Intelleot is the hig

est wa,y of aotualization beoause its very essenoe exoluded the oonditioning
prinoiple whioh is matter.

BO

Intelleot (t.he perfection

at which in man is Wisdom) is man fS highest

capacity 'beoause its objects are the highest of all beings in thd universe.

BDef. De An. 429al3-28I ltIf'thinking is lik3 perceiving, it must be
either a prOe'eSi in which the soul is aoted upon by what is oapable of being
thought, or a process different from but. analogous to that. The thinking part
of the soul JIlU.8t therefore be, while impassible, oapable ot reoeiving the form
of an objeot; that is, flUSt be potentially identioal in character with its
object without being the object. Mind mst be related to what is thinkable,
sense is to what is sensible.
''Therefore, sinoe everything ls a possible objeot ot thought, mind in or
as Anaxagoras said, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all
admixture; for the co-presenoe of what is alien to its nature is a hindranoe
and a blocks it follows that it too, llke the sensitive part, can have no
nature of its own, other than that of having a oertain oapacity. Thus that in
the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and
judges) ls, before lt thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it
cannot reasonably be regarded as blended wlth the body: if so, it would
aoquire some quality, e.g. warmt.h or eold, or even have an organ l1ke the
sensitive faculty. as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to oall the so
'the place at forms t. • • • It
De. An. 430&2-19. "Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same wa:y as
its ob'jeo'G' are. For in the case of objeots which involve no matter, what
thinks and what ls thought are identioal. (~mind is not always thinking we
must oonsider later.) In the oase of those which oontain matter each of the
objects of thought 1s only potential.l.y present. It follows that while they
will not have mind in them (for mind is a potentiality of them only insofar as
they are oapable of being disengaged trom matter) mind may yet be thinkable.
nSince in every class of thing, as in nature as a whole, we find two
factors involwd, (1) a matter whioh is potentially all the particulars
included in the class, (2) a cause which 1s productive in the sense ~at it
makes them all (the latter standing to the tormer, as e.g. an art to its
materia.l), these distinct elements must likewise be found wi thin the soul.

,

'these are the realities that underlie the whole of being, the ultimate
principles and causes of all that exists. 81 Wisdom is "intuitive reason
combined with scientific knowledge--scientific knowledge of the highest object
which has received as it were its proper completion. "82

The perfection of man

lies, then, in the objects of philosophic contemplation.

But what does their

excellence consist in?
And understanding and lcnowledge pursued for their ovm sake are found moat
in the knowledge of that which is most knowable • • • and the first principles and the causes are moat knowable; for by reason of these, and from
these, all other things come to be mown, and not these by means of the
things subordinate to them. And the science whioh mows to what end each
thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more au
thoritative than any ancillary science) and this and i8 the gO~~ of that
thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature.
The value of the objects of philosophic contemplation lies in their
universality and necessity, and these qualities entitle it to the name of
theoloSl, the divine Bcience.

For, traditionally, the divine attributes are

eternity, immovability, separation from all conditioning.B4

These qualities

Wisdom must possess if it is to correspond. to its defini tron fully J and no

-

Blxet. 982&1.

8211 }llal8.

-

83:t6et. 982a.jo-b1.
84of. )let. 1026&10-32, viz. "Now all causes must be eternal, but
especially t'ii9se Ci.e the principles of things that exist separate from matte
and motioEV. for they are the causes that operate on BO much of the divine as
appears to us Ci.e. the heavenly bodies 7. There must, then, be three
theoretical philosophies, mathematics, pnysics, and what we may call theology,
since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in
things of this sort."
Also, !bid. 1013&3-12. "It is clear then from what has been said that
there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and seoarate from sensible
things. It has been shown also that this 8ubstance cannot have any magnitude,
but is without parts and indivisible (for it ?roduces movement throueh infini

r-------n

----,

other of oven the liberal studies has claim to such qualities.
But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable,
clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science-not, however, to physics (tor physics deals ·d th certain movable things) nor to
mathematics, but to a science prior to bot.h. For physics deals wit.h thin
which crist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but. presumably do not exist.
separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals With
t.hings which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes
be eternal, but especially those; for they are t.he causes tllat operat.e on
so much of the divine the heavenly bodies as appears to us. ts.5

time, and nothing fint to has infinite power, and, while every magnitude is
either intini te or fin1te, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite
magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because these is not infinite
magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterableJ tor all the other ohanges are posterior to change of place."
Ibid. 1073a24-28: "The first principle or priJJ1U'7 being is not movable
ai thar in i taelf or acciden tally, but produces the primary eternal and single
movement. But. • • that which is moved D1U8t be moved by something, and the
first mover must be in i teel! Ull.IOOvable, and eternal movement must be produced
by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing. • • ."
Ibid. l074bl-10t "Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed
down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that theBe bodies
Li.e. the starsJ are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature.
The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythioal form. • • • • But if
one ware to separate the .first point from these additions and take it alonethat they thought the first sub.tances to be ..gods, one must regard this as an
inspired utterance. • • ."

6~t. 1026&10-18. Cf. ibid. 1026&29-311
7ut if there is an
imroovable substance, the science ,of this must be prlor and must
be first
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In having these realities as its subjeot oontemplation transcends all that is

merely incidental or oontingent or material.
which could be higher.

There is nothing in the Universe

For the living actuality which is God Himself is

precisely the wholeness of thought--object of thought comprehended completely
by thought, thought completely actualized by what it thinks. 86 Wisdom has as
ita focus the perfection of God, perfeotion that is without shade of
oonditioning.
Contemplation, whioh is manls exercise or Wisdom, is to be considered the
perfect activity for man because it is final (sought f:;r its own sake) and is

86
.
Met. 1012bl-29. Aristotle 1s discussion of the eXistence of God
proceeds from the fact of oontingent motions to the fact of a final cause of
all motions which is not itself IIlOved but mows the first moved by being
desired by them. The unmovedness of this first mover, his necessity, is the
principle from which all other motion oo.s. for it is in itself pure actuality, and actuality is wbat all else seeks as term of its getting into motion.
This actuality is seen to be good since it is universally deSired. All that i
desired is deSired as a good. For example, thinking is desired because it is
good, or, in other words, beoause it is an instanoeof actualization. (Of. Ch
V, note 6h of the present study.)
"
-In this way Aristotle introduces the reality of thought into his
description of the first mover, and it is apparently becallse God is pure
actuali ty that he is pure thought. 'Xhe other chief characteristios of Godlife and eternaUty-are mentioned atter hiB contemplation, and receive less
attention) they do not seem clearly derived from his attribute of intelligence
though; God's intelligence, not his actuality, seems the more immediate
occasion of positing life in bimt • And life also belongs to GodJ tor the
aetualityof thought 1s life, and God is that actuality; and God's selfdependent actuality is life most good and eternal. 11 It is easier to see that
all the qualities converge in one being than that each of th9m follows from
some other quality nreYiollsly established.
e !.2!:. is
Cf. also, Joachiln, pp. 291-3, 296, according to which God !!.
reached in one reasoning process, and!! pure intelligence i8 reac
in
another, neither attribute derived exactly from the other. Cf. Jaeger, Ch. X ,
"The Revision of the Theory of the Prime }lover", for a discussion of the
composition-time of passages pertinent to this explanation, and of the doctr
itselt.
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excellent; its finality derives from its excellence.

Thus the criterion on

which Aristotle has based his judgment that certain activities exist only for
the sake of others (whether dis clSsing what actin ties the gods could be
conceived as engaged in, or whether discussing the serious worth of various
leisure-time act,ivities) is ultimately an excellence-eriterion.

But,

excellence

means for Aristotle everything that is typified in the tradi tionaJ. non...
anthropomorphic notion of the divine.

If, then, the objects of

div~r;.e

aetivity

have already been determined acoording to a standard of excellence, the
reasoning seems to be circular.
--There is in faot a convertibility between the divine and the excellent.
Eternity, immovabill ty, separation from all conditioning are of thft essence of
the divine and are of the essence of the excellent.
are fullness of actuality.

They are so, because they

Here, in actuality wholly free of possible

''''
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\
./
:\
conditioning (@vepfi?ta
alleu
ou//tJAewS"

is the tundamental notion of the divine

or of excellence in its absolute sense. 81

Ever)" other reality, inoluding all

67 Cf'. Vet. 1049b4-10$la21, on the priority of' ~vlpyeL~ , in which the
various quamies here attributed to the divine and to the objects of' Wisdom
are traced to their basis in pure actuality; viz. passim "Obviously, therefore,
the substance or form is actuality. According to this argu;DJl!mt, then, it is
obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we hav.
Said, one actuality alw.rs precedes another in time right back to the actua1it.
of the eternal prime mover." "But aotuality is prior in a strioter sense also
for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal
thing exists potentially." "Nothine~ 'then, whioh is in the full sense
imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent • • • all imperishable
things, then exist actually. )for oan anything which is of neceseitz exist
potentially; y..::t these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing
would exist. Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially;
and, if there is an eternal mobile. it is not in motion in virtua of a
potentiality, except in respect of' 'whence' and 'whither' • • • • And 80 the sun
and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that
they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor
An t.hAV ti'M in this activit.Y; f::)r movement is not for them, as it is for
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the activities of men, have excellence just in so far

88

they approach this

unqualified state of actualitl by activating the various areas (.;f possibility
which are inherent in their natures.

In this way man, always with a heavy

admixture of unrealized or unrealizable capacity in them, achieve whet is
theirs to achieve of what exists in its wholeness only in the d1vine.
The aim of human effort is a perfection which is essentially proper to the
divine alone.

4. Contemplation

As According to Nature

Aristotle's notion of human happiness is oriented tv the divine. "This is
plain from the previOUS considerations and from his explicit statement88 J more
over, he recognizes the paradoxical character of his conclusion and proceeds

perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, 80 that the
continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substanc
which is matter and potenQ1, not actuality, that causes this. Imperishable
things are imt tated by those that are involved in change, e.g. earth and fire.
For these Cheavenly bodiesJ are also ever active • • • • tt "Cbviousl.y, then,
actuality is prior both to potancl and to everr principle of change." That
the actuality is also better and more valuab~. than the good potenc;y"1s evident,
• • •• Ever,.thing of which we say that it can do something, is alike
. capable of contraries • • • • The capacity for contraries, then, is present at
the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same time,
e.g. health and sickness. Therefore, while the good IIlU8t be one of them, the
capacity is both alike, or neither; the actuality, then, is better." "And
therefore we may also say that in the things which are trom the beginning,
i.e. in eternal things, there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing
perverted• • • • "

881177 &15-17J 1178b2SJ 1179&25-31.
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t.o emphasize it.
Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in
virtue of hie humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of 80mething
wi. thin him that is divine J and by as much as this something is superior to
his composite nature, by 80 much is its activity superior to the exercise
of the other forms of virtue. If then the intelleot is something divine
in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in compari
80n with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man
Rhould have man t s thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but ..
ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may
to live in accord with the highest thing in him; for thoug~9 this be small
in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.
7'

•

("/

~

1,/

For mortal man "so far as possible to achieve immortality" (€sP OQ'ov evaeyeTat.

Wa.va.-r!Sew)a this is the sharpest statement of the paradox

its resolution.
something

and at once

There can be in Aristotle no questlon of one fS accomplishing

which lies beyond his capacity_

(Such would be a contradiction of

the basic notion which the principle of actualization of possibility expresses )

--

Man therefore is to deal in imm:>rtal things so far as lies in his power_

Wherever there is in him an opening to such objects, he is to do his most to
fill it.

That opening 1s his intellectual capacity.

So far as a man's mind

becomes the "all things" which it is essentially capable of becomtng90, the
has become divine by leaving behind limitation in time, space, matter.
But to leave behind limitation in time, space, matter is something
man is capable of except in an attenuated fashlon.

What is most properly the

function of the thinker does not require bodily goods.

As

man, though, the

philosopher continues to require certain outward and personal goods (not so
III&I\Y as others require, but still not a few); and as good man he cannot remain

891177b27-l178al.
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indifferent to the needs and troubles of others.

Thus it is inevitable the

needs and duties of his human Ufe continually withdraw his mind from a state
unconditioned attention to the objects of Wisdom.

In his life

0

as human being,

a man, even a philosopher, can give little time to the free play of his
intellect.
tI

Contemplation can hardly be called in accord with human nature.

SUch a life as this however will be higher than the human level.

virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it • • • • ft
proper to him when he learns to contemplate.

not in

A man achieves the good

This goOd is not a good proper

his human nature, though) for most of what belongs to human nature is
indifferent to contemplation or wi.thdraws trom it.

The man ts perfection is

contemplating, yet his nature is scarcely favorable to it.

The conclusion tha

must be drawn trom such considerations is plain s human _na_t_u_re.... !!.!l2.l ~
determines
factor.

.!:h!. !!!!!!! e!rfection,

but 2&r,t of human nature is the determining

The good of the intellect is what is a man's perfection.

human being is not all of him intellect:

And i ! a

then man's good is the good of a par

of him.
Yet it would be strange if the good that perfects a man really is a good
.
91
that perfects something other than himself.
Even granted that the 'somethin

91ct • U78a,3,41 "It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the
life of his self but that of something else." Again, 1166&19-228 tt["EJach
man wishes himself what is good, While no one choose. to posses8 the whole
world if he has first to become someone else (for that matter, even now God
possesses the good but this does not matter to all the others that are not
God), he wishes for this only on condition of being wha~eV8r he is • • • • ft
b
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-

other' is part of him, and that it is the highest part of him-nevertheless,
what is only a part of himself is not strictly himself.

Contemplation is the

mind's good, and the mind is not the man.

-

Aristotle's response to t!'is implicit dif£iculty is to declare that the
_ man's ..............
intellect is _
the
true _8el£.92 Hence in choosing the good of his int.elle

";;';;;'';'';;';;0;;;;;__ _

a man is by tha.t very fact choosing the good of his own self.
Aristotle's reasoning reaches its focus.

Here the line

0

Not in virtue of his total make-up-

as rational being and as animal-is man ultimately to be measured.

The

measure of man is that element in him by which he can rise to contact with the
eternal, universal, necessary aspects of reality.
mind.

The measure of man is his

The rest is altogether, or "for the most part", incidental to this one

essential operation.
According to this vi",w of true self-hood, the significance of the individ
nal man seems to lie in his being at least in part a mind.
the.re is the capacity for intellection.

Where there is min

Intellectual capacity, however, has

intrinsic value inasmuch as it is an area in which the highest kind of actuali
zation can take place.
The goal of human life with the element of mind that belongs to it is,

92117 882-41 "It may even be held that this is the true self of each, ina JlUch as it is the dominant and better part. n
(" dbfete ?>'av ka.! elva/. ekd.Cf"7l>S
roaro ri.e. the intellectual elementJeiTrt:p TOktiPIOV' Kal. tt;uelJ/(!)Y' .")
1166al7';l.81
he does so [seek his goo§7 for his own sake (for he does
it on account of the intellectua part of himself, and this appears to be a
self).
tt
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Finally J 1166&2) t ft Vnd it would appear that the thinking part is the real
selt, or is 80 more than anything else. tl
('tO~e o';1v TO J,lOOUV %karrrtJs eival
tU~tC Lrrrtk .")
Cf. also Ch. V of the prl)sent study, especially pp. 124-12 ,
in which these passages from Aristotle's treatise on friendship in Book Nina
are discussed in relation to the value of self-identity.
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finally, to be an ins tance of that high activity as far as it is capable of
being.

Not~hat.

any individual who instances this actualization in himself

will fail to find enjoymen t in doing

80:

pleasure, it was seen93 , the agree-

able awareness of self as possessor, always and necessarily accompanies the
presence of the good activity.

But the excellence and desirability' of the

activity is something distinct (though not separate) from the agreeableness
of its being-one's-own, and is independent of it.

For the exoellenoe of the

activity consists precisely in ita being a high degree of actualization, somewhat like the unoonditioned aotuality that, is the essence of divinity itself.

930r _ Ch. III, no. 2, pp_ 55-57, of the present stuqy.

It is time to draw to a point of focus the main 11nes of Aristotle's
notion ot happiness which have been examined in the course of this study.
In Chapter One the objectives

ot the stUdy were establishedl tirst, to

tormulate the standard on which Aristotle based his philosophical account ot
the :tull human lite; second, to sound the deeper lD3taphysical implications of

such a standard.

Chapter Two presented a general view ot the direction and

characteristics ot Aristotle IS treatment ot happiness, most notably its
dependence on the .Aristotelian theories of activity and finality.

Chapter

Three was devoted to a consideration of enjoyment, its origin in activity, thUi
its inseparableness from the activity which constitutes happiness, yet,
tinally, its radical distincti:less tram happiness.

Chapter 'our turned to

happiness in 1 ts concrete and oompletest possible realization in the activity
of the retlective life.

Here the two chief ourrents in Aristotle's treatment

of happiness were seen to converge in his identification of happiness and
philosophio reflection on the ground that through knowledge man give place in
himself to actualities of the highest level--etemal, unconditioned and
universal, unchanging fona.
1.

Happiness As Presence of' the Ideal
This is what constitutes the happiness of the happy man:

105

the faot that h.

r
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is in contact with actuality in its highest sense.
closest to what is the essence of the divine.
Aristotelian sense ot the word.

For thus a man approaches

This is happiness in the full

If any other qualities are also to be found

the hapPY' man's st.ate, they will be there as result, accompaniment,
embellishment ot a happiness that already exists in him in its essence.

Thus

the presence of excellenoe in a man's activity, whioh is what constitutes the
happiness of his life, has as its first efflorescence in his person his
consciousness of this presence.
notion of enjoyment.

Suoh a reality corresponds to Aristotle's

Other joys too may come to him from other areas of hie

life and the activities that belong to them.

There is no question that such

joys add to the fineness of his life; but they come as extras, to fill out a
life that is essentially complete Without them (for a happy life 1s already a
complete life).
term.

Such is the meaning of blessedness in .Aristotle's use of the

Yet remove all the abundance of goods which embellish the happy man t s

lite; discount also (for it cannot be removed) the unique state of pleasure
within him at his consciousness of existing at the highest point posjible to
him a deeper than both lies what ultimately constitutes his happiness, the

actual prasence in him of the eternal, unchangeable, unconditioned and univers
forms that are Ear excellence the actual! ty of mind.
The implications of smh a standard ot human happiness deserve special ex
m1nation, tor an understanding at them 1s an understanding of the basic
direction of Aristotle's philosophy.

Despi te their importance, however, they

rece! ve no explicit attention in the philosophy of man as Aristotle developed
it.

Arrr formulations of the., then, and conclusions based on them are apt to

seem forced, especlal.ly in light of the fact that Aristotle himself newr came
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to draw them together in suoh a way.

Nevertheless, let this qualification

stand, and it is still possible, on the ground of what the examination
conducted in the last three chapters has uno overed in Aristotle's handling ot
fu.uBan values, to come to a few definite conclusions about the tendency of his

thought.
Insofar as the Aristotelian universe has a unity, that unity depends on
the subordination of all partieular and specific movements to the great and
general movement of the outer spheres and in tum. the 8ubordin&tion-by-desire
of these to the unmoved actuallty of God. 1 Thus the state of complete
aotuality (~vepre/.~

(£veu

dl.(,v~eUJr) is the ultimately meaningful

reality in Aristotle's system, and implicitly at least the standard of every
evaluation that has plaoe in it.

What is the meaning of actuality?

The notion

does not lend itself very readily to analysis and formulation, but the general
sansa of it can be seen in the meaning that is cODlllOn to its various uses
throughout the oorpus(for example in the Ehlsics by the theory of matter and
form, in the ;Pychology by the explanation of intelleotion through the mental
presence of forms, in the Ethics by the determination of happiness as the
ac'tivit7 of intellec'tion).

The meaning of

~

,/

el/epret~

common to such places

is that of actual form. 2

----

1af. Oh. I, note 1, as well as Ch. V, note

4.

2Tha following exposi'tion of Aristotle's general doctrine of form is based
in large part on the doctrines of activity in intellection as treated in IV, 2
(esp. nows 1.3-20 and the text that they accompany). Cf. Joachim, pp. 16$-7,
on the ultimate identity of knower and known in the activity of knOwing, and
293-5, on immateriality as the ground of perfect identity. Cf. also Hamelln,
pp. 4-6, 11-13, and 87 on Aristotelian act-potency in knowledge, with
pertinent passages.
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At first seemingly quite divsrse, the physical form that combines with
matter to constitute an individual thing and the mental form that is the
immaterial representation by which knowledge takes place do not in fact differ
insofar as they are form.

In itself the form (or formali V or pattern) which

gives matter a determinate existence is exactly the same form that determines
one.s act of knowing.

The difference between a man existing in the flesh and

an idea of man existing in the mind pf a thinker is the different subjects
into which the same form has been received.

In the tormer case the form man

is received into matter, and this matter is disposee this way or that, better
or worse, to admit the form.

But in the latter case the form is received into

mind) and be1ng iaate:tial, mind. is open to whatever form wUl come to tt, and
will not limit form in BlV' w&7.
This reality that Aristotle's formulations point to in the physical order
and in the order of knowledge is not a substance or an idea as such, but the
formality, the determination, which makes any substance or idea to be the kind.
it is.

A thing is actual in the order of nat:ure because a form has been

received in some matter; an act of knowledge actually occurs because a form haa
become pftJHnt to a mind.

In this world there is no such thing as a form that

is not informing something whether matter or mind. Yet the reality of a form
is not in virtue of its informing something, but in virtue of its being form.
Form that is present in knowledge is more excellent that form present in
nature, but this is only because in knowledge form. is not limited and can
therefore be more truly form.
And this is lby it 18 more excellent.

Form is of i teel! intrinSically

excellent, and when it is free of the intermittence and conditioning ot

r
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existence in matter, when it is found unoonditioned and universal, it is found
more like itself.

It approaches what may be oalled here the Ideal • .3

.3This particular term Ideal used as a noun with the lD!aning of goal, acme,
value, maximum is an apt one to refer to the notion of unoondi tioned torm
whioh the present discussion has come to tormulate as the Aristotelian standar
of ultimate value. It has the advantage ot being a modern term in common use
tor a realitY' llke that intended here, and has the etymological overtone d
notional which re-relates it to the context of Aristotelian psyohology-, and of
excel1ent which recalls the value-sc:tl1ngs ot the Ethics and J4etaphysios and
their focus on the divine. SUch a use of the term to ~esignate the reatity
under discussion need not indicate Iny correspondence to PlatOnic use of the
term idea, such a relationship is arguable but is not the issue here. (ot.
Hamel~pp.

87, 88.)

~

1

~

Aristotle's use of the word loea- see Bonltz, pp. 3.38bl2-339a6, where
there are given numerous examples of the expression in Aristotle'$ own
systAmatic exposition of doctrine (as synonym of?of>P~~ A.6roS";, tpuq-/s ) as well
as in his criticisms of the Platonic theo17. Cf. a.lso Jaeger. Index, p. 464,
at idea. also pp. 4S, 46, on Aristotle's doctrine of soul as torm (De An.
4l2limjJ and pp. 340, 341, also 40.3, on the development of Ar18totl8Tsdoctrine
of idea as imma.ttered form, and on the primary importance of the notion of form
through Aristotle.
Stewart, II. 361 (comment.ing on 1166a22) indicates the main point of
contact between mants noetic capacitY' for the unconditioned and universal ~d
his other capacities for excellence and nobility, "Reason is the Form oretoos
of man. This Form the good ml;\.~ preserves pure amid the UA.~ of circumstances,
as plants and animals preserve their various etl>y) from generation to generation,
realising .. TO GeLotl" ka..' TO ae{ in the peI'll\Sllence of the race-type~' It is as
corresponding with his whole environment, and not merely as exercisLng his
'intellectual faculties' that man is identified with ReasCll in this and
similar passages. • • • thollilh man is not, like God, pure e.1oos , but a
o-~vu.iotl'or an evu.iov e1 ~05
."
Again, II, 249, Stenrt describes what is meant by happiness as an inmatte ing of idea in man: !:If Chappines!7 be regarded as an evu.,(,ol/ e'tc>os
--as a lite concretely realised, it presents itself as the harmoniouB p~ of
all human :functions, intellectual, moral and bodily-as the expression, in rna.ny
wa;rs, of the concrete unity--m.ens sana in corpore sane. But since such a
concrete result cannot be produced or miI'ntained without S ewpL.Q.. or the
organising and regulative agency of Reason-is in fact nothiru! but tb:l material
"
'
,
"./
<~"}
." ";\
'7\
manifestat,ion of oewp'Q.
which is its Form, Law, ou,<rtaaVeu u"t.1']s or TI. 1)11'" e'vaL I and since the Form or the... Law .!! the thing, philosophically considered. •
it follows that eu..da.YU0v-Ia" considered formally or philosophically, is
identified with €rewp{Q; its Form or Law. It is especially in E.N. x that
el(:oa.,,~ovr~
is so identified."
If t e co.m.mentat.or's at least apparent limitation of the notion of rJewp(Q;
to the regulation of things merely human is overlooked, this passage helps
()l
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In the argument of the Metaphysics actuality in i"ts purity is God, the

First Mover.

He is simply the Ideal, form Without any conditioning, the full-

ness of what every actuality is in its own degree.

It is possible from the

viewpoint of form in its greater or lesser degree of purity to trace a line of
gradually asoending value in form-greater actuality in it and greater
excellence-as form is the actuality of a non-living substance, of a plant, of
an animal, of a man; or, Within man, as it is "the actuality of his composite
being, of his somehow supra-material sense powers, and again of his completely
un-mrterial intellectual "capacity for all things"; or, beyond the level of
sublunary beings, as it is actuality of the celestial intelligences.

And

according to this line of inoreasing purity of form and freedom from admixture
of matter and potentiality, God 11'1.11 appear

8S

the totality which all

approach and never on their levels of actuality achieve.

The unique

actuality and excellenoe of God will consist in this that he is in totality
and constancy what all others are only partially and intermittently.

He i8

to show how the Ar1atotelian theQry of actuality as encountered in this
sphere of knowl~dge is, mutatis mutandiS, applicable also to the sphere of
human actions, though these are not activities in the same strict sense in
which the operations of faculties are.

r
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the summit which all beings aim at in the various degrees of aotuality.4
In this sense, actuality (eveprecQJ ) is a value-is, according tD its
degree value itself.

4The theology of Aristotle is certainly a disputed area, not only for the
sketchiness of its various appearances throughout the extant works, but
especially for its relations to the rest of Aristotle's doctrineS, particular
his latest.
Sse Ross, pp. 179-186, a concise disc1lssion of the main tenets and
problems of the doctrine, its purity of conception, its dependence on an
ascending order of purity of form, its lack of a notion of creation,
providence, divine interest. Joachim (PP. 291-7> gives a more imaginative
reconstlouction of the place of God in the uniVerse from the aspect of evt!pre/"~
either as arising out of OUII~/f or as self-identical. Both these commentator
consider the doctrin~ apart from its historical relationship to the rest of
Aristotle fS developing, changing views.
Jaeger, on the other hand, brings out the relative earllness and Platonic
character ot the Aristotelian theology as it exists in its most developed form,
in BeokA ot the Metaphysics (ppe 219-22) as well as its earliest origins
(pp. 1,6-66). He further shows traces of a theological and PlatOnic
orientation throughout its extensive development even though ita attention cam
to focus 1001'9 and more on the order and realities and knowledge-worthiness of
the empirical 'IfClrld, which is notior ~.22.!:. Cf. pp. 38$-8. Cf. 3~l-5 for
a synthetic view of this theological-teleological orientation, esp. 38~ I "In
Aristotlets teleology substance and end are one, and the highest end is the
most determinate reality there is. This substantial thought possesses at one
and the sam time the highest ideality as conceived by Plato and the"nch
determinateness of the individual, and hence life and everlasting blessedness.
God is one with the world not by penetrating it, nor by maintaining the
totality of its ferms a.s an intelligible world within himself, but beca.use the
world 'hangs'
Cr7'Pl'}T'a.c.) on hllllJ he is its unity, although not in it. As
each thing strives to realize its own fOrm, it realizes for its part that
infini te perfection which as a whole is God."
The reality of the Aristotelian God (as real is opposed to abstract or
merely formal) is a question worthy of thorough examination, as Is &lso the
qnestion of what the term ou,C1'{a, means in its primary sense, whether an
existent or a formal principle of existence. It is perhaps impossibleto sta
With certainty the meaning of' tfii re81Ity ot kl/e.preLQ. which plays such a
leading role in the Ethios, it the meaning of this still more basic concept
remains in 1 ts ambiguous suspension between real and formal. Cf. Ross, pp. 24
156, 157. on the meanings ot substance, its primacYJ PP. 157-9. the existenc
q,f universals, intelligences, God; pp. 161-18: on matter and form,
individuation, priority and eternity of torm.
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en such a basis as this, it is not hard to see

why the Ufe of

philosophical reflection is the highest that Aristotle can conceive for man.
Whether the philosopher considers the racurring patterns of tile "lOrld of
animals and plants, or the cons tan t laws of human thought, or the eternal
cyoles of the heavens, it is tmder the aspeot of their uni versali ty that he
oonsiders them.

And it is in this universality and tmchangeableness of theirs,

not in their particularity and variation, that these experienced actualities
a:-e like the pure actuality of the divine.

The philosopher aohieves happiness

as he reaches the Ideal.
The philosopher himself is a man and an lndi vidual
all the conditions of time, place, disposition.

IIWl,

and is stlbjec t. to

All these influenoe his

activity, and oan even hinder it or keep it from taking place :tn him.

But to

whatever degree he transoends these 11m! ts and aotual.ly exercises his power of
thought he is happy.

To this degree only.

The Test-embellishtnents of life

and even the enjoyment that is his as an individual well ocoupied-is not

preoisely what makes him happy.

Happiness is presenoe of the Ideal."

The Ideal

however, is never present in a man by virtue ot his indiVidualitY', this
embodiment of human form rather than that, but because the mind he has is in
some small degree a power to bypass indiViduality."

So tar asa man seeks

>rrue, in the sublunar world men are the only'beings with intelligence;
and these are only individual men, not man-in-general free of all conditioning
and disposed perfectly to reaoh the uncondi t1oned. The existence of individual
men is just as necessary for the achievement of actual intellection in the
sublunar world as enjoyment J in its own way, is inseparable trom such actual
intelleotion. "What is to be noted here, is not that happiness can'be had withmolt en,joyJllmt or that happiness oan be had except in indiVidual men, but that
happiness as such is not a matter of either individuality or of enjoyment. It
is essentially distinct from such faotors tor all its dependenoe on them and
actual connection wi. th them.
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happiness he is seeking the Ideal, which is of valuo not by reason of its
particularity but by reason of its universality and transcendence of the
individual.
A man who lives up to this notion of happiness completely, Aristotle's
<T'rro~da.C:oS

av6p , will

not be conoerned nth enjoyment of life, but with

making his person open to the presence of the Ideal.

<b the other hand, a

lesser kind of man is ooncerned wi th enjoyment; he ignores the pure values
which the man of excellence esteems, and pursues instead objects that he knows
Yd.ll bring him a sense of satisfaotion.

Both are taken up with some sort of

activity and with the objects with which this aotivity is associated.

Where

the two men differ, though, is in the relative quality of their activities.
The lower type does not much care what the activity is just so long as he gets
satisfaction from it; if he has preferences it will be because experience has
accustomed him to certain ways and left him unaware more or less of others.
His purSuits are not likely to extend to very arduous goals-not because they
would not be even mre rel'fardlng, but simply: because he is not one to search
then what mows already is good enough.

aim in life.

But the man of excellence has another

His life is a deeply satisfYing one even when it requires great

effort of him; it carmot help being.

But enjoyment is not primarily his

concernJ exoellence is his concern--wherever it may be found, and especially
~

where it
thing.

be found most in its purity.

The serious man is serious about one

that unoonditioned actuality may have as large a place as possible in

his life.

If enjoyment, his own acquiescenoe in an agreeable and satisfying

life, were his concern, he might be content, as is the other man, in a lower
grade of activity.
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.'I

'1'he conclusion, strange as it may seem to Aristotellan terminology, 1s
I

that happiness means nothing

lot~r
I

ii

I,

actuali ty.

tpan this presence of unconditioned
\

\

The joys of a Pl'ospei'ouslife add to the fullness of happiness if
/'

i

/',

they' are present; but they

f

~e

I

"

qot nepessary for it.

And enjoyment cannot help

I

accompanying such happiness. But. hawinas8 in i t8 deepest sense is something
ft
iI
.
beyond these conoa,r~ of the se~t. Th~\ Aristotelian notion of happiness is

1-'

1/

: I

that of an un-selt-concerned openness

t

t<)

value for its own sake.

The self is

of significance ~.~ insofar as lit is a (JOntainar of the Ideal.
I

j

,/

"

This princ!.ple accords with Aristotle.'s finally achieved standard of happiness, as well/ as Wi tb a broad part of his psychological and metaphysical
/

,

doctrines, and Ut. fact helps til> illuminate and unify them: but it is plainly
II
not Aristotl~s
lown way of 8pe~g.
The subordination of self to the ideal
,
,
.
I

l)

actuality lfhiq'h rself comes to ,ont.ain, implicit as it is in Aristotle'8 philo:,

i

sophy of man~i d~s not exist in explicit statement there, if only because the
philosophical distinction of salf and non-self has not been elaborated until
I

.1

relatively JtJodern times.
deeper,
/'

!

t;hJ~h.
.'

The strangeness

ot these principles may go still

Not only may Aristotle'S' way of speaking have been more

'J

adapte~ to !the self -interest mode of presentation found in ordinary language

than;!~ DkJ~ern terJJinology,
i

I

:

/J \

but his own thought may well have contained

'

elct.lll8nts that were inoonsistent with the diSinterest-tendency ot his
I

I

;fhilO'OP(~al direction.
o~nca~n

.

I

to

It is not reasonable to expect in real life self-

give way entirely to un-selfconcern even if such un-selfconcern

.'1

.uld lbe the logical conolusion of s 1rrender to the Ideal.

!

i

~hus,,:\th.

/1

appearance of seltconcern as a way of speaking or even as a

j

partial IIl@tive in Aristotle'S judgment ot human activities need not call into
.;

i I,

\

,
/
I

\

\

\

11.5
serious question the fact that his notion of human happiness tends to concentrate on impersonal and universal excellence somewhat to the overlooking of the
self.

2.

Selfconcern and the Ideal
Nevertheless it 1s reasonable to expeot that the standard of value whioh

has been shown to lie at the heart of the Aristotelian fina.l1 ty and shape the
general discussion of happiness will also hold true in more speoific problems,
where more immediate realities are in question than in the statement of broad
principles.

It is to be expected the foroe of the Ideal Will be at work in all

such questions, most of all in those areas where there is question of self in
relation to others.
especially pertinent.

Here three passages of the Nioomaehean Ethics are
discussions of friendship and of self-loft in Book Nine,

and in Book Four a discussion of the virtue of pride.

!!!!

Ideal

!e yriendsh1E.

In ona of the earliest ohapters of his extensive treatment of triendship6,
.AX'istotle carefully distinguishes friendship in the truest sense fr~m a number

6The discussion of friendship, Books Eight and Nine, nearly one-fifth of
the whole Ethics, consists of a general introduction to the problems, kinds,
stages ot li'ien(lship (VIII, ch. 1-6); a discussion of the reciprooity required
in it (ch. 7,8), and of reciprocity ir. the various forms of societys state,
fami11', companionship (ch. 9-12); next a series of discussions which Ross terms
"Casuistr,y of Friendshlp" (oh. 13, 14; IX, ch. 1-3). then a sat of considerations which establish the internal nature of friendship (ch. 4-8) and its
importance in life (ch. 9-12).
Book Nine, ohapt~~ n:ne, "Why does the' happy man need friends?", oonsists
of four lines of argument, the first Urea of which are (1) a number of
'popular considerations in favor of friendship, (2) the notion that one can
regard virtue better in another person than in oneself, thus appreciate it
better, (3) certain advantages that derive from having associates in practice
of virtue. The fourth argument, which is the most tully developed and which
Aristotle characteriZes as more penetrating the nature of things
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of relationships that bear the same name of friendship but really fall short of
it.

Here he shows there are three types of friendship, each based on a form

of reciprocity, yet only one of them based on a form good without qualification
Thus triends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in
themselves, but in so far as Bome benefit accrues to them .from each other,
And similarly with those whose friendship is based on pleasure: for
instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of what they ar
in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us. Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love their friend for their own
good or their 01111 pleasure, and not as being the person loved, but as usefUl or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on an
accident, Since the friend is not loved for being What he is, but as
affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be. 7
If Aristotle's happy man needs friendship in his life it will not be on the
foregoing bases.

It may well happen he will maintain associations of tlus

kind, for even the great man is a man and needs the supports, relaxations,
encouragements that come to him as a social being8; but these are necessary

(cp/A..cT"II<4>Tepov) than the other arguments, will supply the structure of
this examination of Aristotlets notion of the good involved in friendship. The
argument will be supplemented with selections from VIII, .3 "Three corresponding
ld.nds ot friendship", IX, .3 "Occasions of br~aJd.ng otf friendship", tt, 4
"Friendship is based on self-love", IX, 7 "The pleasure of benificence", and
from other places in the two bookl!.

7l156all-19.
8This function of supporting the activity of the reflective 11fe seems to
be the ultimate purpose of the tht'ee oarlier arguments in IX, 9. See 1169b91170alJ I Friendship is thus considered (1) lithe greatest of external goods" J a
man needs intimates on whom to confer benef! ts J "man is a social being" and it
is better for one to associate with Persons familiar to him than with
strangers. (2) It is an aid to the contemplation of virtue to look on the good
of one whose good is also one fS own. (3) Congenial friends make contemplation
easier and more continuous, and, further, subtly influence one another toward
improvement.
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and helpful in a somewhat extrinsic sense, and so do not directly have place 1
his happiness.
()l

the other hand, the true form of friendship is something intrinsic and

not merely incidental, thus exists because of a good that does not come and go
but has a certain absolute excellence.

Such stability of good and such excel-

lence are verified only' in the characters of really good men, and this is why
true friendship can exlst only among them.

nThe perfect form of friendship is

that between the good, and those who resemble each other in excellence.

For

these friends wish each alike the other's good in respect of their goodness,
and thay are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of the

friends for their friends' sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since
they- love each other for themselves and not aocidentally.n9

Because excellenc

is the buis of their union such a union is essentially more noble than a
liaison for sake of pleasure or advantage.

And because virtue does not easily

shift in the wq advantage or "CaSte in enjoyment do, such a union is more
stable .10

The shared excellence is thus the ..foundation of friendship in the

chief sense in which Aristotle wishes it to be taken.

It is apparently the

intrinsic excellence which a certain person possesses that one looks to in
loving that person for himself.

In this Sense excellence is not something

incidental to a person but deeply his own.
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But such oxcellence can hardly be intended as intrinsic in the sense that
it belongs tJ t,he person and cannot be alienated from him as long as he is a
person.

For Aristotle later discusses whether true friendship can continue if

one of the parties becomes bad, or even if one of the parties grows into a
hit~her

degree of Bxcellence and leaves his friend behind on the lower level

which they once shared.

The negative answer which haa already been suggested

by his statement that friendship lasts

there confirmed explicitly.

!!

lon~

as the excellence lasts, is

HFerhaps it is impossible to do so, since only

what is good 1.s lovable; and also wrong, for we ought not to be lovers of evil

nor let ourselves become llke what is worthless; and, as has been said above,
like is the friend of like. • ••

They will no longer even enjoy each other's

SOCiety; butwlthout this, intercourse and therefore friendship, are as we saw
impossible."

11

One will not break off trom a triend for any superficial reaso ,

of course, because the friendship was founded on a sharing of an intrinsic
good; nor need the good friend break off from his friend as soon as he notices
a fault in him, for a true friend will look more deeply intc the case and try
help his friend regain his footing.

But where it becomes clear that the good-

ness once shared is shared no longer, the basis of the friendship has vanished
:md that is that.
T:'is as!)9ct of friendship's stability reveals the value which friendship
a.'3 slJch

ultimately is concerned with t

the excellence which each person

11l16SbI-31. Of. also l158b29-ll59a5, where dis pari ty in excellence or
vice is shown to be an impediment to the sharing (k'OLVU) v (0.- ) proper to
friendship_
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possesses, and no t precisely the pe rson that possesses it.
-virtuous man seem to be the standard in everything. ,,12
only insofar as he possesses some virtue.

For "virtlee and th

A person can be loved

"Thus a bad man appears to be devol

even of atfection for himself, because he has nothing lovable in his nature. lfl

Furthermore, tile excellence on which friendship is based is substantially
the same as that on which the excellence of happiness is based, namely its acti veness J and {,his .is not anything personal.

Iluch the sane language is used

0

both friendship and happiness.
It is wi th friendship as it is with the other excellences; men are called
eood in t~u s~nses, either as ha-ving an excellent disposition or as
realizing excellence in action, and similarly friends when in each otherts
company derive pleasure from and confer benefits on each other, whereas
friends who are asleep or parted are not actively friendly, yet have the
disposition to be so. For separation does not destroy friendship
absolutely, though it prevents its active exercise. l4
MOreover it is possible to conceive of an act of lova without a return of love,
even if this is not the usual way of things.

The love of mothers is an eX3.lllpl

of this and shows that the essence of love lies "more in giving than in
receiving affection- Hl5

This is why a persop. who does a favor out

reveals more affection than the person who receives the favor.

121166a8-l0.

or

love

It would seem

Of. 1157b25-3?

131166b26. Also U66b2-29; ll59b2,3c "Amity consists in equality and
similarity, especially the similarity of those who are alUm in virtue • • • • "

141157b6-9.
15U59a2 8-36.

r~------------~
120

at first sight the one who stands to gain should show more love.

But his

interest springs from a need, and insofar as a need is filled the person who
been in need no longer feels the pangs of his need and thus loses interest.
part in the favor is passive, while his benefactor has exercised a power.

The

recei ver sees the favor as a matter of 'lsetulness or pleasure to h1m, while the
giver sees the liberality of his act.
benefactor and the artist.

There is a parallel between the

"C'EJvery artist loves his own handiwork more than

that handiwork if it were to come to life would love him. If

This example points

to a profounder tact.
The reason of this is that all things desire and love existence, but we
exist in activity, since we exist by living and doing, and in a sense one
who has made something ensta aetively, and so he loves his handiwork
because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental prinCiple ot
nature. what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.l

Aristotle fS most serious and developed discussion of the true basis of
friendship incorporates this notion of the activeness of friendship as the root
of its values.

At the end of this argument Aristotle summarizes it thus a "It

then (1) to the supremely happy man existence is desirable in i teelt, being goo
and pleasant essentially, and if (2) his friend's existence is almost equally
desirable to him, it follon that

en a friend is one of the things to be
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rov fo'?y-u.et. ." Notice here that the artist loves his work because ereatin& haa
actualized something in
he exi.sts more because he has created. The handiwork is regarded not as the expression of an excellence existing already in the
artist, but as the occasion of the artistts coming to exist more. lfence the
artist ta person is viewed rather as an area open to further perfection than as
fullness of perfection flOwing out into manifestations of itself.

him,
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desired. 017

Aristotle thus makes his conclusion de; end on the affirmation ot

two propositiona, that a man desires his own existence and that the existence

a friend is much the same to one as one's own existence, or, as the latter

17U 70b14-l6. (Numerals added.) See the whole complicated passage as Ar
stotle develops it, 1170al4-b12. n Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally , it appears that a virtuous friend is eS88ntial..ly desirable for a
virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is essentially good is
good and pleasing in. itself to the virtuous man. And life i. defined, in the
case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the
capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activit
and in this its full reality consists. It appears therefore that life in the
full sense is sensation or thought. But life is a thing good and pleasant in
itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears
to be pleasant to all man • • • • But if life itself is good and pleasant (as i
appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and supremel1' happy men
most of all, since their way of life i8 mst desirable and their existence the
most blissful); and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears
that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other
human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercise, so th
whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think,
we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or
th.ink1.ng is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we saw, is senseperception or thought) J and if to be conscious one is alive i8 a pleasant thing
in t tselt (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that one
possesses a good thing is pleasant). and if life is deSirable, and e8pecially s
for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant (because they
are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsicall1' good), and if the
virtuous man teels towards his friend in the same wq as he feels towards himself (tor his triend is a second self)-then, just as a man's own existence
is destrable for him., so, or nearly so, is his friends' existence also desirab •
But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as good that m.alc8s existence
desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought
also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this ia attained
by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to
each other. • • ."
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notion is often expressed, "a friend is another self."
To establish the first of these notions, that man desires existence, Aristotle develops the two ways in which this desire shows i uelt) a man (here as
in the rest of the discussion it is the good man) desires his existence because
it is good and enjoyable.

Here existence-lite-amounts to activity, tor lite

is defined by the actions for 'Which it is the capaci tYI th'U8 in man life is
sensation and thought, though of course chiefly thought. 18
is good and enjoyable.

~

is it

And it is this that

80?

First, it is good, because it is definite; and we know this to be the case
because the good man chooses it tor this reason.
that Aristotle gives and almost the only reasons.
ni ten.ss is a part

These are t.he chief reasons

"CIJt

is definite, and def

ot the essence ot goodness, and what is essentially good is

good for the good man• • • • n

Again, this view of the human good is consistent

with the value soheme that has been pointed out in the other Aristotelian contexts.

A good Ufe is one that manifests in itself a senae of f'ona and

direotion, an order that lives ill-lived dO,.not possesS) it partakel of some of
the unoondi tionedne8s and stability which thought discovers in the regularities
of nature and the heavens. 19 Aristotle does not further develop this aspect of
existence, its intrinsio worth. perhaps he considers it sufficiently indioated
in these fn remarks, perhaps he merely takes the fact for granted, and indeed
such a view is the climate of the Ethios.

18ef• II, 2, beginning, and III, esp. note 31, of the present paper.

198M 1l06b29, on the necessary defini teness of the good. ef. also note :3
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The intrinsic enjoyableness of life is another fact that all seem to agree
on; but this aspect of the question Aristotle chooses to treat more at length.
ttfe 1s not something carried on without the living person's awareness of it.
For every one of the activities that make 11te into the thing it is, is accompanied with a consciousness 20 that such activity is present.

Now consclousnes

of the activities that make up life amounts to an awareness of existence itself
Existence, as was seen betore, is good because it is actuality.

Thus one is

conscious in living activity of a good that is present in him.

This awareness

is precisely what is meant by pleasure or enjoyment:

ft["Vife is a thing

essentially good, and to be conscious that one possesses a good thing is
pleasant. • • • ,,21
The second propos! tion, that a :friend is another self, is really the
pivotal point ot the whole argument.

For whatever may be true

ot the

desirability or existence, of life and activity, clearly this has nothing to do
wi th triendship.-unless 1 t is also true that the existence proper to another
"

person is yet somehow one's own existence too because he is a friend.

There c

be no question of Aristotle's opinion in this matter; 1t is essential to the

20Al<rfi~veq'{)aL ,sentire, as the activity of an interior faculty-what woul
seem to amount to a sort of sensorium commune, a basic or central perceptive
capacity which unifies the percepts of the other faculties is aware of them,
etc.
21-"1'1\
/
"~I\ \ r;'
\ ,~ 11 \ r"
;} c
~"
II
.,.,"q"el rap aral;lov J&u!J ~ 7"0 0 ara(7oV' U1tCl.f>A'Ov ev edUT'f at (f"()Ialle(f()lal
/4,.
Later in the same paragraph Aristotle expresses it somewhat differently,"
is the consciousness of oneself as good that makes existence desirable, and
' : > ' -;-S'
<
,
..,.,
"
such consciousness is pleasant in i tee l t. i t
Viz.
n To €!II/at. 1')'" atpeTr>V ala. TO
) c:.~
61·
..
~, _J:2 ..., ""
".\.'
"
~ .i'1
(' \...
~_.o'~_
"It
It
a.Lcr~l/ecr ~t aU7""Ou, at w.vOl.(. OI/TOr.? 1)014 TOl'll-tT? Cllq"l71,}d"'IS !)oeta k"av c;:aUTl)Y",
. i s
perhaps not unreasonable to see in this double wrq of speald.ng the outlines of
a distinction between good .m!! good-thus, the definite as good-and good So':!
object-ot-choiee,a.~peToV" -enjoyable as well as definite.
1'\;)

(J

ItIJ/

124
conclusion he wishes to reach, moreover he enunciates the principle in several
different forms in the present context.

"fiJhe

virtuous man feels towards hi.

friend in the same wtr¥ as he feels tow-arcs himself (for his friend .1.s a second
self) • • • • "

The friend's exis~nce is ttalmost eq'...lally desirahle to him. tt

the conclusion of Book Nine this same principle is expressed again.
friendship is essential.ly a partnership.
to a friend as to himself • • • • 11 22
and another to establish it.

In

"For

And a man stands in the sarre relation

But it is one thing to hold a principle

In the present disoussion Aristotle seems simply

to tam it for granted, since he is oontent to refer to it, especial.l.y in its
popular maxim-form without ever actually attempting its justification•
.An earlier ohapter 23 amounts to the closest Aristotle has come to treating

this relation. of self-love to love of others.

It is an extended parallel

betwaen the qual! ties of a person's regard tor himself and of his regard tor an
lntim.a.te friend.

True love expresses itself in these five ways.

(1) by wish-

ing and promoting the good of the one loved, (2) by wishing the existence and
:preservation of that person tor his own sake., (:3) by liktng to be wtth him (4)
by loyalty to Lls state of mind, and (5) by sensi tivi ty to his joys and sorrows
Aristotle shows first how these quail ties are to be tomd in friendship at its
beat.

Next he shows how each of them is verified in the good man's feeling

toward hlmsel£ (and not verified in the corrupt man's)-the consistency and

,
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23u66al-b29. The first in a series of three in which friendship is distinguished from self-love, then from mere good-wlll, finally from the kind ot
agreement that exists among fellow citizens.
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order of his state of mind (4») his contentment even in soli tude because of the
good things that are his to think about <':3), his keen awarenesa of what pleases
and hurts him (5).

But especially doea he show his love of self in the way he wishes himself
what is trul;r good and seeks to secure it by his acti vi V, and in the way he de
sires his own existence.
Also he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by
action (for it is a mark of a good man to exert himself actively for the
good) J and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the
intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a mants real self).
Also he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his
rational part. For existence is good for the man of excellence; and ever;y~
one wishes his om good. no one would choose to possess ever)" good in the
world on cornii tlon of becoming somebody else (for God possessee the good
even as it is), but only while remaining himself, lIbatever he DlI(f' be; and
it would appear that the thlnldng part is the real self, or is eo more the ~ .
anything elae.

It is in this passage that Aristotle comes cloaeat to really describing the
driving self-concern that each person experience. in his own attitude toward
himself.

True, there is present the tendency of Aristotle to see in. the self

11 ttle mre than a capacity for acts.

But 'the opposite of this attitude shows

itself too.
Even if Aristotle give. this emerging aspect of the fact none of the
special attention which it seems to call for, the passage is never1iheless at
least suggestive of oore than the self-equals-capacity view of Ufe.
one wishes his own good t

II/J.Jvery ..

no one would choose to possess every good in the

world on condition of becoming somebody else. II Here the value of an
individuality as such seems to be the issue.

If this passage intends what it
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seems to say and is indeed Aristotle's

24 then even on the supposition that one

might become possessed of great goods, divinity not excepted, such goods would
still not be acceptable it they entailed a loss of selt-identi ty.

'!hus the

self appears to have a significance distinct from the values found in it.

This

notion accords well with the parallel passage which descr1bes friendshipt

u A.

friend is one who wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the
fr1end fS sake.

(rus is the

teeling of mothers toward their children, and ot

friends who are at odds. ) .. 25 For even when there is no return of love or the

24rhe passage hae been rejected by some ot the commentators, mainly becaus
of a difficulty in fitting the parenthet1cal remark into the line ot argument.
Cf. Stewart, II, 357-61, for an extended treatment of the various views of the
text's genuinity and its place in an Aristotelian context. Comparing this te
with llS9a9-l3, where Aristotle discusses friendship between unequala ("If t
it was rightly said above that a true friend wishes his friend's good for that
friendts own sake, the triend would have to remain hiJDBelt, whatever that mq
J
so that he wUl rea.l.l1' wish him only' the greatest goods compatible with his re
maining a human being."), Stewart accepts it, and COllll81lts t "In the light of
the above passage I 'WOuld explain the seC{j.on before us as follows-'Every man
wishes good things for hillaelt, that 1s, tor himself as remaining the same
person. no man desires to beco_ another being, and let that other being posse
all good tbinga-thus, no man desire. to become God, in order to ~s..s the
absolute good which God possesses now and for ever in virtue of being what He
i •• ' God's WSH.siop of the good depends on His selt-identity. the good man'
wish tor his own good oannot overpass the llmi ts of his self-identi ty-he cannot wish good for himself as having beco_ God. u The Paraphrast, whoa stewart
. also quotes.. interprets the passage acoording to the vieW' of the rational part
as true selt and irrational part as not true self, hence as the fother' that
one would become.
2Sut6a5-7.

('l'r. J.D.)
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exchange of usefulness and enjoyment and community of mind has been lost through
a falling-out, there still exists in the person who loves an esteem for the
other which oan be only for the person.
In suoh passages as these the author seems to approach the need of discus-

sing good-of-aelf from the
the good.

an~le

of the self rather than from the usual angle of

For it is the person as such that the text. foous on and not so much

some good ....
fo_un
.........
d .!!! the person.

Jeftrthel.ess Aristotle reveals a tendency toward

his ,uma! way of speaking in the passage parallel to these where he speaks of
the corrupt :man's love of himself.

"eV.Jen who have committed a number of

orimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make
away with thamselves. n26

Here Aristotle oould very well have referred to the

far more n1llllerous instance. in whioh the degraded, no less than the virtuous,
hold on to life and resist every inroad of death, eftn with great pain, despite
the fact that their Ufe is good to them in no .Aristotelian sense ot the word,
sinoe they bave no interest in heroio virtue and lack J¥)reover all hopes of
battering their lot.
passages.

Suoh a parallel would bear out the tone ot the "other

Instead, Ari.stotle·s example is that of a person who no longer desirE I

life once it has oeased to have a value, for onoe excellence and enjoyment are
absent trom life he prefers not to exist at all.
If Aristotle does recognise something naturally ot significance in self-

identity beyond the fact that it is a capacity for the actualities of virtue anc

.

26u66b12 •
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knowledge, for t.he Ideal-he is closer to uncovering it here than in other pas
sages of his Ethics.

Instead, however, he bases the rest of his discussion on

the usual standard and does not come so close again to reexamining it.

Thus

0

the whole, in his t.reatml!lnt of friendship Aristotle does not reveal an attitud
toward self radical.l.y different from that in his treatment ot happiness.

The

Ideal remains the focus of his attention even in an area like friendship where
the riohness of the author's own experience oould easil,y have led him to a

fuller recognition of the personal elements of human destre. 27
27Ross fails sutfieien~ to distinguish the warmth ot Aristotle's feelin
for friendship, as it is revealed in the present passages, from the essentiall
non-personal. standard that he brings to his philosophical discussion of it.
Thus in the introduction to his summary of the doctrine on friendship
(Ari.totle, p. 230) Ross makes the .AJ'istotelian view of friendship take on an
altruistic tone which does not, philosophically at least, belong to it (if
alt.ru:Lam is taken in the sense ot an interest in the other erson and not mere
as an interest in Bome value other than oneself). "The discuss on 1s a
valuable corrective to an impression which the rest of the Ethios tends to mak
For the mfrlj part Aristotle·s moral syetem 1s decidedly self-centered. It is
at his own euoa.!,M-ov/a, we are told, that man aims and should aim. In the
account of justioe there is an implicit recognition of the rights ot others.
But in the wmle of the EthiCf outside the b()Oks on friendsh1.p very 'Uttle is
said to suggest that men can and should. take a warm personal int.erest. in other
people J altruism is alJl108t completeq absent. Traces of an egoistic view are
present even in the account of friendship, as they should be, for friendship
is not mere benevolence but demands a retum. But justice 1s done to the
altruistic element; loving is said to be more essential to friendship than bei
loved, a man wishes well to his friend for his triend's sake, not as a means to
his own happiness."
Jaeger (p. 24h) on the other hand is truer to the tone of the PUSag8S,
though in the light of what has already appeared in Aristotle's attitude toward
the selt I his use of the word personal has to be interpreted to mean concrete,
or embodied in the individual, rather than something more to do with selt.
t~lstotle retiins-the kernel of Plato's notion-the basing of friendship on the
ethical principle of the Good-but makes the Good a concrete moral value
developing wi thin the character of the man himllelf. The suprapersonal ground
of the value of the human relationship no longer diverts attention from the
personality of the friend; on the contrary, it is concentrated and incarnated
therein. Aristotle's idea is therefore not just another way of referring all
social values to the general problem of value; its aim is rather to establish
the independent worth of the moral personality, and in the last resort
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The chief concern of friendship, then, is not the se1fhood of the friend,
but the excellence whioh is to be found in his character making him a good man
and worthy of esteem.

If altruism means the kind of love that values a person

in his own distinct, llllcomunicated individuality and prescinds from his

worthiness or unworthiness, Aristotelian friendship cannot be called altruistio
It ms;y or may not be that egoism is the only alternative to altruism.
is, then Aristotelian friendship is egoistic, not altruistio.

If it

Indeed, this is

the usual way Aristotle refers to it, inasmuch as he insists that love of

.

others i8 based on love of self, as well as resembles it.

26

Q1e of the queationa which Aristotle treats toward the end of the books on

friendship is what self-love ('flA4ur/a-) really means.

It 1s by far the

commonest way of 8pea1d.ng, to condemn the man who is taken up with himself •
•

of human morality in general, as opposed to the cosme Good that 1s based on
the idea of Ood.u Thus Aristotle's distinct contribution is the re-re1ation of
this human value to the beings that generate. it rather than to some 'Universal
principle whioh logically subsumes it. But such an advanced preCision in the
.understanding of friendship does not of i taelf constitute any more deeply
personal view than haa been shown to be the cue.

28

Of. the whole of IX, 4, in which the parallel between self-love and love
of others has already been described by Aristotle, and IX, 8 J the ohapter from
which the following discussion is drawn.

130
We censure those who put themselves first, and 'lover of self' is used as
a term of reproach. And it is thought that a bad man considers hi.m8elf
in all he does, and the more so the worse he is. • .whereas a good man
acts trom a sense of what is noble, and the better he is the more h~ so
aots, and he considers his friend's interest, disregarding his own. 9
'Ib this viewpoint Aristotle opposes another way of spea1d.ng whioh people reoog-

nize

tha~

every man 101e8 himself best and oannot help doing so.

His own long

demonstration, for example, that all the qual! ties of friendship are verified
also of selt-l0ve.

Or: the popular maxims that 't\'I) friends share one soul'.

ane

''iVhat's mine is thine', whioh amount to figurative ways of saying that friend....
ship overlooks otherness} or 'charity beeins at home', whioh states that love

for others begins with love for what is one f S own.3°

tove is not altruistic.

Aristotle solves the inconsistency of these views by ascertaining what eacl
side means by self-love.

Those then who make ita term of reproach call lOOn lovers of self when the,
assign to themselves the larger share of money, honours, or bodily pleasures J since these are the things which most .-n desire and set their
hearts on as being the greatest goods, and which according~ they oompete
with each to obtain • • • • Acoordingly the use of the term 'lover of self'
as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind
is ~ad. Hence self-love is rightly censured in those Who are lOvers of
self in this sense. • • • LB7ut if a man were always bent on outdoing
everybody else in acting just)i or temperately or in displa;r1ng artf other
of the virtues, and in general were always trying to secure lor himself
moral nobillt.,.., no one will charge him with love or self nor find an:r
fault with him. Yet as a matter of facj1such a man might be held to be a
lover of selt in an exceptional degree.

291168829-35.
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This new sense of self-love is of course not a familiar one, and so Aristotle
sete out to show in the passa;:'e immediately following that it is not onl¥
justified but is actually a truer way of speaking _ The argument is a simple
one.

A person can be said to love his capacities for intellectual and moral

excellence beeause he seeks their good, that is, t.heir dewlopment and tulfilment.

Now this capacity of his for intellectual and moral excellence is

-

what we mean by his self_Therefore in seeking the tultilment of his
intellectual and moral capacity' he is seeking the f'ulfiJ..nt. of his very selland in seeldng the fulfilment of his very self he is by that fact loving it.
"Therefore in all spheres of praiseworthy' conduct is 1t manifest that the good
man takes the larger share or moral nobill ty for himaelf'.

In this sense, then,

as we said above, it is right to be a lover ot self, though self-love of the
ordinar.1 sort is wrong_ n32
It stands clear, then, what sort of goods they are that 1IOst befit the
capacity of man for nobility_

"CIJt is the most dominant part of himself

that he indulges and obeys in all

things."3~ Whether the Ideal is eonceived

in terms of moral excellence in the manner of the earlier-oomposed parts of the

Ethics. or in terms of leisured reflectlon on the structures of the universe
in the manner of Aristotle t s .ore developed doctrine-it is much the same

32U69a3 )-b2. This is the paragraph by which Aristotle sumarizes the
whole argument of the chapter, and is the most succinct statement of his notion
ot selt-love, though it lacks his usual emphasis that this also the most pr~~
sense ot selt-love.

33U 68b31.
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reality in either case, namely, the presence of an order in human life that
lifts it beyond itself toward the uncondi tionedness of di vini ty.

This has been

established in other parts of the Ethics, and does not call for special enlarge
ment at this point.

Instead, Aristotle's concern is to establish the important

second term of his argument., that a man's true self is this aapaeity of his tor
excellence.
He does so by showing how attention to this capacity and devotedness to

developing it is really a triumph of selfhood.

First, because it is the domi-

nant part of the compos! te which is man, reason may rightly be called the man,
that is, the chie!' part

JJJq

be taken tor the whole, just as the ruling body of

a state is properly taken for the state itself.

Next, Aristotle finds the

dominion of mind in the man who is praised for being self-controlled.34
-BeSides, a man is called self-controlled or lacking in self-control depending
on whether his reason is in control or not--w:L th the implication that reason is

the man. n3S

Finally, Aristotle turns to the fact that it. is the acts which men

perform in conformity to reason that they ccmsider most truly' their"awn, not
those which have as it were just happened or happened despite their better judg

men~6 In this sense it is only those actions Which arise from our effort and
are tree and are reasonable which ... claim tor our

01111.

Because of this,

3~e 'WOrd erl<pa.-n)s and its privative a..kpa:rr)5 lack in Greek the explic t
reference to self that their English equivalents have.
3SU68b44. (Tr. J.D.)
361169al,2.
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certain actions which arise from our effort and are free, thus ful1'il the
usual. condi tiol18 for responsibl11 ty, are still not claimed for our own in the
same way as those which have the turther quall ty of reasonableness. 37
From each of these viewpoints, then, it is the domination of the man by

his highest powers that consti tui;es his real. loyalty to himselt.

Aristotle

could go on to a consideration of what the selt-love is that is manifested in

-

the ambition and self-seeking of a corrupt man-what the self is when it is not
one's reasonableness and nevertheless 1s something; what it is when in fact 1t
is the base of values to a man who lacks a true sense of values.

But, as

happens, Aristotle does not undertake to consider this aspect of experience,

-

and concentrates instead on the selt whioh is the center of true value..

Thus

he can speak of a self-love that is wrong, and in the same context insist that

real self-love is al....ays right.
both statements.

Clear:q, self does not mean the same thing in

But in last analysis it is only' the second sense of the word

37 There appears somewhat of a diaerepancy with Aristotle's USl%al theory
of moral actiOns, but see St.ewart., II, 3791 ' "The acts of the rational agent
represen t a consistent and single personall ty to which we always refer them,
whereas the acts of the b.lCpa.nJ$ represent merely the prevalence for the time of
certain ernf:)u;u{o.." , and are regretted and as it were dLsowned, by the man
twben he comes to himself' again. Ckl this ground the acts of the rational
agent are spoken of here as volunt!tl in a higher sense than those of the
b.l<pa.r6f. But it must be remembered t.hat the doctrine of the 'lbird Book (and
we have no reason to suppose that Aristotle wishes to modify it here) makes no
eractical difference between acts done K4ra.A6yoVj and those done C>t'emBI1M(a,v
~ bL4. Bu,.u..t5v , .Sl!! voluntary. U our good act. are voluntary 80 are also our
bad acts. • • • We may say perhaps that • • •the statement is made in the
spirit of the 'metaplv8ic of Ethic8~1t

that Aristotle has seen fit to examine.

True self is the capacity for the

Ideal.
By way of closinG the discussion of true self-love Aristotle sketches out
a number of paradoxical s1 tuations in the life of the man of excellence in whicl
he seems to relinquish his claim to goods which would contribute to his state
excellence.

But this forgoing of excellence i8 only an apparent ona.

is only one thing for which the man of excellence may be said t..':> have

o~

For ther.
greed,

and that is excellence itself:
But it is also true that the excellent man's conduct is otten guided by th.
interests of his friends and of his count17, and that he will if necessary
181' down his life in their behalf. For he will surrender wealth and power
and all the goods that men struggle to win, if he can secure nobility tor
himself, since he would prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of a
mild enjoyment, a year of noble life to l1l8D1' years of ordinary existence,
one great and glorious exploit to many small succeSBes. And this is
doubtless the case with those who give their lives for othersJ thus they
choose great nobility for themselves. Also the excellence man is ready
to forgo money if by that means his friends may gain more money, for thus,
though his friend gets money, he himself achieves nobility, and so he
assigns the greater good to his own share. And he behaves in the same
manner as regards honours and offices alsol all these things he will
relinquish to his friend, for this is noble and praiseworthy fo.r himself.
He is naturally therefore thought to be· virtuous, as he chooses moral
nobility in preference to all other things. It may even happen that he w1l '"
surrender to his friend the performance of some achievement, and that it
may be nobler for him to be the cause of his friend's performing it than
to perform it himself.
Therefore in all spheres of praisewor~ conduct it is man1fel~ that
the good man ta~s the larger share of moral nobility for himself. J
This series of

~)aradox1ca1

Aristotelian virtue.

statements brings out in relief the nature of

The good man focuses all actions (even acts which few

13$
would scruple to call highly altruistic) on the development of his own

perfection.
SUch a focus has an egocentric tone which it is hard not to notice.
egocentrism is not easily reconciled with an outlook of un-selfconcern.

BoW'

Hence

the question of Aristotle IS egocentrism is directly pertinent to the present

discussion and calls for examination.

It is in Book Four, in his long chapter

on the virtue of pride, that Aristotle BIOst fully t.reats this aspect of human
desire.
In passing, it is especially interesting to take notice of the tirst in

Aristotle's list of those goods which the man of excellence is wiling to relinquish for the sake of greater nobill ty.

This willingness of a man to give up

life itself because of an Ideal at once remarkably transcends the quasi-egoistic
context in which it 1s found, and nonethelass unmistakably belongs to it.

The

series of paradoxes centers its most strildng reality in this particular
instance.

The same situation, moreover, 1s to be found as conclusion in the

l1ne of argument which arises in discussion of the meaning of the virtue of

human pri de.

-

--

The Ideal in Pride

Pride (rera,{otpux/a,) is the quality of a man wbo possesses excellence

and knowa that he does and cherishes that excellence.

The proud man ts attitude

toward himself is best expressed by Aristotle's brief description of him:

"He

he high self-esteem and his estimate is right. n39 High self-esteem of this
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kind would be offensive in the extreme if it were not based on truth, for
Aristotelian pride knows nothing of self-depreCiation.

40

It is true insofar as

the esteem whioh the proud .man has tor himself is esteem for an excellence

4'1:xeept (U24b3l) in an ,)ccasional ironic tone and turn of ph:oase with
inferior persms. Otherwise, it is the opposite of what;. is oommonly meant by'
humility. Ct. Raokham, IV, iii, 1, notel ~rdLopu;rta, ~imitas, means
lofty pride and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-l'l&ss (in the
.,dern senSe of the word).1t Thus Aristotle marks out for praise a quality W'hic
is more commonly looked upon as a fault, with preferenoe shown lnstead to sel£'depreciation, a tendency to cover up one's excellence even to a point of being
unaware of it o~e8elf.
Yet pride is not arroganoe. Aristotle characterizes arrogance as a false
torm of pride that i8 found in men haughtT and insolent--urrep 0 1l'"raL and
rJ{3pL(f''ra( - who have an abundance of goods like birth, position, power, but
lack the necessary quality of moral excellence, thus despise others and treat
them rudely in order to give themselves a specious superiority (112ha2'-b1).
Nor is pride equivalent to vanity t this fault is the characteristio of persona
who want to be thought more than they are, thus it falls short of pride, which
claims respect for excellence truly possessed (1l23b9, 112$&28-33).
Again, if the desoription given still seems extreme, it is to be remember.
both that Aristotle himself admitted this ton. while nevertheless maintaining
that it 1s an extreme that. stays within the bounds of virtue and does not err b
exoess or falsity as its related vices do (1123bl3-l,), and that the pioture is
of an ideal man who can be as perfect as the example requires him to be, while
all aetual men are leS8 exoellent and, being honest With themselves, will feel
themselves acoordingly les8 entitled to sel.t'~steem. Cf. Stewart's '(I, 335-7)
remarks on the abstractness of the descnption: "This spirit in a real man
would be intolerable. But Aristotle'~erc:f'(6~UXos is not a real man. He is an
ideal oreation in philosophy, a8 Philcctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is
Aristotle's concrete presentation of that {)ewp{ a, which is easential to human
excellence. He 'contemplates- thek~oS" or beautiful harmoD7 of his OVll natur ,
and allows nothings external to it to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus
realises a:?t.rt5.p/C"e/A or autonoDU, and 'poss88ses all the virtues' in a iuller
sense than other virtuous men, who are oonsoious ot the moral law merely throng
theirtpDllrJtf'lf, or prl'.otical insight and selt-knowledge. Th~era,(6p"'X0S' is a
man of the highest ~cuta~ive power • • • • The desoription of the~era~~~(OS
in tm F.t.hics ls ra
tho iiiise en soene of Aristotle's doctrine of the a~ nfpKeLtN ot the eU'Oa.~//. in"""the trfe ot Reason, than a portrat t-sketoh after
the manner of 'rheophras tus • "

er
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which he really does possess.

There can be no such thing as rightf'ul pride

aside from the presence of such excellenoe, the esteem is a good thing, a
'Y1.rtue, because it recognizes a good for what it is.
The exoellence reterred to here 1s not exactly specified.

Suoh excellence

is simply the possession of all the virtues, e.g. courage and fairness, for it

is the quality

~hLch

makes a man a good man

(a~~~"s ).41 But

pride is

unthinkable without the excellence that it is an esteem for.
Now the proud man, since he deserves JIIOst, JllUst be good in the highest
degree; for the better man always deserves IJV:)re, and the best man most.
Theretore the t:rul.y' proud man JIIWIt be good. And greatne.s 1.n e"17 virtue
would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it would be most unbacoJli.ng for a proud man to tly from danger, swinging his 8l"lI8 by his
Sides, or to wrong anotnerJ for-to what end should he do disgraoeful acts,
he to whoa nothing is great? It we examine hill point b;y point, we shall
see the utter absurdity of a proud man who is not good. Wor, again, would
he be wortbT of honour it he were bad; for honour is the prize of virtue,
and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a 80
ot crOWD. of tne virtues, for it mak&S them greater, and it is not found
wi thou t thea. 42
If there is a:nything that the proud man seeks it is honour.

For honour is

the outward recognition of excellence possessed, only an outward good, it is

4lHere, as in most of the early books, the excellence present to the mind
or t.he author is, as far as the writings themselves show, an excellence of
character. Not until the last book of the Ethics is the excellence of
refiection reestabllshed as the crowning excellenoe. Cf. the pr&aent study, IV
3, first part; Ross, pp. 232-h, on Aristotle's subordination of moral to
intellectual aetivi ties as contrasted with his great emphasis on the moral in
the earlier part of the Ethios) and IBonard, ah. V, 2 n<ppo.vy)(n:r et Z-Opl.'f:N
dans 1 'Ethique l Nicomaque·, 'or an extended development of the tenSion between
tne two lives, their unity in the hierarchical unity of the person Who employs
prudenoe in action to maintain the conditions requisite to wisdom.

421123b28-1l24a2.

(Tr. Ross.)
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nevertheless the highest outward good.

It is the only good, tor example, that

one would seriously think of ottering to men of high station or to the godator these alreaQf have everything they need in the

~

ot other goods,

espeoially the inner good whioh constitutes the excellence proper to them, and
the only thing that can be possibly added to them is the admiration ot perSOll8
who recognize their high excellence. 43

But this admiration is atter all only

an outward good, it takes its meaning from the excellence which it recognizes;
let it come or go, it will not mace any intrinsic difference to that excellence
It is an embellishmant and nothing more.
toward honor.

ThUll the proud man is detached even

He enjoys the esteem of perBons whose opinions are worth some-

thing (the acclaim at the rabble means nothing to him at all), but i8 not at a
loss without it, tor he has what is beyond price.

He may be thought haughty" tOJ

this detachment, yet he has reason for his attitude. 44
It is this cherishing of excellence that is most typical of hi..

It is the

basis of his spirit of independence, of his calmness in the face at
circumstances that would make others

d1stur~d,

of his reluctance to" commit him-

self to undertakings without serious reflection on their consequences, heree of
his reserve and general tone of deliberateness and dignity.45 For this reason
too he does not like to be under obligation to others tor tavors conterred on
him; he preters to be on the giving-end in such transactions.

431l23bl6-24.

'lhus he considers

This recalls Aristotle's description at the activity which
1s proper to divinity. a lite whose sole con'~ern 1s the pure objects of thought

44U2 4a5-20.
4SlI24b24-32, ll2'al3-l6.
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degrading any torm of subservience to persons who are in a position to benefit
him, and is apt to be distant with them, while on the other hand he is well
disposed to helping others.

For b,y this attitude he keeps himself in mind of

what the true value is and disposes himself to acts, suoh as generosities, that
will inorease it. 46 He avoids boasting, rancor and meanness and spite, and
compla1n1ng; tor, the things that give rise to them are trifling matters llnwort
of his serious attention. 47

In outward possessions he is both independent and

llberal. 48
The tocus

ot the proud man ts attention, then,

and the goal

ot all his

efforts, is to esteem and increase the deposit of excellences which he carries
in his person.

Such an atti tude as Aristotle outlines here may sound ego-

tistical and not virtuous.

Indeed it is a point always open to question whethe

IU11 given person with this high regard tor selt-pertection would ever be really
more interested in the element of perfection than in the element of self_But
if one should be wUling to forgo enjoyment ot perfection tor the sake of
perfection in i taelt, the desire of selt-pertect1on need not in that' case at

46u24bl0-2.3,
47112.5&.3-10.

m'al-.3.

48 uFor he does not care much even about honour, which is the ireatest of
external goods more than power and wealth, Which are means w iy_ • • J he
therefore to whom even honour is a small thing will be indifferent to other
things as well." Again, "He likes to own beautiful and useless things, rather
than useful things that bring in a return, since the former show' his
independence more." 1l24al7-19J 112,all-13.

C

140
least conceal selfishness.
Now Aristotle's remarks on the good mants attitude toward danger and death

suggest that it is excellence rather than the self's possession of excellence
which commands his ultimate allegiance.
danger for trifling

l'easOIlB,

"The great-soulod man does not run tnt

and is not a lover of danger, becanse there are

tew things he values, but he will face danger in a great cause, and when so
doing will be ready to sacrifice his life, since he holds that Ufe is not

lfOrth having at every Pricee n49
This passing allusion in the discussion of pride recalls Aristotle's extended treatment of oourage in its own context in Book Three.
of keeping one fS balance in the face of fear.

There are

Intany

Courage is a so
kinds of courage

in this broad sense, as .III8l1Y as there are forms of evil that befall men; dis-

grace, for example, and poverty, disease, loneliness, pain, death.

But in its

strictest sense oourage has reference only to the last of these, death, which

tar surpasses all the other evils in dreadfulness.

And even here, .Aristotle is

not willing to oall any and every form of death matter for courage: "

rWJe

do not oall a man courageous for facing death by' drowning or
diseasee What torm ot death then is a test of Courage? Presumably that
which is the noblest. Now the noblest form of death 1s death in battle,
tor it is encountered in the midst ot the greatest and most noble ot
dangers.
70urage is sb:nl1 in dangers where a man can defend himselt
by' valour or die nobl¥, but neither is possible in disasters like shipwreck. And this conclusion is borne out by the Princip~ on which public
honours are bestowed in repubUcs and under monarchies.

Cc

U9U 24b7-ge
SOlllSa29-31; b4,5J a,32,33.

(Italics added.)

Death by drowning or
done about it.

b.1 disease is a death one accepts beoause nothing oan

But true courage faces a deat.h ifihlch it needn't face; true oour

age faces death because
thing to do.

be

un~er

the circumstances that is the right and fitting

"A man ought not to be brave because he is oompelled to be, but

because oourage 1s noble. lt51 Nobility is What counts oven more than life.
The noble (-r-o k:'a"(6v) is frequently mentioned in the course of

Aristotle's oonsideration of this Virtue, and is tightly bound up with his
conception of it.5
form and its goal.

2

And this quality is in turn bound up with activity as its
The value of the one is the value of the others.

For the courageous man feels and acts as the ciroumstanoes merit, and as
principle l1l.8Y diotate. And every activity aims at the end that oorrespon
to the disposition of which it is the manifestation •. So it i9 therefore
with the activity of the courafS8oue ll'.an: his courage is noble; therefore
its end is nobility" for a thing is derined by its end, therefore the

51m6b3. Utility also 1s rejected as
soldier's professional valor, i.e. the oalm
of danger and will retreat when real danger
hold that line_ Cf. 1115b2,3J 1116a,30-23;

52E• g • 1115b21-24; 1116al2-15J

a motive-in the sense of the hired
of a person who is used to the so
appears unless so_one forces him
lll7al0-22.

b); 1l17al1. J(a.,t6'v 1s the term most
commonly in use with Aristotle to designate those qualities to whioh the presen
study applies the more general term Ideal. See Rackham, note to I, lil, 21
"k"".{o'v is a term ot admiration appUed to wbat is correct, especially (1)
bodies wall shaped and works of art of handicraf't well made, and (2) aotions
well done it thus means (1) beautitul, (2) morally right. 1t Cf. Bonltz, p. 360,
b, 1-47, on Aristotle's uses ofkaMv, esp.17-20, its synonyms in desoriptions
of' moral character._ ws ()eZ, WS 0 A6ros, opews J and 2!!l. Aa- 731b25,
in forms of nature.

courageous man endures the terrors and dares $~e deeds that manifest
courage, for the sake ot that which is noble.
Courage is noble because it is the form of one ot the peaks of human activ1ty.

It comes into existence where a man is exercising the deliberateness

proper to him with a degree of intensity that is rare under less straitened
conditions.

'Ibe high pitch ot dartger works on the man's natural spiritedness

and rouses in him all the physical

8

iVJls of anger and tension.

Animals, it is

true, can show signs ot physical excitement too, but they are not properly
bra'tre.

In courage the element of deliberateness JllUst also be present and only

men can have this.

ItLTJhe

form. of courage that i8 inspired' by spirit seems

be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice

!!!i purpose

it

appears to be true Courage. ltS4 For it requires a great straining of human
powers to maintain oneself in the face of the greatest personal loss, the 105s
of life itself'.

"Now the JOOst terrible thing of all is death; tor it is the

end, and when a man 1s dead, nothing, we think, either good or evil can betall

531115b20-24. See Stewartts note, I, 288, on this pusaget "We see trom
this passage what a 'positive' conception of Nature underlies Aristotle's
'teleology t • Human nature is a bea.u tit'lll organism, and to be beautiful is its
raison dtc$tre. So a plant or animal. is its own raison .st!:w:v it pertorms the
functIons of i t8 nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection
• • • • If

Cf. ibid. II, 373, "The I<:a.'(tll" 1s the orderly work of YOU, or the active
Reason. Bel'iig VOY)Tt..- it can be apprehended tor what. it is only by I/o;;'s , or the
act! va Reason. An act. which, for the rational agent who has performed it.,
takes it due place as 1Ca.A.,sV' in an orderly system. of life, appears as an
isolated and transitory occurrence to the person who is merely af'fected by
it • • • • It

'~n7a4,5.

(Italics added.)

him art¥ more."

55

It is paradoxical t.hat the action in Which the perfect form of cOUl"age is
exercised is the

~ry

action in which the subject of the activity will be hin-

dered from enjoymept of it by pain or anxiety or even be destroyed, and that it
\

is the essenoe of his glory for him t.o "end\!l'e ,,,hinge -c.hat are terrible to a
!

human being and th"t Beem so to him. n56
,

The paradox is a hard one to resolve.

Henoe Courage! it-seli is attended by painJ and it is justly praised l
beoause it isi harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Not
Qut what it w~uld apP~8+ that the end oorresponding to the virtue of
Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the
attendan~ circumstances.
'lhis is illustrated by the case of athletio
contestss to boxers l for example, their end--the object they box for, the
Wl'Gath and the honours of viotory-is pleasant., bilt ,the bloW's they receive
must hurt them, being men of flesh and blood, and also all the labour they
undergo is painful. and these nainful incidentals are so numerous that the
final object, being a small thing,appears not to c~ntain ~ pleasure at
all.
By this example .Aristotle at-tempts to show how the true enjoyment of an actlv1V

may be overshadowed by the pains which it. involves in achievement, and is,

nevertheless, the motive which draws the athlete to his effort.
immediate~

In the lines

following these Aristotle applies the example to the case of a man

facing death.

Ye,t the parallel is not. exact (for death is a loss greater than

any pain and the man who dies does not 11ve to enjoy any ld.nd of viotory even a
diminished one) and Aristotle f s comparison falters:

"1ll5a27,28. Of. the present study, Ch. II, no. 2, especially notes 3h36 and the texts they accompany.

56U17 al6.

If 1;;hen the same is true of Courage, the death or wounds that it may bring
will be painful to~he courageous man, and he :1111 suffer them unwillingly; but he will endtlI'e tham because it is noble to do 50, or because it is
base not to do so. And the more a Juan possesses all virtue, and the more
happy he is, the more pain will death cause him; for to such a man life is
1,orth l'OOst, and he s"ta.'1ds to lose the greatest goods, and knows that this
is so, and this must be painful. But he is nom the less courageous on that
account, perhaps indeed he is more so , bocause he orefors glory in war to
the greatest prizes of life.
It is not true therefore of 0ver;y· virt.ue that its acti¥~ exercise is
essentially pleasant, save in so far as it attains its end.;11
Here Aristotle might have maintained the parallel with the athlete's
satisfaction in wreath and honors, by showing that the hero has a certain
enjoyment in antioipating the glory that will be his though posthnunously.
Instead, without exactly rejecting such an interpretation, he has ended the
passage with an ambiguous statement which appears to constitute an exception to
his general theory of enjoyment as a necessary accompaniment of activity.

For

t.aken literally, the stater:1ent 'WOuld suggest that Aristotle has envisaged at

least the oossibillty of an activity unaccompanied by enjoyment on t.he part of
its agent. 58

57 lU7a34-b16.
,SThn qualification "in so far as it attains its end" seeme to call in
question the fact that the activity has actually been achieved. For if every
activity is accompanied b:, a pleasure proper to it, then the act of courage will
have auleas'lre of its ownJ in this view, if pleasure is miSSing it is to be
presumed the activity has not taken plac~ or has not been completed. Yet in the
present oaee the activity has been oompleted, since what was intended was the
act of faclng up to danger;-ri'ot safety, and the former was achieved if not the
latter. The alternative to this interpretation would be that oourageous
activity is an activity improperly so-called. (I.e. not a single evepretfk as
such but a congeries of individual acts pleasant and painful, physioal and moral.
under a single name of bravoq-the sum of which would be enjoyable because of
the increased awareness and intensity which the danger and effort arouse,
despite the fact that the last of them may end up in pain and death.) But
Aristotle does not even consider it.
In his commentar,y on the passage Joachim merely rephrases Aristotle's
statement. then draws a conclusion from it which is inimical to Aristotle's

An tntel"Pretatton or this sort would be highly problematical; moreover the

amb1g'Uity of the passage in W'hioh the oooasion for it artses is Stlohthat

another, le8s difficult interpretation is
preferable.

poa8tbl~,

and for this reason

Irl the usual Aristotelian vie.. of. aotivity, as it has a;-,peared in

the oourS6 of the examlnation, every actlvity-.Yhether in tho striot sense of
the operation

ot some faculty, or tn

41"IO'S accompani.ed by a pleasure oorrcspondlng to t t.
only in i

t.8

..

the extended meaning or an act.ion-is

If

p1ea.-rure i8 viewed

narrower meaning one 15 hard-put to see any way in which the hero

who '!ive8 his life in battle can be said to enjoy his etion.

But U' it is

viewed in its deeper meaning, a sense of well-being in the poS.88ion

ot an

excellence, it 1s just as applicable to t.he hero at h1s hour of death as it 1s

gGneral theory of aotivity because it speaks of an aotivity that involves pain
in Its axeroise without a oompensating pleasure once tho activity is under way.
"Tb1s leads Aristotle to the general remark that, with regard to all the moral
virtues, we MUst say that good action is pleuant only so far as the agent
attains hie end t the actual aotivity will involve at least .frort and often
pain. It (p. 121)
"
stewart (r, 3(3) gives more attention to the pa."fS&ee, but without

resolving :1 ts dU'f1eulties. He quotes a passage from Orant ('fext and Commentar:
on the Nlcomaohean Etbics, lDndon, 1885) wb10b amounts to an antiaipatiC-gI017
Intei;retatloru "The <ieep moral pleasure which attaches to noble acts,
Aristotle describes as trlwapbing over even the physieal pa1n and outward horro
whieh lDIV' attend the exeretse of oourage. And he acknowledges that in many
cues this mq be the only p1ea:.m1"e attending upon v1rtuons actions. tit Stewart
hi_elf distincutshss the activity of !)I'aVeneS8 from other kinds of activity in
that the others do inwlva enjoyment 1n their performance eftn U' sllch enjoymen
is not spontaneous but ha~ to be learned, while actions fl /<Q.....,.a, 70va.vdpeCav
however are not thus in themselves pleasant. They are 80 patnM that it 1s
onq the man who has "the strongest interest in the cp.lef encl, who will bring
himself to perform them. It
No doubt the difrtcu.l ty is ultimately 'the unraoolvabla one of trying to
apply Aristotl.ts theory of acta that are psyehopl\Ysioal to acts that are moral
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to the wiseman in his lifelong reflection and to the gentleman decently enjoyi
the good things of life.
It is not a protracted enjoyment ot excellence, of course, since it ends
almost as soon as it begins •. Thus it seems to lack the lastingness which Aristotle earlier has required of happiness. 59 But this moment of intense joy is
not the only happiness and enjoyment that the hero has ever lmmm, for by supposition he has led his whole life in the pursuit and attainment of excellence.
The lOOment of self-sacrifice, then, has to be seen in the context of the mants
whole life-indeed, as its climax.

lIhether the final awareness of moral excel-

lence is enjoyed by the hero (111is remains the more probable interpretation of
Aristotle), or whether the pain and sorrow that attend loss of life cause the
joy to be clouded over:

-

this is not primarily what matters in Aristotle's

understanding of heroic virtue, nor is it What occupies the hero's ai-nd.
element that matters is the achievement of excellence.

The

When the primacy of thi

oonsideration is grasped, the chief point of Aristotle's treatment of the
problem has received the understanding it

ca~ls

for.

The hero who faces death bas made of his pers en the container of an exeel-

lence of the highest order, a value--nobility--whioh deserves well of him and
has received as it deserves) and his awareness of this presence is, if only for
the briefest of moments, a joy that surpasses any other.

This is the meaning

the paradoxical statement which closed Ar1.stotle' s consideration of' selt-Iove t

59"HapPiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete
lifetime. tf 1100a5. Also, 1098418-20.

0
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a concern with the Ideal so genuine, a man tlwill surrender all the goods that
lOOn struggle to win, if he can secure nobill ty tor himself'1 since he would
prefer an hour of rapture to a long period of mild enjoyment, a year of noble
life to many years of ordinary existenc':l, one great and glorious exploit to
many small succeases.,,60 Here the diverging lines of Ideal and self-concern

meet.

In his act of greatest un-selfconcern the hero has found his greatest

joy.. a joy, it might be said, without personal reference t

for at the moment

0

sacrifice the self ceases to exist which alone could receive compensation for
its loss.

Despite this the hero has deliberately faced up to his loss, has in

fact gone out to meet it; and i"t is only because of this that his act has the
stature it has.

It is possible to say, then, that to such a man the Ideal has

meant more than his own selfhood.

6011,69&21-24. See Stewart, II, 381,2, on this pMsage I "We see how far
removed the q>,,iauTfa. of the good man is from ordinary self-seeldng. For the
sake of the Kal.t5" the 9'tiauToswill lay down his life. He will not cast it
carelessly away as inferior men, falsely called courageouS, do under the
influence of anger or other exci t&ment, but will lay it down rationfllly for th
sake of his ideal of Human Perfection. He knows that Human Perfection, unlike
the Divine Perfection which is realised in One oternal Being, is realised in a
succession of mortal beings. The mere prolongation, as such, of a mortal life
he sees to be a matter of little moment, because Bm:nan Perfection is secured
by the succession of lives. He cares only for Human Perfection, and if he
finds that he can further it by doing something that can be done only at the
cost of his own bodily life, he gladly lays down his life. Here &.11 the
ordinary motives operating within the region of the sensibility are lett behin ,
and the agent rises into the sphere where aotion is determined b.Y 'reverence
for law universal.' Thus the doctrine of fP,-iau.:r {4- I whioh in its highest fo
amounts to 'self-sacrifice f I belongs to what JDlJ.Y' well be called 'the Metaphy'sl
of Ethics'. That there is such a t}letaphyslc t is surely a great practical
truth, attested by the fact that men are found thus read¥ tD lay down their
lives."
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3. Aristotle's Doctrine as Concern for the Ideal
It would seem to be only Aristotle's occasional way of speaking that standi
in the way of an unqualified affirmation of this conclusion.

Admi ttedly, an author's 'If.al of speald.ng is not without ita own significancE.
For a perceptive interpretation of the various more or le88 spontaneous turns 01
expression that appear in an author will reveal facets of his personality which
the author did not have in mind as his purpose in writing and which he may evan
have been unmrax-e of.

But this 1s a matter of interpreting his personality and

not precisely of understand.tng his philosophy, biography not exegesis.

'lhe per-

son md the philosopher are the same man, of courso, and his person 1s truly tht
matrix of his philosoplT'/J hence a batter appreciation ot the one can illuminate
the other.

But an understanding of Aristotle's philosophy basically consists it

a grasp of his thought explicit and implicit; in other words, it seeks to know
what notions .Aristotle actually developed in the course of his thinking, and
what were the habits of thought which directed his thought-processes and would
presumabl)- have directed his thought if he had taken up other problems or gone
further along lines he had already entered.
Something has already been said about the personality-reveali.ng turns of
Aristotle's language in contrast with the apersonal orientation of his philosopbicall7-developecl standards.

For the present that is enough.

low is it pos

sible that the %OOre personal elements of Aristotle '8 experience would eventual!;
have had an influx on his philosophical work which they did not have up to the
time ot his latest writings?

Such always remains a possibility.

Yet, if the

considerable development that Aristotlets philosophY underwent was toward a
greater attention to the realities of direct human

e~erience

rather than

tow~
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a more person-regarding standard,61 his later development of a personal orientation is unlikely though not impossible.

Meanwhile it is not with soma posslbJ e

reversal of Aristotlets philosophioal direotion that the present

st~

has been

conoerned, but with the dootrines and attitudes whioh belong to the philosophioal direction actually to be found in Aristotle's writings.
Thus it has appeared that when Aristotle approaohes questions such as the

meaning of human happiness, the relation of enjoyment and aoti'vit,., the finding
of happiness in reflection, and in the areas of friendship, self-regard, honorhe tends oOll8istently to focus his estimates of value on the Ideal whioh oonstitutes the exoellenoe of these states rather than the person in whom the
Ideal is present.
This examination, oarried on in the oontext of the Ethios, has thus been
restrioted to one area of Aristotle ts thought, though a oentral one.

It haa

alao recognized the importanoe of further ascertaining the direction and developments of Aristotle's thought in a number of non-ethioal matters whioh touch
questiOns

61

t~ated

'.
in the Ethios, but has had ,to leave these attars to

As appears to have been the oase, for example, in the developing orientation of hi~ ethical theory from the religious tone of the early ~latonism found
in his primitive ethios and in 1Ietaphyaics to the world-eontemplative spirit
of the latest period, that of the Nicomaohean Ethics and the introduotion to the
Parts of Animals. As remarked before {note ~'l), the increasing personuness to
WhIch Jaeger has referenoe amounts in fact to a greater concentration on the notiora quoad p.os, but still with the individual viewed only from the aspeot ofita being a momentary embodi.men-t of "he Ideal. Of. also note 4, and Oh. I,
note 2.
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settlement in studies other than the present.
(he suoh pertinent area 1s the Aristotelian theology.

Besides the questio

of how Aristotle arrives at his dootrine of God, the uniqueness of the First
Mover, and the nature of his oausality throughout. the universe, is the question
of what

th~

Aristotelian God is in himself'.

The author's expansiva description

of certain aspects of God, notably the divine salf-knowledge and self-enjoyment
is in contrast to an otherwise apersonal oharacter.
universe simply by being

knOWf'.

For God moves the whole

of, and this without having any active interest

in the universe or even any If:oowledge of it.

This view seems to grow system-

atioally out of the Aristotelian universe io its gradations of actuality and
po'i;.entiallty, and is cOllsistent with Al'istotle 'a doctrines of final causality
and of knowledge.

The mre personal notion of' God is present in Aristotle's

theology t.oo, though its pnusence is rendered enigmatical rather than clarityi
because of the apersonal oontext in whioh it is found.

It 1s part of

Aristotle's tradH.lon-respeoting way of' speaking but is elaborated
philosophioally as well.

Whether or not it ,can b9 1.educed from the "systematio

notion of God which predominates is a problem in itself.

Also problematic a

suggestion of' divine interest in human affalrs,62 and an inclusion of enjoym3nt

62500 1179823-32, viz. "For if, as is generally believed, the gods
exeroise sorre superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to
suppose t.hat they take pleasure in that part of man whioh is best and most akin
to the_elvea, namely the intellect, and that tIley recompan&e with their
favours those men who esteem and honour thls most, because these care for the
things dear to themselves, and act rightly and nobly."
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among the divine characteristics,63 though the Aristotelian notion of

&.~

implies a sort of distinction between excellence possessed and subject posseBSing it.

In short, it seems possible from the viewpoint of the Aristotelian

notion of excellence (actuality) and possessor of excellence (capacitypossibility) to see Aristotle's First Yover onlY as
not as a PEss.ssor of excellence.

~~e

totality of excellence

For Aristotle's treatment of the possessor

or subject of an activity always regards it only from the aspeot of its being a
capaci ty for the activity to take place, and not from the aspect of i. ts being
some kind of reality prior to its capacity-ness.
subject of

Hence any notion of God as

~tivity is self-contradictory,64 The question which ari8eB from

63See 1154b25-28. flFor if any .man had a simple nature, the same activity
would aftord him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enJoys a single simple
pleasure perpetually. It Also lIet. l072b14-16 f The life of God is "suoh as the
best that we enjoy, and enjoYbut for a short time (for it is alwqs in this
sta te, whi ch we canno t be J) since its ac tuall ty il3 also pleasure. It

64The

distinction between perfection and ground-of-perfection in human acti·
vity and unmixed perfection in divine activity is developed at lengtl\ by Jan Van
dar Yeulan, Aristoteles: Die Mltte in Seinem Denken (Ileisenheim/Glan, 1951), .
!who concludes from the argii'ii8'nt of ~~SiCS :;r that the full reality of the
~istotelian God consists in his being t e totality ot determinateness, or
~etiniteness, without however being anything determined, that is, without being
Ia subject (p.283). Men, on the other hand, go beyond the determinateness which
the lower animals and other beings possess and in their own ways develop, by
"he special human characteristic of openness to higher values, by their capacity
to become in soma lim1 ted degree (for they are bodily, and, even in their
immaterial powers, potantialH.ies rather than actualities) all things, thus
leave the restriction of determinedneBs-to-one-thing-alone behind. "In diesem
~einem wirksam8l1 Sein 1st jegliches Seiende aut Gott als das reine Sein selbst
bezogen, ja 8ein Sein ist nur dleser BeZllg, und sonst nichts." (p. 286) With
~eterminateness as theUI'timate meanine of reality (oEia{Q.l1 cf. pp. 282, 31~6), the aspect of being something in which determination COABS to take place is
~l tiJDateq or no significance and can be dispensed 'Wi. th in God.
The problem ot
~he primary sense of reality is the same question that underlies areas of
~er1ous ambiguity elsewhere in Aristotle's doctrine as well.
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these considerations, then, is whether the Aristotelian God fS good consists
totally in his sheer ideal! ty, or also in his being a subject of existence.

It

cannot mean the latter if being a subject implies no more than a capacity for
actualization.
Again, the question of Aristotle's notion of the composition of the human

being is important for an understanding of the value standard which he applies
to human activities.

The traditional difficulty of reconciling the lives of

action and of reflection in the Ethics 1s due not so IIlUch to Aristotle's
failing to subordinate one to the other (tor he accomplishes this in the last
pages of Book Ten), as to the uncertainty of the basis on which he does so.

The thinlci.ng part of man "is the man, or is so for the most part" and is the
source in him of worth.

But how man as a composite being and as a capacity for

activity is related to the element by virtue of which thought actually takes
place, is not clearly expressed in Aristotle, hence 1s a matter of dispute. 65
Yet on this point hinges the ultimate value of the individual.

---

whether the

excellence of knowing originates in him as an.- individual or whether his
'

individuality is only a place in which the actuality of knowledge, originating
in some other source outside him, may be poured as into a

reoeptacle~

In the

one case, the qualities of the Ideal, its excellence, eternaliq-, unchangeableness, will find their ultimate reference in the subject, who reveals his own

65(.b the problematic un1 ty of the soul as form of bodT and as immaterial
source of thought, cf. Giacomo Soleri, L' Immortall tAl dell' Anima in Aristotele
(Turin, 1952), esp. Ch. VII, "Il Probleis. aelt' Iiitellettott , ~int&; fIrst
part of Ch. vnr, "Vete e Limite dell' Immortalita in Aristotele"; and in
commen~ on the conclusions of this
, study, Augustin Mansion, "L' immortal1te
de 1 t ame et de 1 t intellect d t apres Aristote" I Revue ,Philosophigue 2!.
IDuv&1.n, 1953, pp. 444-72.
~
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transcending inner-reality by producing them in his activity.

Otherwise, that

is, at mere capacity, the individual as such lacks significance.

--

And this ambiguity in Aristotle.s psychology points back finally to the
metaph,ysioal question what reality
philosophy.

,

,

(OU<I"'L t:L )

.means in the Aristotelian

whether there is anyone sense of reality to whioh the variety of

uses of the word can generally be referred.

It ma;y be that Aristotle never

tries to systematize his use ot the terml nevertheless it is conceivable that
his use J/JIJY tend to keep one general orientation.

If so, two general

orientations of meaning suggest themselves as possible t
(the existing subject), or

oc.. (J"t

t:AJ

ou. u-(a"

as substance

In the former sense real1 ty

as essence.

will mean an eXisting being, in which certain perfections exist and others may
come to exist, but which is i teelf, beyond the perfections that may or may not

1'8&11 ty will mean essence or Ideal, what amounts

be found in it, a sort of radical perfection, a self.

In the latter sense

to the forms of perfection in

their uncondi tionedness and their indifference to existence in \his or that
subject.

From the one viewpoint the subject of an activity is a reality beyond

the level of i\.s activity and has significanoe on that countJ but in the other

-

viewpoint the subject is only a capacity or at beat an unconsidered x in which
a capacity is found.

It has been remarked already whioh ot the two

Aristotle'S general approach to value suggests.
This characteristic Aristotelian tendency to conoentrate on the formal aspeots of reality, on the knowable and assimilable patterns of reality in their
unchangeableness, unconditionedness, eternalness-il. short, this attentiveness
to the Ideal, is the quality to which Jaeger has reference in his closing
remarks on Aristotle'8 contribution to philosophy'.

The presuppositlon of this complete devotion to the oontetnplatlon ot the
world is the objectiv1 t,., to the ulttmate spiri t'Hll deptha or which we can
not penetrate, in which everything that Aristotle put out 1s steeped, and
which he bequeathed to R<allenietic science. ~e have already r.marked that
it is not to be oontused with impersonality, but is a sUE!p!Z"aonal torm
of the mind. It 1s as tar removed trom t.he artist1o-o63ect1.v1tq wlth"Whtc
'Prato-til Iit8 1f1'ltinga olothes his 8p1r1t\1al passion to transform. hUIWl
lite, as from that Thuoydtdean kind whieh escapes the pains of a !rIgbtful
hUtorical fate by regard1:Dg it as the necessary eourse ot events and
turning 1 t into poUtioal knowledge. In those two Attic wrt tel'S tr.e
struggle tor objectlvitq is the reaction of a selt that concentrates on
sovereign values and is passionately interested in 11te. In tJ:le1r cues
we oU8ht to speak of objeotIt1oatton rather than simple objectivity. The
objectivity of Aristotle is something prlaar.1. It expresaes a great
Berenit7 towarcla 111e and the world, which we look tor vainly in Attica
from Solon to Epicurua. It 1s to be found rather 1n Hecatae1l8, Herodotus,
Anaxaeoraa, Eudoxus, and Dtlmoeritus, much as theM man diUer tNm each
other. There is something psculiarly oontemplativa and non-traglc about
them. Aristotle, too, possessed that world-widE) Ionian hartson, ot whoae
soul-liberating breadth the broOding Attic spirt t had no lnkl1ng. At the
same time the essence of the Att10 spir1t bad a profound 1nnuence upon
him as it had upon Herodotus; it gave to his comprehensive {(fT'opfa. or
inquU.':y ita unity aDd strictness ot principle. Through these gifts he
became, what it -*as not vouohsafed to any of the Ionian oontemplatons
the uniVerH to be, the c0J2\P8ll1ng organillar ot :reality and ot science.

0u

~uoh

obj.ativeness ts the tendency of thought whioh the p:resent exa1natlon baa

which the personal eleman t could be axpecterlto be ot oentral

'.

i~rtanee.

Instead

ot the

pattiem

ot Ute and oontent of thought, a be-all and end-all ot a man who 1s

11•

person, however, the Ideal 18 at center of' bis thought-as

.Ar1stotl.e open to the oontemplat1on ot the ordar ot

thing.,

an objectiw

man.
<bjftCtivene••, t.hen, i. the note Whioh oharacterize. the Aristotelian ap-

proach to philosop!v'.
hapJ'lines. and

.m.r.v

It has lett ita mark in Aristotle's treatment of

well be traced in the otMr areas ot h1a thought.

As such
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it is a positive factor, to be discerned, examined, recognized for what it is.
It is also in its way a restrictive factor.

Aristotle's objectlveness maJ, by

a change of suffix which reflects a difference in critical viewpoint, be called
his obJectivism.

For, correspOnding to .Ar1,stotle'8 dominant attention to the

Ideal, is hi6 inattentiveness to the extsting subject in which the Ideal is
found.

Revealing i tael! in the direction in which

he doctrine tends to develo

itself if not in many of the attitudes present in his daily conduct of life, it
is his tendency to put the weight of philosophical concern on that aspect of
experience which is other than-in Jaeger-s VieW', beyond-the personal.
Aristotle's strong focus on the objective, projectible, structures of experienc
tends to draw strength away from his Vision of what must lie under the
struoture-the subject as a reality in itself prescindlng from ita signifioance
as repository of powers and capaoi ties.
This reverse-side of Aristotle fS objectiveness Jaeger calls with a certain
appropriateness Ifa supra-personal form of "t.he mind".

But such an (ixpression is

at least questionable if it suggests that the aspect of reality which .Aristotle
tends to disregard is inferior to the aspeot which he emphasizes.

Insofar as

reality and the experience of reality presents a twofold aspect, that of
objectively discernible struotllre and that of existing subject, a phUosophy
will oome short of its purpose of cota! comprehenSion of reality to the degree
that its foous on one aspeot of reality results, however unaVOidably, in
unfoousing its vision of the other aspeot.
Disoussion of the relationships of the two aspects, of the necessity of
both in a comprehensive expreSSion of reality, and of the effect of objectivism
in the work of Aristotle and of other philosophers, is a philosophioal question

r
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one of great moment.

But historical or exegetical study of an author, the

present study included, has as its proper purpose no more than to re-create the
thinker's actual train of thought as far as it can be discovered.

This

interpretative function is a work distinct from the critical and reflective,
though ultimately related to it, as memory is related to imagination and
understanding, and expertence in the past to inventiveness in the present.

r
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